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Abstract 
George Kelly's Personal Construct Theory, especially as subsumed within the 
cc conversational science" paradigm developed by Thomas and Harri-Augstein, is 
fundamentally a framework for a geometry of personal meaning in which all of the 
dimensions of distinction within a persons experience are like the dimensions of 
geometric space. A person's system of constructs is not just a framework for 
predicting the attributes of future events; it is a coordinate system for navigating the 
dimensionality of experience. The work of F. M. Alexander is primarily concerned 
with the "psycho-physical unity of the individual, " and thus with the continuity of 
experience. 
The present work has two aims. The first, drawing on the work of Merleau- 
Ponty and John Dewey, and culminating in the concept of "Conductive Reasoning, ") 
is to lay a theoretical foundation for a synthesis of the practical work of Kelly and 
Alexander. The primary premise is that the act of comprehending is an embodied 
act, and as such is as subject to the conditions of the coordination of the whole 
person as is any other act. 
The second, practical, aim has been to develop a conversational methodology 
for dealing with learning in a more fully embodied way. This method of "conductive 
conversation,, " formally derived from the "Learning Conversation, " evolved from the 
author's teaching experience with the Alexander Technique. 
Appendix 1, "A Conversational Introduction to Conductive Reasoning, " is an 
interactive conversational structure which incorporates a development of these 
concepts in the context of personal experiments for generating the kinds of 
experiences from which the reader may draw something of the intended meaning, 
and some skill in using the conductive conversational tools for exploring embodied 
dimensions in their own meaning. It is intended as a piece that will stand on its own 
as a conversational research instrument for personal scientists. 
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Chapter I 
1: MOMENTS OF INERTIA: A PERSONAL PROLOGUE 
1.1 Memoir of an Erstwhile Physicist 
I begin with the fundamental assumption that all meaning is personal-and 
that what is called knowledge is always a product or representation of someone's 
personal knowing. Thus a personal prologue is an appropriate starting place. My 
own story as a scientist began when, at the age of six or seven, I decided that I would 
grow up to be a physicist-a nuclear physicist, as I recall, because all I understood of 
what that meant at the time was that they were interested in the fundamental ele- 
ments of reality. As it happened, I left physics behind after earning my degree 
because, as I Joked at the time, I no longer believed in atoms, and have spent much 
of the time since trying to find my way back. Now, looking back over forty years, I 
find that for me "physics" has come to mean something far more intriguing to me 
than either the boy of six or the student of twenty-one could have imagined. During 
the years I have thought of as a frustrated struggle to become the scientist I had 
imagined, several strands of study and practice have braided together into a pattern. 
I take as my present task to delineate and elaborate that pattern. 
From the earliest days of my contact with physics and mathematics, I found 
myself involved with one-on-one tutoring of other students who found the subjects 
difficult, or with teaching classes for students whose interest in physics was broader 
and less intense than that of physics majors. From the beginning I found myself as 
fascinated by how people understood physical phenomena as I was by the physics it- 
self. Indeed over time I came to believe that just such personal understanding is 
what constitutes "physics7-that is, that the central subject of physics is not so much 
the material world as our comprehension of it, and thus that a fully unified physics is 
not possible unless it includes some reflection on the nature of how we comprehend 
our world. In my own case, while I worked at mastering the official paradigms of 
physics and their associated skills, I also had the good fortune to be subject to a good 
"Jesuit education. " I was able to pursue expanding interests in, among other things, 
philosophy, history and theatre. In particular it was at that time that I first encoun- 
tered the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and what 1 would call the 
cognitive ecology of Gregory Bateson. I found in them an articulation of what were 
becoming my personal research questions. Ironically, the area of physics in which I 
had the easiest academic success as an undergraduate was nuclear physics, ironic 
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because it was just at this time that I began to find the wider questions beneath those 
I had glimpsed when I first chose physics as my field. 
After a short tour with the Peace Corps teaching junior secondary school in 
Fiji, I embarked on graduate work in biophysics. My choice was, I now believe,, 
largely an attempt to blend my primary interest in the whole human individual with 
my desire to think of myself as a physicist. I found, however, that although I wanted 
to claim that my personal questions were essentially "biophysical" they did not fit 
into the construction of biophysics current at the university. My self-assessment was 
that I was a person with a great conceptual ability that was not being supported. This 
unsupported ability was combined with mathematical skills that were insufficient to 
take me as far as I wanted to go. I thus embarked on my long quest for what seemed 
to be a non-existent discipline in which I might work-and for a paradigin in terms of 
which I could make sense of the many threads of meaning I was finding. In what- 
ever academic guise I wrapped it, the field I was attempting to pursue was a sort of 
personal anthropology in which concepts played the role of the artifacts that reveal 
the underlying structure of a culture. From the level of the development of personal 
understanding to the social level of how common understandings evolve and how 
they underlie collective social action,. I kept finding a kind of structural continuity of 
relationship between thinking and acting. It was early in this period that I first en- 
countered the work of the two most central contributors to my current view, George 
Kelly and F. Matthias Alexander. It was to take me a number of years before I came 
to recognize just how central. 
I want to give an account of each of these major tributaries to my present 
work, but first it is relevant to point out that interspersed with periods of academic 
work there were important periods of teaching work, in both classroom and tutorial 
settings, and the experience I gained from that practice was at least as significant as 
anything I gained from my academic study. One event in particular seems. in one 
stroke, to have undermined all my efforts to follow the path I thought I was on and at 
the same time to have held open a new (or perhaps a much older) path. I met and 
began studying with Marjorie Barstow. Ms. Barstow had been , in 
1934,, the first 
graduate of F. M. Alexander's training course for teachers of his technique for what 
he called "psycho-physical reeducation. " He had developed the technique, now 
commonly referred to as the Alexander Technique, to put into practice what he had 
discovered about whole human functioning. In the 1970's Ms Barstow was a pioneer 
in working with Alexander's ideas with groups of individuals and applying them in 
the context of a person's personal activities, from "performance"' activities such as 
playing a musical instrument,, singing, dancing, etc. to such "everyday" activities as 
2 
Moments of Inertia: A Personal Prologue 
walking, writing, and reading. My "training" with Ms Barstow was not in the mold 
of the usual Alexander Technique training. As a student, assistant teacher, and 
eventually coordinator of her summer intensive workshops, I had much more of a 
classical apprenticeship in which most of my time with her was spent observing her 
work with hundreds of other people. As the quality of my own self-perception 
improved, so did my ability to see, and eventually to anticipate what she did with 
other students. I remember discovering that as I progressed I became better able to 
guess what she was going to do next and to understand why she had made that 
choice. I also recall the sense of independence I had as I became able to anticipate 
and appreciate what she did with a student and at the same time know that had I been 
teaching I would have made a different choice, and further that for me,, I would have 
been correct in doing so. Although it was outside the scientific and academic 
realms, I found in this work the beginnings of the new sort of biophysics of the 
whole person that I had hoped for. I gradually, almost reluctantly, became a teacher 
of the Technique myself, all the while fully expecting that my "real work" lay else- 
where. Eventually I was to learn that the way into that real work was to be found 
through rather than beside my teaching work. I had come to my first workshop out 
of curiosity rather than a need to solve a problem, and as my own teaching pro- 
gressed it evolved into my own personal action research. The domain of my 
research, the focus of my most intense curiosity, has been the nature of the experi- 
ence of whole human action. Since I cannot have enough experience of my own to 
satisfy that curiosity, I have found, in rich conversations with my students, in the 
context of their activities, a way to share in the experience of others and to engage 
them full cycle. It is in the practice of learning about, and helping another person 
experience their own whole psycho-physical functioning that the be ginnings of the 
theory of human action that I seek seem to emerge. Although most people first come 
with a problem of some sort to be solved, I have become over the years increasingly 
frustrated by the prevailing view of Alexander's work as a sort of cult of self- 
improvement. I share with Dewey the view of it as a method of self-investigation. 
In Dewey's view the importance of the Alexander Technique as a method by which 
an individual can generate new personal experience, indeed experience of a new sort, 
far outweighs any specific benefits that it might bring. In fact Dewey made two 
rather shocking statements about the implications of Alexander's work. When asked 
by his daughter Jane for a statement for a biographical entry on him in a book on his 
philosophy, he wrote, 
My theories of mind-body, of the coordination of the active elements 
of the self and of the place of ideas of inhibition and control of overt 
activities required contact With the work of F. M. Alexander, and in 
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later years his brother A. R., to transform them into realities. (Dewey, 
1939, p. 44) 
The second statement is from his introduction to Alexander's The Use of the Seýf in 
which he says of Alexander's technique that, "It bears the same relation to education 
that education itself bears to all other human activities. " (Alexander, 1932, p. xix) 
Much of my work has been about exploring what those two statements might mean. 
It was my desire to articulate the implications of this method of self-inquiry that led 
me to seek a convergence of Alexander's work with Kelly's. I 
Over the years I have come to think of myself as something of an experimen- 
tal natural philosopher. After my several less than satisfying attempts to make 
myself into a scientist of various sorts, I find that I have been a different, much ear- 
lier sort of scientist all along. In my graduate studies in the history of science I came 
to view two interwoven scientific traditions,, the one evolving from the formulaic 
worldview of the magical tradition and the other from the personal (I might now say 
conversational) tradition of shamaniSM. 2 The two traditions are not mutually exclu- 
siVe-and I believe that Science (With a capital S) must, in the end, incorporate both. 
So I have been pulled, over the years, between the childhood ambition to compre- 
hend the world from a physicist's point of view and the phenomenologist's recogni- 
tion of the primacy of whole human experience. The details of my years of struggle 
are of no importance here; indeed the paradox is that what seemed at the time to be 
failures to complete prior tasks now appear as unanticipated paths into an inquiry 
into my deepest personal questions. What emerges from them for me is a particular 
'Frank Pierce Jones, in an article titled "The Works of F. M. Alexander as an 
Introduction to Dewey's Philosophy of Education, " claimed that the justification for 
that title was that several of the concepts central to Dewey's philosophy found their 
concrete experiential sources in his work with the Alexander Technique and that 
though one might come to appreciate these concepts as abstractions by reading 
Dewey's books there is no way to know if such abstract understanding bears any 
close relation to Dewey's own. If, however, one were to have a similar personal 
psycho-physical experience With Alexander's Technique, one would have a basis for 
a shared understanding. Dewey wrote a letter to Jones in October, 1942, stating, 1 
have read your paper with much interest. I hope School and Society will publish it. I 
certainly endorse all you say about my work. I am especially struck by the truth of 
what you say about the difference between a kind of intellectual assent to certain 
propositions and beliefs and the concrete vital meaning they take on after an 
experience of their work. " This opens some intriguing possibilities for pursuing 
Dewey's view of the Technique as an experimental method for investigating 
philosophical questions. 
2The science of chemistry, for example , is very much a 
descendent of the magical 
tradition. 
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personal construct, or perhaps a tightly wound bundle of constructs, and a new per- 
ception of my own C, si I *tuation" not as a frustrated student pulled between two 
domains but as a curious person taking the whole human person in action as my field 
of inquiry. It is this experimental-and conversational-science of human action that I 
have been pursuing one way or another all this time. The focus of my interest has 
become steadily less academic and more personal. I have come to see that it is in 
myself, in the continuity of mind and body in action-what Dewey called "thinking in 
activity" and what Kelly called living "in anti cipation))-in my own coordinated self 
as a natural process,, that I begin to find the paradigm I have been seeking. Bateson 
liked to use the phrase "our own metaphor. " I have come to see that I am my own 
paradigm. 
1.2 Intuitive Physics: The "Presenting Problem" 
When I first began the work that was to lead to this dissertation I was inter- 
ested specifically in the understanding of "scientific concepts, II in particular those 
from physics, and their incorporation into daily life. What did it mean "to under- 
stand" a physical phenomenon? How did a person come to such an understanding? 
What did the persistent differences between common understandings and the 
"'official" view of concepts in physics reveal about the nature of our understanding of 
the world we live in? Was it possible, from the perspective of personal construct 
psychology, to construct an anthropology of public understanding of science? Stud- 
ies of science students' concepts had shown that there is often a great difference 
between the sort of understanding with which one can correctly answer questions on 
physics tests, for example, and the kind of underlying conception that structures 
one"s anticipations of physical phenomena. Whether the subjects were elementary or 
university students studying simple mechanics or graduate physics students coping 
with questions about the behaviour of light in relativity theory, they seemed to sort 
themselves into three groups: the majority whose understanding, after some struggle, 
came to more or less match (at least on paper) that of physicists (as portrayed 
by 
their teachers), those few who seemed almost naturally to understand things that 
way, and those whose understanding seemed not only at variance with it 
but indeed 
seemed to be very resistant to change. These other systematic or semisystematic 
ways of understanding were variously characterized as naive, pre-Newtonian, 
Aristo- 
telian, etc., the later two indicating that the concepts they contained seemed to mirror 
those of prior historical periods. One common explanation given for this was that, 
indeed, everyday experience is pre-Newtonian. For example, in most people's daily 
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experience continuing motion does require a continuing force to sustain it. It might 
be said that the key to the birth of modem science was the idea of asking what 
motion would be like under impossibly refined, mathematically "linear" conditions'. 
on frictionless planes, in a vacuum, etc. Since no one sees such conditions in ordi- 
nary experience, it is not surprising that many people have difficulty with such 
abstractions; they have no personal experience from which to abstract them. 3 A 
typical study in this field takes a particular physical concept or topic, momentum, for 
example, or electric currents, and proceeds to draw distinctions between the 
"official" concept and that elicited from a group of subjects, most often students of a 
given age. These studies are often made in the context of testing ways of helping 
students come to an understanding that is more like the official one. One curious, 
and often frustrating, finding of these studies is that it is quite common for students 
to acquire an abstract understanding by which they can be successful within the ab- 
stract context of a physics course. ) essentially playing an abstract game by abstract 
rules, while holding the same habitual intuitions about concrete events that they 
began with. For example, having given the correct answer to a problem, their expla- 
nation for why they believe it to be the correct answer is more consistent with their 
previous naive view than with the answer itself (at least according to the understand- 
ing of the researchers). 4 This mismatch between conceptual, abstract physics and 
"lived" or "intuitive" physics often has practical consequences. Even if a person 
30ne irony of this is that the understanding is called Aristotelian because Aristotle 
supposedly held a physical view that Implied that force was proportional to velocity 
rather than to acceleration, and this, supposedly, because he failed to allow for the 
abstract question, "How would the motion change in a vacuuniT, ) This 
characterization is ironic, and misdirected, since the argument from which 
later 
readers drew the faulty proportionality was, in fact, part of an argument 
for his claim 
that an actually existing vacuum is inconceivable. The murkiness of the whole 
historical recapitulation question was pointed out in an article titled, C. (Aristotelian' 
was given as the answer, but what was the question? " (Lythcott) 
This point is only 
significant here because it may often be the case that an individual who seems 
to 
have a distorted understanding from my point of view may in fact, 
from their own 
point of view, be doing something altogether different. 
4While conducting a physical science lab on Galileo's classical inclined plane 
experiment, I asked the students to predict what they thought would 
happen to their 
wheel as it moved on the plane and to explain why they thought that. 
They gave me 
many quite interesting answers. One young woman said that the wheel would speed 
up as it rolled because it was going down hill-and that it would go even 
faster due to 
gravity. J asked her after the lab if these were really two 
distinct effects for her and, 
after considerable pondering, she reported that they were. It was clear 
that not only 
her understanding, but the dimensions of her understanding, were 
different from 
mine. 
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teams how to give the correct responses to formally presented problems about mo- 
mentum,, they may still drive their car as if they had a very different understanding. 5 
A "constructivist" analysis of this persistent divergence between the physicist's view 
and that of the "naive"" person would lead to the conclusion that the significant dif- 
ference is in the level of abstraction of the construct dimensions being used. Much 
of training in physics, that is the development of skills not only analytical but percep- 
tual, involves assimilating a set of paradigms. This amounts to the adoption of a 
certain set of perceptual and conceptual dimensions along which one's experience of 
the physical world is organized. A key fact about these construct dimensions is that 
they are relatively abstract. That is, they subsume attributes of a wide variety of 
experiences, and thus the trained person's understanding of a given phenomenon is 
in terms of attributes that are relatively distant from those related to their immediate 
concrete experience of it. It may be possible to ((seeý`) angular momentum being con- 
served, but it takes practice. The understanding of the untrained person, on the other 
hand, tends to be in terms of dimensions that are more closely tied to that immediate 
experience. Quite often in my experience with students in this group I found that 
their difficulty in coming to grips with physical concepts was that they could not find 
appropriate perceptual or conceptual dimensions on which to construct a new 
understanding,. in particular, the dimensions of "before" vs. "after" some key event. 
Their expectations about where a physical process would lead were limited by the 
ways in which they could see the situation being the same or different. The 
underlying construct dimensions tend to be "orthogonal" to those of the "official" 
concepts. For instance,, the typical notion of the spring includes aspects of the 
concepts of force, momentum, energy, etc. which tend to be quite difficult to resolve. 
Both students and physics teachers often make the same classical assumption of an 
objective realm of things that have properties; they only disagree about what things 
have which properties. There have been many studies over the years that have 
attempted to map the specific concepts involved in various specific topics, as well as 
a few attempts to provide more general categories (such as diSes4s 
crphenomenological-primitives" or Guidoni's "natural thinking"). What has in- 
terested me most has been my observation that the orthogonality of these underlying 
"cognitive" subspace, but also encompass bodily constructs is not limited to a 
5A student of mine once related a contrasting example, the story of a high school 
physics teacher whose fon-ner students thanked him for the effectiveness of his 
teaching by relating stories of how their real, practical understanding of the 
; -P- principles they had learned from him helped them to act effectively in real 1,11; 
situations,, avoiding car crashes, etc. by not doing what would previously have been 
the intuitively obvious thing. 
7 
Moments of Inertia: A Personal Prologue 
(muscular, kinesthetic, emotional, etc. ) dimensions. Not only is it sometimes possl- 
ble to observe the bodily effects of, for instance, a person's attempts to build an un- 
derstanding of the concept of "force" out of their own muscular experience; it is also 
quite possible to see them "using" the interference of muscular tension or extraneous 
movement as the embodiment of cloudy thinking when they face a problem that they 
construe as beyond them. They literally, physically, prevent themselves from being 
able to solve the problem. So most of the time the roots of the problem of intuitive 
physics remain wholly unexamined. Questions about how abstract understanding 
derives from concrete bodily experience are researched and debated in abstract ways, 
and efforts to deal With the mismatch between the understandings of various groups 
miss a central point, that such understanding has as much to do with what we call 
"feeling" as With "thinking. " We debate the status of "external reality" yet assume 
that our own "felt sense" of internal reality is unquestionable. 
Thus as I continued to teach physics and philosophy in the classroom and 
mathematics etc. in tutorial settings as well as the Alexander Technique, a new set of 
questions evolved. These were essentially practical philosophical questions about 
embodiment and the relationship between the quality of thought and the quality of 
action. I became increasingly curious about the wider implications of Alexander's 
work. What did Dewey really see in that work? How are we to take his statement 
about the relation between the Technique and education? What is the "new field of 
enquiry" that Alexander thought he had opened? I naturally took that psycho- 
physical work to apply to the body-subject as Merleau-Ponty had descnbed it. The 
Alexander Technique is often mistakenly classified as a type of "body work. " Per- 
haps such a classification would be acceptable if what one meant by "body" were 
articulated on the basis of Merleau-Ponty's relational definition of body as one's 
mode of "being in the world. " What kind of a physics course might be derived from 
that articulation? 
Bringing these two areas together, what came to puzzle me most was the 
question of embodiment, particularly in relation to "understanding. " Just how is it 
that a person's conception of the phenomena of their physical environment is con- 
structed out of that person's bodily experience? Just how is it that my own self- 
directed movement becomes the paradigm for my concept of motion and force, etc.? 
How might it be that a psycho-physical personal science could form the foundation 
of a more human view of physics? 
Physics is commonly defined as the science of matter and energy. In its pre- 
Socratic roots it was a pondering over the fundamental nature of the material reality 
underlying human experience. At least as far back as Aristotle cmatter" was taken to 
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be synonymous with "potential. V) On the other hand, the very concept of energy is 
fundamentally one of relationship. So perhaps it would not be too poetic for me to 
claim that at its most basic, and its most general, physics is a science of potential and 
relationship, of what Dewey referred to as CC material consequence. " As physics is 
usually considered, the one thing in the universe which is left beyond comprehension 
is such a phenomenon as a physicist. Where in the physicist's model of the whole 
world is there a place for the one who is asking the questions, for the one who makes 
the model? I still believe that what I am about is at least related to physics-but to the 
physics of a world in which such things as physicists are conceivable. A fair 
question at this point would be, what has all this to do with human learning? In an 
address on "Hostility, " Kelly said of the term learning that it is "washed up, " that 
when personal construct "theory gets through with it it sounds like a synonym for the 
verb to hecome. " (Kelly, 1979 p. 272) 1 take the phrase "human learning" to refer to 
learning in this life-wide sense. And I take the act of learning, the process taken 
whole as my field of study. It is ultimately nothing less than a way of studying what 
it means to be a changing person. 
1.3 Towards a Wider Science 
I had originally intended this study to lead to new ways of thinking about and 
learning physics. That specific goal has become secondary to my endeavour to 
explore a wider "lived physics" though building such an approach on the present 
foundation may be a task for some later time. At its core, physics is a search for in- 
variants,, for those aspects of physical experience which remain constant in the midst 
of change. Physicists are seldom troubled by the questions of eternal fixity and 
change that Western philosophers have struggled with for two and a half millennia. 
This is because in the midst of their practice as physicists they live out just the kind 
of conversational construction of reality that Kelly proposes as our model of a human 
person living life ((. in anticipation" of the ways in which events may be replicated. 
An invariance is not a fixed entity, it is simply a way in which some bit of the world 
as experienced (e. g. measured) may be replicated. Given some interaction or process 
of interest,, an invariance is a clearly articulated way in which events as experienced 
from "here" and "there" or "before" and "after" will be similar. To say, for instance, 
that energy is constant is simply to say that certain kinds of interactions one may 
have with a physical system will give the same "result" after some process as before. 
It doesn't matter when we interrupt the process to measure the total energy; we will 
always get the same result. The search for invariants is simply a search for ways in 
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which experiences can be similar. Invariances are reasoned to,, not directly 
perceived; they are in the realm of what Aristotle called the "rational forms" of 
things. They are a matter of the dimensionality of potential physical experience, and 
the history of physics is a story of the quest for ever more general Invariants, that Is, 
for ways in which things are similar in the face of ever wider ranges of difference. In 
a sense, the search for universal theories is just a seeking after relationships about 
which one can say, "This will be the case no matter what else happens. " In this 
sense,, a physical principle might be considered as a construct generator-a means of 
generating new ways of anticipating the physical dimensions of events-and the 
"physics" is in the constructs. Two important points that can be drawn from this 
apply to the physicist as natural philosopher and to the ordinary person as intuitive 
physicist respectively. The first is that we get into trouble when, having recognized 
the dimensions of meaning in physical experience which lead us to things that 
continue to be true as conditions vary, we go beyond that to claim that they consti- 
tute "truths" which exist separate from any conditions. Interestingly, physicists seem 
to have less tendency to fall into this difficulty than do scientists working in other 
fields which they see as in some way "modelled" on physics. The second point is 
that what we mean by a "misconception" is often a misconstrual of the dimensions 
of "before" vs. "after" which lead us to anticipations that do not play out in subse- 
quent events. An incorrect prediction may be the result of an application of an 
inappropriate principle to a situation which I have perceived as an example of 
something else. If I do not construe the situation before some key event (a collision, 
a string breaking, etc. ) in appropriate ways, my expectations of what features of the 
situation will be the same after the event may be incorrect. If I know that what I ex- 
pect is not what is supposed to be the correct answer, I may give that other answer if 
asked, even though it does not "feel right. " This is how we can learn to give the 
"right answers" for the "wrong reasons. " Of course, both the physicist and the per- 
son can get into either kind of trouble. Having said that I have left specific issues of 
physics behind, I belabour this matter a bit only because, just as we will see later in 
the case of geometric space, the physicist is an apt model for a person striving to 
make sense of their experience. This is precisely because they, in their work as 
physicists, are doing just what we all do, but in a most formalized, intentional and 
or humans living abstract way. To consider a person "as scientist or to claim that f 
is a kind of science, is not to claim a primacy of intellectual abstraction but rather, 
exactly the reverse. Abstraction is the servant of anticipation. 
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11: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS 
11.1 Four Converging Streams 
The scholarly sources of my current understanding of the issues I have been 
wrestling with are primarily the works of, in order of their appearance Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, F. Matthias Alexander, George Kelly and John Dewey. There have 
been many other more peripheral contributors, of course, from several fields of 
study, but With some effort I have resisted the temptation to attempt to be 
encyclopedic and give a full accounting of them all. In fact, as the work has pro- 
gressed it has become more clearly centred on a certain intersection of the ideas of 
these four. Regarding many of the other writers that I might have chosen to discuss,, 
their importance for me has seemed to come down to the fact that if I read them the 
right way I can claim that they have each, in their own way,, articulated some of the 
same fundamental insights which I have found in the work of the above four. But 
my intention is not to establish priority in any of these matters. It is not my inten- 
tion,, even regarding my main four sources, to claim that any combination of them 
already constituted the new science that I am seeking, but rather that their work cer- 
tainly took steps in laying the groundwork for such a science. 6 It is usually the case 
that only after a new perspective has emerged that we can read the works of its 
"godparents" and say, "See, they were saying this all along. " As I mentioned earlier,, 
my own entry into the field of biophysics was motivated by a combination of an in- 
terest in the physicist's view of nature and the phenomenologist's view of human 
experience. For me this combination made sense in relation to the particular brand 
of phenomenology with which I first became familiar, namely that of Merleau-Ponty. 
It is personally significant that I first read Kelly in the context of Merleau-Ponty's 
Phenomenology of Perception and of my early practical experience with Ms. 
6Dewey noted ("Body and Mind, " Dewey, 193 1) that in the earliest 
days of the 
European tradition theory and practice did not suffer the exile from each other that 
they so often do today. They were united within the term, techn6, which 
Dewey 
described as an endeavor seeking "to command practices that were rational and a 
reason embodied in practice. " By this standard I would certainly take 
Kelly's work 
to qualify as techn6 and Alexander's as well. Both Dewey and Merleau-Ponty seem 
to have seen the importance of their own work in its relation to a context that could 
be called "technical" in this original sense. 
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Barstow's teaching of the Alexander Technique. On reflection, it is not surprising 
that I should have given both Kelly and Alexander the phenomenologically primed 
reading that I did, given that I encountered their work soon after Merleau-Ponty's. I 
find that Kelly's work also seems to be an endeavour of bringing together the funda- 
mental attitude of experimental science and the phenomenological approach to the 
context of the "ftill cycle" of a person's experience. There is a practical complemen- 
tarity in the methods developed by Alexander and Kelly. Alexander's self-discover- 
ies point to what Dewey termed "the continuity of experience" in perception 
(internal and external), conception and action, although in recognizing the unity of 
the individual in action, particularly action in its directional and sequential aspects, 
they also refer to its dimensionality. Kelly, in the theory and methodologies of per- 
sonal construct theory, provides a means of addressing and articulating the dimen- 
sionality of experience, as we shall see,, a geometry of meaning. In pointing beyond 
the methods, however, he emphasizes that it is in the continuity of the full cycle of 
experience that the full meaning of a person's living is to be found. It was in my 
effort to articulate what I found to be the common psycho-physical core of Kelly's 
work and that of Alexander that I "rediscovered" Dewey, and the need to reconcile 
the "phenomenological sense" of Dewey with that of Merleau. -Ponty led me to the 
deep agreement between them on many of my own key issues, and so has brought me 
full circle. 7 
H. 2 Human Learning: The Conversational Context 
The Conversational Science Paradigm 
What was needed, however , if I was to 
bring the various threads into a coher- 
ent fabric, was a framework within which to cultivate their synthesis. During my 
years tutoring individual university students, occasionally one of them who had suc- 
ceeded well enough to contemplate going on to do graduate work would ask me for 
advice. What I would tell them was to find the people somewhere in the world who 
were doing the sort of thing they most wanted to do and go and study With them. 
7Late in this process I found that the circle has been fuller than I knew; I 
rediscovered an anthology which I had first read more than a year before my 
first 
encounter with Merleau-Ponty, complete with my own underlinings of passages in an 
extended excerpt from Art as Experience .I 
find on rereading that the underlinings I 
would make from my present perspective are not much different. So there is after all 
something essential about my own view which has been greatly shaped and enriched, 
but not created, by my experience with my four conversants. 
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Eventually I had occasion to take my own advice when I discovered the Centre for 
the Study of Human Learning at Brunet University. The paradigm of conversational 
science that had evolved at CSHL over the years (paradigm both as a theoretical 
framework and as a set of means for practicing within that framework) with its cen- 
tral concepts of "self-organized learning"" and the "learning conversation, " and the 
essentially "humane" scientific attitude inherent in it. )8 seemed to provide both the 
theoretical and practical contexts within which I could at last bring some unity to my 
own work. In some ways I found nothing new. For though I had never called my 
students "self-organized learners" I have nearly always worked from the assumption 
that they were and treated them as such, and though I never called my conversations 
with them "learning conversations" I believe they have had that multidimensional 
conversational quality for some years. The ideas and methodologies developed at 
CSHL have been well described in Thomas and Harri-Augsteins books,, Self-Organ- 
ized Learning and Learning Conversations, and in a number of doctoral dissertations 
produced by their students. However, at the centre of all is the simple proposition 
that learning is itself something that one can learn to do better, that by finding ways 
of articulating and reflecting upon personal experience and thus making our present 
means of engaging our experience explicit, we gain a greater range and depth of 
choice about how we will construe that experience. The learning conversation is es- 
sentially a self-referential process by which an individual not only learns better but 
learns to become a better leamer. By reflectively engaging, in a given context, the 
dimensions of personal meaning, as well as the strategies they are employing, the 
individual can not only improve the effectiveness of their learning in that context, 
they can also gain experience that improves the effectiveness of their engagement in 
other learning contexts. Such a learner is self-organized in that the dynamics of any 
particular learning process are driven by their own purposes and leaming needs. As 
ways in which they learn effectively in one context get reflectively recycled, the 
process is not merely iterative; it is elaboratively so. In my own case, by finding a 
means and a framework for articulating the conversational quality of the psycho- 
physical work I was already doing, I gained the ability to carry it on with more 
confidence, more consistency and finer detail as it became more explicitly conversa- 
tional. I have seen my task in relation to this evolving conversational science para- 
digm as being the pursuit of means for making the psycho-physical, embodied, char- 
81tisahumanescience in that it does not accept the typical isolation of the 
researcher from the subject, but recognizes that each is a person with purposes and 
I. -Cl. - needs of their own. In true action research "caring' is just part of being scientitic. 
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acter of the learning explicit and maintaining the articulation of that character within 
the conversation. As they point out in Learning Conversations,, 
What fails to be appreciated is that learning embodies as much 
feeling as thought and as much action as reflection. Our 
representations of personal myths are multi-faceted; kinesthetic, 
iconic, auditory, tactile as well as symbolic forrns; all these mediate in 
a process language about learning. In learning to pilot a helicopter, to 
control a combine harvester, to use a manual, to lead a scout patrol, to 
operate a computer, each form of representation plays its part, albeit 
almost always unconsciously. This tacit representation underlies and 
conditions how we learn. Herein dwell our deepest myths about our 
processes of teaming. (p. 17) 
My working question has been, "How can we go beyond recognizing that it is the 
whole person who is engaged in conversation-whether with their own knowledge, 
with another person or with the world-to carrying on the conversation itself in a 
more fully embodied way? " 
What this exploration has been about then is "human learning, " recognizing 
that a human individual is an embodied knower, that human knowledge is always es- 
sentially what Merleau-Ponty refers to by the beautiful phrase, knowledge in the 
hands" and that knowledge is thus inseparable from action. In this pursuit, I believe 
I have made two significant contributions. The first is the weaving of a common 
thread in these four relatively overlooked bodies of work, culminating in my concept 
of "conductive reasoning. " The second is my development of a conversational 
methodology for the practical use of this concept in dealing with learning in a more 
fully embodied way,. indeed, in dealing with the exploration of "embodiment" in a 
more embodied way. This has become a conversational framework which I have 
called "conductive conversation. ")9 
Learning Conversations 
Before pursuing this line, however , it will 
be useful to give a brief outline of 
what a Learning Conversation is and how it proceeds. The Conversational Paradigm 
takes its concrete form in the methodologies Thomas and Ham-Augstein have 
developed in support of this conversation about learning. There are three levels on 
which Learning Conversations can take place, corresponding roughly to the levels of 
the learner's awareness of their own learning process. The most basic level is the 
9See the "Conversational Introduction to Conductive Reasoning" and refer to the 
audio and video tapes in the second "volume. " 
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tutorial or task focused conversation. This level of conversation relates to a specific 
learning task. Such a conversation may, for instance, be organized around a single 
personal learning contract relating to some initial purpose and set of strategies,, or a 
series of such contracts as the learner refines these. It may happen that the pursuit of 
the task reveals wider questions or wider purposes, and these may lead the leamer to 
a second level of conversation, the life conversation. Where the task focused 
conversation is concerned with the question of what to do and how to do it in the 
service of the learner's purpose, the life focused conversation is concerned with why, 
with the purpose behind the purpose. Further, as a learner goes through some cycles 
of task focused conversation, and even more as they engage in conversations about a 
series of different tasks, aspects of how they go about learruing can become 
observable. This learrung focused or learning-to-learn conversation is formally like 
the task focused conversation, but now the task is that of learning to be a better 
leamer. 
At whatever level a learning conversation takes place it is, over tune, a 
weaving together of three interrelated dialogues. Typically we come to a leaming 
task with a certain set of "robots, " that is, habitual competencies. We have a way of 
doing something, often mostly unconscious, which is effective to some degree or 
other. In situations where we seek to "know" something rather than to "do" 
something this takes the form of an habitual construction, our way of making sense 
of things, or of holding them in a comprehensible pattern that allows us to know 
where to put new bits of experience. The dilemma a learner faces is that as long as 
the robot is in operation there is no way to find a better way of doing things. Their 
awareness is "task bound. " It is the situation of those with whom Socrates spoke, 
who, because they believed they knew, could not seek to know. Thus the first step in 
learning must always be calling into question the belief that one already knows. The 
first step in the process of leaming is the "challenging" of the robots. Occasionally 
circumstances will challenge them for us; our habitual way ceases to work. More 
rarely an individual is able to call their own robots into question. The intentional 
challenging of a learner's robots is the first task of a "learning coach" and is the 
substance of the process dialogue. 
What happens when a person's habitual competence is called into question is, 
of course, that they become relatively incompetent. This is a very insecure,, 
uncomfortable state to be in; it is the "leaming trough. " Whenever a person is 
thrown into that state their strong desire is to get out of it as quickly as possible, and 
the only apparent way to do that is to revert to reliance on the original robot. If a 
person is to stay in the trough long enough for something else to happen, they need 
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support. The suppon dialogue is the second ongoing task of the learning coach. 
Being able to challenge one's own robots, to call one's own knowledge into 
question, is the first mark of a self-organized learner. Being able to provide one's 
own support in the trough is the second. 
The teaming coach who holds the process for the learner, and who provides 
systematic support so that the leamer may continue to engage in that process , is 
acting as the essential teacher Plato described as the one who induces a person to 
turn from the shadows toward the light and then keeps them facing the light long 
enough for their eyes to become used to the brightness so that they begin to see what 
is there. The third phase of the process is the task of bringing things together in a 
new pattern to replace the old robot. This task of rearranging the old pieces, finding 
usable new ones and constructing new personal meaning from them brings a new 
requirement. If the learner succeeds in giving up their reliance on external authority 
or on the authority of their own robots, they will need to establish a reference frame 
against which to evaluate their learning. This is the substance of the referent 
dialogue. It is a dialogue about the establishing of standards by which the learner 
can measure where they are in relation to their task and purpose. 
These three levels and three dialogues are not distinct conversations,, but 
rather more or less distinguishable parts of an ongoing interaction. Some segments 
of a conversation may be easily identifiable as being at particular level or as being of 
one dialogue or other, but often several aspects are implicit at any moment. In 
particular, whatever the specific task at hand, the learning conversation is intended to 
help the learner to become more self-organized. Thus the task focused conversation 
is carried out in such a way that the learner may come to see how to address other 
tasks,, and the process, support and referent dialogues are carried out in such a way 
that the learner gradually becomes capable of challenging their own robots, 
sustaining their own process, providing their own support, and seeking out the 
needed resources for their own learning. 
The central model of the learning conversation, the framework for 
implementing and reflecting on personal learning contracts and the 
heuristic that 
gives explicit shape to the learning process is summarized in MA(R)4S. 
This stands 
for: Monitor, Analyze, Record, Reconstruct, Reflect, Review and Spiral. The first 
three have to do with the articulation of experience. If any learning is to take place, 
some way of observing and capturing features in what is happening initially ts 
needed. These Monitored observations must then be analyzed in terms of the 
learner's present model of what happened in order to form the material for an 
adequate reconstruction. It is the Record of the results of this analysis, the 
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representation of personal meaning, that becomes the subject of the rest of the 
conversation. The process of building that record also begins to develop the personal 
language in which the conversation can proceed. 
The second major phase is then represented by the other three R's. By 
running the record through the model the learner takes a new perspective on the 
original experience and can thus Reconstruct the experience, bringing new meaning 
to it or revealing personal meanings which may have been hidden in it. By 
Reflecting on these new meanings in relation to the original intentionality they can 
evaluate the experience in terms not bound by their initial conception of it. They 
can, for instance, become aware of the various ways in which their performance of 
their task might have been better in relation to their purpose. But this step is not only 
a matter of learning to improve performance defined according to the original model, 
for Reviewing it opens the possibility of taking apart and reconstructing the model 
itself which makes whole new levels of learning available to the learner. It is 
significant that many of the dimensions of meaning in terms of which this new 
learning takes place and much of the personal language which emerges from the 
conversation itself are non-verbal. 
The Review of the process itself as a whole often leads to a reassessment of 
the learner's purpose as well as a refinement of how they pursue it. Thus the whole 
process Spirals upward to a new level of the conversation. In a Learning 
Conversation this spiraling recycling of the whole process is an explicit step in the 
process itself. The process is thus both iterative and hierarchical. The Learning 
Conversation has a 'Tractal" quality. Learning Conversations at the tutorial, life and 
learning-to-learn levels and spanning varying durations are repeatedly revealed in 
retrospect to be segments in larger Learning Conversations. On one scale the single 
personal learning contract about a specific learning task, reflectively implemented 
and reflected upon, can constitute a Leaming Conversation. This whole conversation 
can then become one cycle among many in the process of a much larger 
conversation. In the end, for a "fully fledged" self-organized leamer, all of life can 
be experienced as a single Leaming Conversation. 
As noted earlier , in practice the conversational paradigm is embodied in 
the 
technologies which support the process just described, and the potentialities of the 
Learning Conversation rest on that methodological base. Thus much of the work of 
CSUL has been directed toward developing such "reflective tools. " Some of these 
are computer based, some pencil-and-paper; some involve other kinds of hardware. 
in each case the purpose of the tool is either to provide a means of producing an 
adequate representation of personal meaning about which the learner can then 
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converse or aiding the leamer in systematically reflecting on such a representation. 
The general form of the Learning Conversation spans many levels of meaning and its 
specific implementation is always uniquely personal. The task for the tool maker is 
to bridge the span by providing tools suitable for specific kinds of learning tasks. In 
order to navigate the phases of the learning process as summarized in the MA(R)4S 
heuristic, whether with or without help, the learner requires an appropriate 
". measuring device" for monitoring events, a means for generating a representation of 
their personal meaning which is open to reconstruction in relation to the 
particularities of their task, and perhaps means for enhancing the reflective phases of 
the process. Each of these tools may need to have features specific to the kind of 
task involved. 
It is thus that the present work lies squarely Within the range of the Leaning 
Conversation model. I have endeavoured to articulate a perspective on the more- 
than-verbal dimensions of meaning as being embodied as well as constructed and to 
develop conversational tools which are appropriate to the task of learning to become 
more articulate about my own embodiment of meaning. It is fair to ask at this point 
why I have not chosen to make more explicit use of the tools already developed at 
CSI4L. These tools facilitate the task of making explicit and elaborating personal 
meaning. Part of the conversational quality of the process is an alternation between 
monitored experience and explicit reflection. It will be seen later that, though for 
many learning tasks there can be great advantage in this separation in time of having 
an experience and reflecting on it, it is in the nature of the learning domain involved 
that the conductive conversation cannot afford this separation. It is explicitly about 
the dimensionality of the space between any such explicit dimensions and on the 
bodily continuity that underlies both experience and reflection. Thus it sacrifices the 
number of dimensions that can be handled at once in return for the leverage gained 
by an awareness of a relatively few dimensions in relation to the individual's 
coordination in the context of their action. 
The Conversational Embodiment of Meaning 
My primary claim is that the act of comprehending is an embodied act,, and 
thus is as subject to the conditions of the coordination of the whole person as is any 
other act. I do not merely perceive the world; I act in it. To perceive 
is of course, 
already to act. Indeed the Latin roots of a whole group of common English words 
having to do with perceiving and knowing-perceive,. conceive,, comprehend, appre- 
hend, sense-all come from words meaning to take hold of, to catch or to feel. At 
root,, the verb "to know" and all of its relatives are active,, transitive verbs. I 
do not 
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know the world from a distance; I grasp it. I am engaged with it. 10 1 and the world 
of which I am a part act on each other. There is no separation between the cognitive 
and the physical (or between either of those and the emotional) dimensions of that 
grasping. I take the kind of intelligent responsiveness to conditions expressed by 
"knowledge in the hands" as a paradigm case of personal knowing. Knowing is 
never, in practice, merely cognitive. This is perhaps best illustrated in cases which 
are clearly -instrui-nental.. '" 
To get used to a hat, a car or a stick is to be transplanted into 
them, or conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of our body. Habit expresses our power of dilating our being in the world, or 
changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments. (Merleau- 
Ponty, 1962, p. 143)" 
Merleau-Ponty discusses the example of a person who knows how to type. 
"It is possible, " he says, "to know how to type without being able to say where the 
letters which make the words are to be found on the bank of keys. To know how to 
type is not to know the place of each letter among the keys. " (ibid., p. 144) Nor is it 
a"conditioned reflex" for each key which is triggered when we see the correspond- 
ing letter. The ability to type is an acquired, habitual ability, but what is that? "If 
habit is neither a form of knowledge nor an involuntary action, then what is it? " It is, 
he says, 
knowledge in the hands which is forthcoming only when bodily effort 
is made, and cannot be formulated in detachmentfrom it.... When I 
sit at my typewriter, a motor space opens up beneath my hands,, in 
which I am about to 'play' what I have read. (ibid., p. 144, emphasis 
added) 
The central thesis of my work, the fulcrum on which it is balanced is that all knowl- 
edge is a kind of "knowledge in the hands" and that all learning is reconstruction of 
meaning, not only in thought, but also embodied in action. All levels of abstract 
knowledge, and indeed the very idea of abstract thought itself, are abstractions. And 
I take this "knowledge in the hands" as a prototype of the kind of "lived" knowledge 
from which they are abstracted. I am seeking a means for learning to become more 
articulate in the realm of knowledge which is seen to be not only personally con- 
IOEven the word, "habit, ')' has a similar descent, meaning at root "something held 
onto. " 
I 'As we incorporate these instruments they become part of our "body, "' our way of 
"being in the world. " Cf. Radley's comment that "a construct is a process or 
vestibule through which a person exists. " (emphasis in original,, Radley, p. 226) 
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structed, but embodied. 12 This personally constructed character of meaning is what I 
refer to when I speak of the dimensionality of experience. Personal Construct The- 
ory is fundamentally a framework for a "geometry of meaning" in which all of the 
dimensions of distinction within a person's experience are like the dimensions of 
geometric space. Thus a person's system of constructs is not just a framework for 
predicting the attributes of future events; it is a coordinate system for navigating 
experience. Harri-Augstein and Thomas define meaning as simply "the relationship 
between the knower and the known" (Harn-Augstein and Thomas, 199 1, p. 27). 
Thus personal meaning is not just constructed; it is embodied, and what I intend the 
"continuity of experience" to convey is precisely that meaning is embodied in expe- 
rience. "Leaming" is then the elaborative reconstruction of embodied personal 
meaning-that is, in Kelly's phrase, learning is a "synonym for the verb to become. " 
The focus of my work has been fundamentally a search for a way to explore ques- 
tions of embodiment in an embodied way. What is "human learning" in its embod- 
ied context? If knowing is inseparable from feeling or doing, then to leam is not 
only to view things differently, not only to place a different interpretation on them; it 
is to respond differently to them-to become different myself in relation to them. To 
leam is to change. With apologies to Aristotle for the elaborating on his categonza- 
tion, we might say that learning is a form of motion. 
Self-Organization and Coordination: Learning as Motion 
This is not, however., a merely theoretical claim. It is possible to go beyond 
merely affin-ning this interpenetration of the cognitive, emotional and physical in 
learning and actually put it into practice. It is not about making learning psycho- 
physical. It is about recognizing how it already is psycho-physical, and consciously 
employing that recognition. What is wanted is a practical method for doing so. I 
12Perhaps this is what Dewey meant by Alexander's technique bearing "the same 
relation to education that education bears to all other human activities. " Irene 
Tasker, who was Alexander's assistant and ran a Montessorl based "little school" in 
conjunction with his practice in London, gives an account of how the children 
learned to type. If they "refused to strike the keys until they had arranged their 
fingers on the appropriate keys for at least three letters ahead, they prevented rather 
than making mistakes. Prevention of mistakes,, by encouraging the children to wait 
long enough to have their means clearly and thoroughly prepared before going on to 
their end, proved to be a result of carrying out F. M. 's principle in the classroom. " 
(Tasker, 1978) 
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have evolved such a method by bringing the practical work of George Kelly and F. M. 
Alexander together within the framework of the conversational science paradigm. 13 
If learning is an act of reconstructing personal meaning, if it is , in a general 
sense, a kind of motion, then what I am investigating is the relationship between 
learning and human coordination. I am always (If in action" and the very idea of 
what I am doing" is already a concept abstracted from the whole of my experience 
of myself in action. If my biological structure or my learned habitual patterns of 
movement affect the structure and qualities of movement of which I am capable at 
any given moment, then they also affect what meanings I am capable of embodying. 
If learning is an act 11 17 1. _, 
then being a "self-organized learner is inseparable from the 
natural quality of the self-organization of human coordination. This is a most 
practical matter in that "knowledge in the hands" has its own inherent logical struc- 
ture-and I Will wish to describe that logic of action as "conductive" in nature. If a 
self-organized learner is one who can incorporate awareness of how they go about 
reconstructing personal meaning into the act of reconstructing in a given situation, 
then what I am claiming is simply that the "incorporation" involves a level of literal 
in-corp-oration, that is, an embodiment. It is the embodiment of dimensions of 
meaning in the experience of the learner as, in Dewey's words, a "live creature. " 
(Dewey, 1934, chapter 1) 
Within the framework of the paradigm of conversational science, what I am 
seeking, then, is a rationale and development of a method of self-science,, a practical 
means for being a "personal scientist" who does not neglect my own embodiment. It 
is a science that is about the continuity of my own experience, the unity of my own 
action and the logic of my own embodiment. It is also a practical science, a sort of 
13The components of my synthesis have long since proven themselves in practice. 
Kelly's Personal Construct Theory, especially within the Conversational paradigm 
has been fruitful in a wide variety of contexts. Alexander's technique has come to be 
practiced most often in relation to chronic physical problems (where there 
is an 
important "learned" component) and also to many performance related activities. 
I 
am claiming not only that the combination of the two approaches makes explicit 
what each leaves implicit, but that in so doing it goes beyond that to establish a 
single coherent, and explicitly post-Cartesian approach to teaming. Kelly's 
framework for viewing myself as a personal scientist, together with Alexander's 
method for generating new personal experiences, provide the ground for a more 
comprehensive way of being intentionally experimental in relation to my own 
embodied experience. 
21 
A Brief Introduction of Major Contributors 
personal cybernetics" in the original sense of being about the one who "steers" the 
ShIp. 14 
In its early stages what the Learning Conversation is "about" are the dimen- 
sions of meaning within my personal construction. As it continues, it comes to be 
about how I construct and reconstruct meaning, thus leading to greater freedom to 
reconstrue. What I am developing is an interaction, what I call a 44conductive" 
teaming conversation, which is a conversation about the dimensions of my embodi- 
meni of personal meaning. It is a conversation not only about, but also in action, 
leading to greater freedom to reconstrue within the continuity of experience. Dewey 
spoke of finding the "unity of mind and body in action, 17 asserting that the place to 
seek for the unity beyond such hyphenations as "body-mind" is precisely in human 
action. In a sense the three attributes of experience that I wish to emphasize, namely 
the qualities of dimensionality, continuity and conductivity are translations of the 
terms mind, body and action viewed not as things but rather as qualities within 
whole embodied experience. 
14See the "sailing ship" metaphor in the "Metaphorical Toolbox, " Appendix Ia. 
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MVITATION TO A CONVERSATION 
To write about these matters is, of course, to deal in abstractions. The ideas I 
have endeavoured to present are abstract, and unless they are grounded in concrete 
experience, they will remain for the reader "mere abstractions. " I have throughout 
avoided attempting to state directly what these various qualities are. I have given 
some illustrations along the way, but since they are illustrations from my experience, 
they are still abstract from the reader's point of view. Recall what Jones had to say 
about the concrete experiential sources of many of Dewey's central concepts. 15 1 
have also provided a number of videotaped conversations in which these ideas can 
be seen as they play out in actual practice. The videotape can be found at the end as 
Appendix 3a, together with written descriptions and timellnes of the conversations in 
Appendix 2. The findings drawn from the experience represented by these tapes are 
summarized and discussed at the end of the chapter on "Teaching Practice. " In order 
for the reader to derive their own meaning for these concepts, however, the concepts 
need to be grounded in their own concrete experience. This is especially true if one 
hopes to come to an understanding of embodiment in an embodied way. Further, if 
the reader's meanings are to have any relation to my own, they need to derive from 
in appropriate ways. In experiences which, while personal, are sufficiently similar i 
the service of that end I have provided as Appendix 1, though it is more vital to the 
ton survival of the whole than appendices normally are, a "Conversational Introducti 
to Conductive Reasoning. " This is a conversational structure that incorporates a dis- 
cussion of these issues in the context of instructions for generating the kinds of per- 
sonal experiences from which the reader may draw something of the meaning I 
intend,, and if they persist, some skill in using the conductive conversational tools for 
exploring embodied dimensions in their own meaning. It is written, for the most part 
in what Kelly would call the second person invitational mode, as a piece that will 
stand on its own as a research instrument for personal scientists. Essentially it is an 
ore pursuing the theo- invitation to replicate something of this work itself Thus bef 
retical roots of these ideas, I invite the reader to engage with me in a more conver- 
I relating their experi- sational mode by actively reading through Appendix I and then 
ences with it to what follows. 
15See footnote I above. 
Chapter III 
III: TOWARDS A GEOMETRY OF EXPERIENCE 
111.1 The Phenomenological Unity of Perception and Action 
In pointing to dimensionality as a significant quality of all experience I am 
asserting an essentially spatial or geometric conception of meaning. There are then 
two important points that must be established, the spatial quality of the relationships 
among dimensions of meaning and the priority of original experience itself over 
those dimensions. I found in my encounters with the phenomenological work of 
Merleau-Ponty a rich conversation about the nature of the relationship between con- 
scious subjects and the world in which they find themselves which may illuminate 
both of these points. Two central, intertwined themes in his work,, which I am dis- 
cussing here in order to convey the phenomenological sense of my own ideas as they 
underlie my practical work, are spatiality and motility. All experience has something 
of a spatial quality. Location in geometric space is a particular kind of meaning 
abstracted from the more general "space" composed of the meanings found in whole 
experience. Indeed, the space of location is the prototypical space precisely because 
it is the most abstract, that is , its attributes are 
drawn from the spatial character of the 
widest variety of personal experiences. If I consider a number of perceived objects, 
for example, any one of them may be dark rather than light, soft rather than hard, 
living rather than nonliving, attractive rather than repellent; here rather than there is 
but one possible distinction among many. After I have left out of my consideration 
the many ways in which the ob . ects differ from one another, my experience of them 
as having various relative locations is one of the few common attributes remaining. 
That I may then cycle this abstraction back onto my experience and posit this 
"space" and changes of location within it as being more fundamental than the origi- 
nal objects of perception, and indeed the source of them, is a curious by-product of 
the original abstracting process. One of the major themes of Merleau-Ponty's 
philosophy is the primacy of perception, the claim that original experience is prior to 
any abstractions which we may draw from it. It is whole individual experience ftorn 
which all other understanding derives. All of our theoretical constructs, all models 
of material reality, all principles which we may use to comprehend or account for the 
events we experience, all of these are abstracted from that original personal 
experience, and are thereby secondary to it. Whether in the case of the perception of 
a world or that of my own self, as an object for myself, or of the composition of 
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some intentional action in which I may find myself engaged,, the whole is in an 
important sense prior to the parts because it is the context within which they are 
parts. Failure to recognize this primacy leads us to attribute concrete reality to all 
sorts of abstract entities. 
The physicist's atoms will always appear more real than the 
historical and qualitative face of the world, the physico-chemical 
processes more real than perceived phenomena, the intellectual atoms 
represented by the "significations" of the Vienna Circle more real 
than consciousness,. as long as the attempt is made to build up the 
shape of the world (life, perception, mind) instead of recognizing, as 
the source which stares us in the face and as the ultimate court of ap- 
peal in our knowledge of these things, our experience of them. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 23) 
The basic phenomenological idea is that when I direct my attention to my 
own experience of the world, and myself in it, I find that my perception, as a phe- 
nomenon, already has an integrity and a structure prior to any abstraction I may make 
in my accounting for it. In particular, any division in terms of contributions to the 
structure of my experience from the "outside world" or from my "Inner self' etc. are 
denved ftom the original whole. The point I want to emphasize here is that this 
pnmary expenence has "'space-like" qualities. That is, it lends itself to being 
"dimensionalized. " Whether we are speaking of the ordinary visual experience of, 
for example, looking at a lamp on a table, or the more general experience of inter- 
preting the shape and position of the lamp in physical, aesthetic, cultural or political 
terms, we find ourselves speaking of the "perspective" from which we observe it. 
There is, however, more to the spatiality of experience than a passive frame- 
work for perception,, more than an empty space in which perceivable events happen. 
Perception, and conception , in relation to this general space of meaning 
has every- 
thing to do with motility. It is because it is a space in which I move that it can be one 
in which I perceive. When I view an ob . ect from a given perspective, what I per- 
ceive is not the perspective but the object. Part of what makes it possible for me to 
perceive a whole object is my, at least implicit, ability to move in relation to it. To 
be able to perceive an object as being an object with attributes beyond what are 
available to me from my present position in relation to it is to be able to project the 
possibility of motion, of the taking of other positions, the adopting of other perspec- 
tives on the ob . ect. The appearance of an object as it does under present conditions, 
viewing the lamp from a particular angle under particular lighting conditions, for in- 
stance , is inseparable 
from the context of the other ways it would appear under other 
conditions. I may "literally" move to a different part of the room to view the lamp 
from a different angle, or I may change the lighting. Whether I in fact do so or not,, it 
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is Within the context of the possibility of doing so that my perception of the lamp as 
a lamp With such and such shape, colour, etc. rather than merely as a set of visual 
shapes having various colours or brightness is possible. But I could go even further. 
I could view the lamp, or in some other way interact with it, from a political rather 
than a physical "perspective. " Not only what attributes, but what kinds of attributes I 
notice are themselves conditioned by the perspective I take, and again it is the pos- 
sibility of taking different perspectives that is the root of my ability to perceive the 
lamp as such, and to include it in meaningful experience. So while perception holds 
a primacy over all abstractions that may be drawn from it, it is itself possible only in 
a context of action. From a physical,. aesthetic or diplomatic perspective,, I may per- 
ceive the lamp to be cylindrical or misshapen or in an insulting location. These at- 
tributes of the lamp are meanings for me from my perspective, and in the context of 
the other perspectives I might have taken. To perceive it as cylindrical is to know 
the shape beyond the rectangle I see from the side and the circle I would see from 
above. To be insulted by its position is to appreciate what it would mean to be sit- 
ting on the other side of the table. Of course, the meaningfulness of these other pos- 
sible perspectives is derived from prior experience viewing similar objects and the 
construing of "similarity" is itself a personally constructive process. Merleau-Ponty 
repeatedly emphasizes the pre-objective roots of experience. In doing so he is not 
allying himself with the subjective in a subjective-objective dualism. "Pre- 
objective" does not imply unstructured or non-objective. It expresses the inherent 
structuring of that primary whole experience that precedes, and culminates in,, our 
experience of meaningful objects. It emphasizes the fact that every such meaningful 
object has a history. What I want to emphasize is that it is the dimensional character 
of this pre-objective experience that gives rise to the meaningfulness of the objects. 
111.2 Darkness in the Theatre: the Spatiality of the Stage 
How then are we to get from the space in which I grasp objects to the space 
in which I grasp meanings? And from there to inhabiting a world that 
has meaning 
for me? The answer, I believe, lies in the interplay between the dimensionality of my 
experience and its continuity. The spatiality of my own body and that of the external 
universe, the inner and outer dimensions of meaning are woven together 
in the con- 
tinuity of ongoing experience. It is that continuity which makes them not merely the 
dimensions of a space in which I observe, but those of a world in which I act. And it 
is their interplay within that continuity that gives life its dramatic quality. Both 
Merleau-Ponty and Dewey make explicit the importance of the dramatic quality of 
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experience, a quality which I find implicit also in the work of Kelly and of Alexan- 
der. If persons are essentially scientists in their anticipating and interpreting of 
events, they are also actors in their dramatic engagement with them. In this section I 
want to draw primarily from two chapters from the Phenomenology of'Perception, 
"The Spatiality of One's Own Body and Motility" and "Space" and attempt to illu- 
minate this notion of spatiality by examining the actor on stage as a specific example 
of a person in a role. 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of spatiality is derived directly from those of the 
primacy of perception and the role of the incarnate subject, and it in turn gives them 
solidity. The spatial quality of an individual's situatedness is bound up both with the 
pre-objective roots of their perception and with their embodiment as a perceiving 
subject. As a conscious subject, I project space around myself, locating objects in it. 
This space has as its origin that irreducible "here" of the incarnate subject, and as 
Merleau-Ponty says, it "... is not a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation" 
(ibid., p. 100). "Space is not the setting in which things are arranged, but the means 
whereby the positing of things becomes possible ... we must think of it as the universal 
power enabling them to be connected" (ibid., p. 243). Thus at root spatiality is not a 
property of an arrangement of objects, but rather a quality of my relationship to 
them; indeed it is the power of the perceiving subject to perceive objects as con- 
nected. But in common experience it is seen that things can be "connected"' in many 
ways, the connection of geometric distance and direction being only one type. The 
common space of position, being a subset of the space of situation, can also be taken 
as closely analogous to it. It is the prototypical space precisely because it is the most 
abstracted from whole experience. 
All existence is situated existence. I exist as a subject only Insofar as I 
maintain myself in distinction from the objects of my world. And there can only be 
objects in a world at all because 1, as the subject, can say, "I am here. " Objective 
space, the space of geometric location, is an abstract space constituted from this 
initial presence, but since it is so abstract, and since objects never appear to con- 
sciousness without appearing as meaningful, we find open to us other, seemingly 
secondary spaces, which appear to be built upon it. An important point to note is 
that the power by which these secondary spaces can be so given is precisely that 
which is the possibility for any objective space. Every possible set of global inter- 
connections between the meaningful objects of the situated subject is a possible 
world which that subject may inhabit and with reference to which they can define 
themselves and their actions. Just as the space of position is the area in which the 
geometric distribution of objects is possible, each of these worlds is a level of situa- 
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tional space. "The essence of consciousness is to provide itself with one or several 
worlds, to bring into being its own thoughts before itself as if they were things (ibid., 
p. 130) ... and the possession of a 
body implies the ability to change levels and to 
understand' space" (ibid. p. 251). 16 Thus the existence of the incarnate subject 
consists in constituting for itself at any given moment one specific world or combi- 
nation of worlds, and the continuation of that existence depends on the ability to 
shift from one such world to another. All one can ever answer to the question, 
"Where am I in my own frame of reference? " is "Here. " All other questions of 
"Where? " elicit the further question, "With respect to what? " Location is always a 
relationship. More generally, questions of meaning are always questions of relation- 
ship between knower and known. I am" is a simple assertion; what I am is only 
definable in relation. But if space is "the universal power enabling [things] to be 
connected, " then meaning is not in relation to what is, but rather to the ways in 
which things might have been otherwise. As Kelly has it, 
So any statement we make can well be regarded as the answer to a 
question we ask-a biased question-and emerges as an indicated 
choice between alternatives previously posed. Furthermore any act, 
or experience, can be regarded as having such dimensional proper- 
ties.... Any act, or feeling, or statement bears equally upon its subjec- 
tive antithesis without which it has no psychological significance to 
the person involved. (Kelly, 1979, p. 116) 
Note that this quotation does not imply that cognitive or verbally expressible 
constructs are in any way primary. Indeed it is just the opposite; such constructs are 
themselves drawn from the wider "dimensional properties" of experience. Even 
more than that, a question like, "What is the meaning of that? " elicits the question,, 
"With respect to what intention? " For my personal meaning is not only a 
relationship between myself and an environment that I "know; " it 
is a relationship 
inescapably bound up with my actions and purposes within my enviromnent. 
Compare this with Merleau-Ponty in the later chapter on "Freedom" and in particular 
his discussion of the relation between meaning and intention. Such attributes of a 
mountain as "steepness" only have the significance they 
have for me in relation to 
my intention to climb it. Any given level of situatedness, any given 
level of a space 
of meaning may be abstracted, but the whole only occurs 
in relation to the embodied 
intentionality (in Merleau-Ponty's phrase, the incarnate subjectivity) of a person in a 
situation. Through examination of pathological cases in which the patient 
lacked 
16CfKelly's description of the freedom derived from the ability to shift among 
levels of one's system of constructs. 
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precisely this ability to move easily from one "setting" to another, and of ex- 
periments in the alteration of the perceptual field, Merleau-Ponty found that "what 
counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not the objective body but a virtual body 
with its phenomenal "place" defined by its task and situation" (Nd., p. 249). Later 
he concludes that "our body and perception always summon us to take as the centre 
of the world that environment with which they present us. But this environment is 
not necessarily that of our own life" (ibid., p. 285). 
It is here that we may, by way of illustration, draw the parallel between the 
ordinary person and the actor on stage. The ability to act and to function as an inte- 
grated "body-subject" depend on the freedom to choose the level of situational space 
in which we are to operate, to choose our task and select a set of meanings from 
those possible for the objects around us. In his most clearly applicable statement 
Merleau-Ponty says, To act is to place oneself for a moment in an imaginary situ- 
ation, to find satisfaction in changing one's 'setting. ' (ibid., p. 135) ... the normal 
man and the actor do not mistake imaginary situations for reality, but extricate their 
real bodies from the living situation to make them breathe, speak and, if need be, 
weep in a realm of imagination" (ibid., p. 105). To act, whether in this sense, on 
stage, or in life, is an act of reconstruction of meaning. It is not to represent the 
world but to create a new world which we may inhabit for a time. It is to "take on" 
dimensions of meaning within which we go beyond attempting to reproduce what we 
know toward the creation of new experience which is similar to what we know in 
certain ways. In Kelly's terms, we are free not only in the dimensions of our con- 
struction of meaning but also in the level of the dimensionality. Indeed, we seem to 
find ourselves free at levels of construction below that at which our conscious atten- 
tion resides and at the same time determined with respect to levels above it. True 
i ur freedom then, includes the freedom to move among the levels themselves. It is f- 
ther notable that this free change of environment is possible because of the impos- 
sibility of my being fully an object for myself My quasi-objective viewing of myself 
is accomplished only by reflection on my taking up of a world and only because 
I am totally reflected-that is, absorb none of the objectivity-for-myself of that 
world-that I can freely take up any of the possible levels of situational space. This is 
one sense in which Merleau-Ponty can describe the spatiality of the body itself as 
"the darkness needed in the theatre to show up the performance" (ibid., p. 100). 
It is the constant task of consciousness to establish and maintain the bounda- 
ries and contours of a given world, to shape the forces by which that world's mean- 
ings arise, to maintain the global setting always in the explicitly possible grasp of the 
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subject, and thus to continue to give meaning to the self in relation to that world. 17 
This is analogously the task of the theatre and specifically the actor on the stage. It 
has always been a major aesthetic and ontological question, just what is produced on 
the stage? What do actors do? It can be seen in this frame that what they do is pre- 
cisely to take on a virtual body which is different from (though grounded in) their 
own habitual body, and that drama consists of creating a world which such virtual 
people inhabit. It is thus not a representation of reality but a reality in and of itself 
But it is a world intended to have objective existence for-an-audience. This may be 
clarified by considering the real "darkness in the theatre" and how the metaphor can 
express what it does. All of the world of the theatre is on the stage, set off by the 
rapid transition to the zone of indeterminacy which is the darkness. As in the life of 
perception, the world on stage can only be a world because of the darkness. To cast 
our gaze anywhere invariably precludes us from seeing somewhere else. To construe 
our world according to a given set of dimensions makes other dimensions of con- 
struction unavailable in that moment. 18 If we define performance in a general sense 
as engaging in an activity as if the quality of the activity mattered in some way, 
whether or not anyone happened to be watching, then Performance, in the theatrical 
sense, is activity in which the quality matters precisely because someone is watching. 
It is a performance "for" that someone. The audience "stands for" the perceptual 
subject; the stage is a world for them, and they, in darkness, are not objects for them- 
selves. Traditionally, an added aspect of this theatrical darkness has been that it 
conceals the spectator from the characters of the play; they are the unseen 
viewer-safe from the gaze of the other-subject, but not object. They are 
perceptually "on stage, " that is, they are in the world of the play-but are not present 
to the other in that world. They can see and hear that world, but they cannot "act" 
upon it. Each audience member is a discarnate being, a presence having no body. 
Some twentieth century theatrical experiments have been directed toward breaching 
that protective darkness, as it were , illuminating the viewer 
from behind and making 
them potentially object-for-the-character. It is in fact commonly breached in a 
particular limited way when one goes to a play "with someone" 
Having literally defined the space of the play as the area of the stage, we then 
proceed to build an environment in that space and characters begin to inhabit it. 
This discloses another essential distinction between the two kinds of space. Space of 
position is itself taken to be empty, objects are merely in it and it is thus independent 
17Perhaps one would want to say that consciousness is the performance of this task. 
18CfHeidegger's notion of "blindness. " 
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of them. But the space of situation, whether as given for-the-audience or for-the- 
character is wholly wrapped up with those objects which are in it-the set, props, 
lights, costumes, etc. -and with the movements of the characters which inhabit it, and 
the very structure of its spatiality is determined by them. The free space projected on 
the stage by a body-subject (for example, the director) is truly a paradigm case. It is 
on the one hand an empty area to be filled and on the other hand an infinity of 
possibilities to be shaped and formed into the world of the play. 
Just what is the actor's stance in this world, both as actor and as character? 
The actor takes on the phenomenal body of the character and situates It in the world 
of the play just as in "real life" a person as body-subject takes up a particular task or 
a particular environment of meaning. Just as we may speak of the musician assimi- 
lating their instrument into their body, literally "incorporating" it for the task of 
expressing their musical intention, so the actor , in shifting levels,, slips their real 
body into the new phenomenal body of the character and moves as if it were an 
instrument which has been assimilated to itself 19 This is the root of the great con- 
cern on the part of actors for the flexibility of their "instrument, " for if an actor has a 
certain fixed habitual way of moving they will be incapable of fully portraying any 
character whose habits are inconsistent With that fixed pattern. The classic case is 
the film star who in role after role plays himself If a large enough audience likes his 
habitual character he may make a great deal of money, but he is in only a limited 
sense "acting. " The often overlooked issue, which accounts for the consistent inter- 
est in the Alexander Technique among actors, is that it is not enough to culti ivate 
greater access to one's habitual repertory. One must be able to set aside aspects of 
one's habitual self. It is not enough to be able to play characters who have habits 
that I lack; I also want to play those who lack habits that I have, but that is much 
more difficult. This difficulty is a model for the one we all face when we find our- 
selves unable to respond to our situation as we would like. We find ourselves liter- 
ally unable to embody the meaning that we wish to convey when the pattern of that 
embodiment is inconsistent with our general habitual patterns of action. 
On stage this is the crux of the technical problems of motivation and appear- 
ance. The task of the theatre is not to be realistic but to be convincing, not to be 
complete but to be global. Thus what would normally be a ladder may be a tree-not 
a representation of a tree but a "tree" in the world of the play. It is, as object for-the- 
characters, a tree., and they will react to it accordingly. The audience must at once be 
19it may not be so surprising then that it was a young actor, Alexander, who 
developed a technique for improving The Use of the Seý( 
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able to know the ladder objectively as a ladder and see it through the eyes of the 
character as a tree. In life we face a similar need to recogmze that an object can 
have very different meanings simultaneously in different contexts. Just as the actor 
must have the flexibility to live in more than one reality at a time, the rest of us need 
the flexibility to live with an openness to multiple interpretations of reality. Dewey 
repeatedly pointed out that the more we learn, the greater our need for flexibility. 
Unfortunately it is often the case in habitual practice that the more we know the 
greater the tendency for routine and rigidity. 
Every figure presented on the stage including the characters' actions must 
have sufficient and proper background; it must be "motivated" in the space of si I itu- 
ation. The actor-as-character acts within the situation of her world and at the same 
time the actor-as-actor is aware of herself as object for the audience. Maintaining 
the balance between the sincerity of motivation of the character and moving so as to 
"look like... " is the skill of the great actor. Shaw said that we as the audience, "are 
not to see this woman as Ophelia, but Ophelia as this woman. " (Quoted in Carse, p. 
12) This is accomplished by situating the character as firmly as possible in their 
environment. One typical method is to invent an autobiography of a character which 
has at least as many details of their past life as are needed to motivate their action as 
given in the script. The more detailed this work is, the more complete will be the 
character's "history, " the more dimensions of meaning will be evident in the world 
the character inhabits, and thus the more real their situatedness. For that is in a sense 
what history is-the flow of the situatedness of the subject. Once they have assumed 
the characters' pasts, the actors can fully locate themselves within their characters' 
present situation, and fiction then counts as much as reality. 
The point of this discussion is that we are each actors in the worlds of our 
i just thi own experience, and we inhab it the world which we think of as our reality in Is 
way. Living is a matter of taking on virtual worlds which we in-habit (i. e. engage 
with our habitual bodies). "All the world's a stage... " has become the clich6 that 
it 
has because we recognize that, just as science is the refinement of the anticipatory 
quality of experience into a formal endeavour, so the world of the stage 
is the 
distillation of the dramatic quality of ordinary life. In terms of my three thematic 
concepts, the interplay of the continuity and the dimensionality of personal experi- 
ence is not merely conductive; it is dramatically so. The act of reconstruing, of 
choosing other dimensions along which to make sense of things is an act performed 
by a person as a whole. It is also the taking on and inhabiting of a new world with 
just these dramatic qualities. Beneath the dispositions toward certain patterns of 
action that we call habits lies the dimensionality of the habitual space of meaning out 
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of which we construct the world in which we act. For us as for the well portrayed 
character, there is a continuity between the unquestioned dimensions of meaning that 
we fail to see as the framework of our interpretation of events and those dimensions 
of action that are the structure of our "instinctive" routine reactions. Just as a good 
actor is free to "Inhabit" a wide range of possible roles, living in many worlds on the 
same stage, so every human individual has the capacity to step beyond the world of 
their habitual construction to inhabit, not just to view but to live in alternate 
constructions. In life every event that might be termed a stimulus is a perturbation of 
the balance in the organization of the whole web of a person's meaning. It produces 
a moment of "drama" in which the whole system of the person's habits must reor- 
ganize to produce the person's "response, 11 that is, their answer. If the person is too 
ill, too tired, too rushed, or too bound by routine, then one of their habits may 
dominate, as if in an attempt to maintain the balance,, and collapse the moment 
before any substantial reorganization can occur. What follows is a mechanical reac- 
tion, a product of the stimulus and the dominant habit. If the web of habit and 
meaning is complex and flexible enough to allow the drama to continue, then what 
follows is a dramatic response of the whole person. 20 In Dewey's view the signifi- 
cance, and the aesthetic value, of life lies not so much in the balance as in its restora- 
tion. What we will find later is essentially a method for insisting on that small 
dramatic space. 21 
20The character of this whole response is reminiscent of Aquinas' analysis of Beauty. 
All beautiful things, from the physical to the spiritual, are characterized by three 
qualities- Integritas, or wholeness, Consonantia, or "due proportion, " and Claritas, 
variously translated as clarity, brilliance or radiance. A beautiful thing constitutes a 
whole; it has integrity. What is more, that whole is composed of parts which are in 
due proportion with each other. The whole is also in proportion with the other things 
in its surroundings. The beautiful thing does not merely have these qualities of 
integrity and internal and external harmony, it has them in a way that calls attention 
to them. Claritas is a quality of self-assertion. The thing stands out, as if to say, 
"Come and take a look. Is this not an harmonious whole? " In just this way natural 
actions, as dramatic responses that reestablish the balance of a whole person in and 
with their envirom-nent, can be beautiful. 
211n her Master's thesis on teaching the Alexander Technique to school children, Ann 
Mathews relates the following wonderful little episode with a little girl named 
Sophie. It illustrates the comprehensive simplicity that can be generated in that 
space. 
Sophie was a child whose habitual slump suggested not only the shared 
peer group posture, but a genuine mild depression .... 
One day she was 
squatting to get something from her cubby and looking particularly 
ungraceful-up on the balls of her feet, back humped over, head pulled down 
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There is one more apparently technical point that will turn out to have great 
practical significance. We may think of space as a sort of pre-existing emptiness in 
which objects are located, just as we may think of a stage as an empty space prior to 
and independent of all of the various plays that will come to be produced upon it. 
But the stage is only a stage in relation to those plays that are on It. It is only prior to 
them in retrospect, only empty in anticipation of them. In j ust this way the space of 
meaning, the dimensions of experience, may seem to be an empty space which waits 
to be filled with the events of my life. And indeed, dimensions which I have made 
explicit, or those which I have come to habitually use, do prestructure subsequent 
perceptions and actions. They become the coordinates of a space which I in-habit, 
and which predisposes me toward seeing and doing things in familiar ways. This 
space is not prior to my experience; its dimensions are drawn from it. It is only 
empty in anticipation of future events, and even future events will remain open to 
new interpretation. In the case of ordinary geometry, certain relationships obtain 
within a set of orthogonal xyz-coordinates. Yet these dimensions are not prior to the 
space in which I draw my figures. I am free to set my origin where I will, and 
choose which way the x-axis shall go, or indeed even to use cylindrical coordinates 
instead. It is only if I come to routinely make the same choice that it comes to 
appear to have priority. Just so with meaning in general. This is why, although in 
practice many of the conversations I engage in deal with dimensions of meaning, I 
to peer into her cubby, neck nowhere to be seen. I asked her to ease back 
onto her heels. She protested that she couldn't; her designer jeans were too 
tight. I asked her to try, and said my hands would support her so that she 
wouldn't fall over backwards. She came back successfully, but was still 
hunched. I asked her to let her neck release,, her spine float up, and feet the 
air come into her lungs. My hands were still there to give her security, but 
not Doing, just being there. She lengthened up and as she did, her neck 
released and the head eased into balance. The parts, differently assembled, 
had, literally, different dimensions; there was something total about the 
change. I exclaimed in pleasure at the sight, then asked her if she would 
demonstrate the two different ways of squatting to the group. She agreed 
and at class time I had her hop on the table and slowly go through the shift 
in balance,, my hands helping, just as it had happened. As she squatted 
there, apparently quite comfortable, designer jeans and all, I asked the 
children what they had observed. "Her back went from bent to straight. " 
"She was squashed in front before and then she wasn't. " "Her head 
moved. " "Her neck got long. " "She looks more comfortable. "', I was 
pleased that they had seen everything I had hoped they would see and was 
going to Wind up the discussion when I called on one last child. "Yes, what 
did you see? " A pause, then, "She got beautiful. " Several children nodded. 
I nodded and left it at that. (Mathews 1984, p. 40) 
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prefer to speak of the dimensionality of experience. What characterizes experience 
is not its dimensions but its availability to be understood dimensionally. 
In his last work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty returns to these 
matters again, drawing a connection between knowing and what he calls the "I can. " 
In the process he elaborates a quite distinct, kinesthetic context. What is true for the 
relationship between my vision and the visible is also true for my sense of touch, in 
perhaps an even deeper way. I can at one level feel texture,. roughness, smoothness, 
etc. At another level what I touch is not textures, but objects. But I do not simply 
touch them in the abstract, nor do I cast a tactile "gaze" on them. To touch a thing I 
must reach for it. To feel its shape and texture I must move my hand across its sur- 
face. Whether I turn my head to look or reach out my hand to touch, as I move to see 
or touch an object, I find my knowledge of it already in a context of action. But 
there is more. There is something peculiar, even paradoxical about reaching out to 
touch an object. As I reach out With my right hand to touch something, I can feel my 
own hand-a touch, as it were, from the inside; I can also see my hand moving toward 
and over the thing touched. I can even touch that right hand with my own left hand. 
I am a part of the visible even as I am the one who sees. I am both the one who 
touches and am open to my own touch-in both internal and external ways. My left 
hand touches my right as it might touch any other object, except, of course that my 
right hand returns the touch. And also, as my right hand moves, I "feel" the 
movement. In a sense my right hand touches itself in movement. 22 This is a most 
difficult concept, but that should not be surprising. As Dewey pointed out, it is often 
the case that what is closest to us is the hardest to perceive, and what is closer to us 
than our very selves in action? The practical consequence of this for-itself/in-itself 
distinction is that although I am open to my own touch, although I am at least in part 
221 have found the power latent in this touch from the inside illustrated often in the 
changes that occur when a person replaces phrases like "the head" or "the knees" 
with "my head" or "my knees" in their descriptions. I was working with a student 
once as she sat writing with a pad on her lap. She had managed to gain increased 
ease in her sitting, and some decreased tension in her hand and arm, - 
but she was still 
at some distance from her own act of writing and found it difficult to maintain the 
ease whenever she began to write. At one point I reach down and touched her hand 
and said, "Now remember, this is you. " She gave a slight shudder, a surprised smile 
came to her face, the quality of integration of her whole act of sitting and writing 
changed in a way quite visible to the others present. As she reported it, she 
experienced a sudden new sense of herself as a whole, a whole that included her 
hand holding the pen, and her vision improved. Nor was this a transitory thing. 
Many of those changes stayed with her for some time, and more importantly, she was 
able to regain them to some extent later using a similar turn of thought. 
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visible to myself, although I can hear my own voice, I do not feel or see or hear my- 
self in quite the same way that I perceive the rest of my world. Watching myself on 
a video monitor while I perform some action is a very different experience from 
watching a video tape of that same performance later. Arthur Keostler, after having 
lived in the U. S. for some forty years, chanced to hear a tape recording of his own 
voice and was shocked to hear that he still spoke with a distinct accent. For years he 
had "heard" his own voice as sounding just like the American voices around him. 
He speculated that all that time he had been perceptually comparing his habitual ex- 
pectation of what his voice sounded like with itself and thus never recognizing that 
his voice actually sounded different. It was only when he heard the sound of his 
voice while he was not at the same time producing it that he was able to make an 
"objective" comparison and hear his own accent. We do not have a means of record- 
ing kinesthetic images for later "feeling" separated in time from the action itself, so 
it may not be possible to test the hypothesis that all of our inner experience of feeling 
ourselves in action exhibits this same characteristic distortion. 23 
M. 3 From Phenomenology to a Geometry of Meaning: 
Merleau-Ponty and Kelly 
Personal Construct Theory seems to be most often understood to be a theory 
of personality (this, indeed, was the title of the reprinting of the opening chapters of 
his large two volume work) but it provides a framework for something much broader 
than that (either that or we must greatly expand what we mean by "person-ality"). 
The combination of the methodology, its supporting postulates and the underlying 
philosophical assumptions provide a basis for a theory of meaning. In the introduc- 
tion to A Theory of Personality, Kelly says of the philosophical assumptions in the 
23There is an interesting parallel to Merleau-Ponty's account of touch in Carse's 
Finite and Infinite Games, in which he derives a number of what might 
be 
considered metaphorical constructs based on that of a finite game 
(where the basic 
intent is to win) and an infinite game (where it is to continue the play). One such 
contrasting pair is that of touching and moving (p. 75). To touch., in 
Carse's usage, is 
to solicit a response, and it is only "touch" when there is a response. 
Furthermore 
one cannot touch without also being touched. One cannot touch except as a whole 
person. We might say that real touch is by nature conversational. 
The contrast of 
touching is "moving. " I can move you physically by pushing on you, which is to 
relate to you as an object of my action rather than as a partner 
in conversation. An 
actor or other performer may "move" the members of the audience emotionally, and, 
as Carse has it, the difference between a "touching" performance and a 
"moving" 
one is essentially this same distinction. 
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tI irst chapter that without them "the notion of personal constructs would be little 
more than another outcropping of nineteenth century phenomenology. " His criticism 
of the phenomenological view in that work and later in "Ontological Acceleration" 
(Kelly, 1966) seems to characterize phenomenology as tending toward little more 
than a despairing subjectivism. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is certainly already 
more than that. Indeed, it has much of the same quality of dimensionality and atten- 
tion to the anticipatory and "lived" character of the knowledge of the individual as 
does Kelly's own theory. Kelly seems to be aiming his criticism at the attitudes of a 
certain kind of phenomenological psychologist rather than to phenomenology as a 
philosophical perspective. He is criticizing a particular logical error, in fact the same 
logical error often found in behaviourism. To begin by finding that I have no access 
to the "reality of things" independent of my experience of them and to decline to say 
anything about such things on that account, and then to go on to claim that there is 
no reality beyond my experience is a contradiction. This is equally so whether one is 
denying the reality of an external world outside one's subjective experience or 
denying that of the inner world of the experience of another person behind their 
observable behaviour; it is the same contradiction in either case. Phenomenology 
does not-certainly Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology does not-take the position that 
there is no reality beneath my perception,, nor even that it is futile to ask questions 
n1lout a" i but simply that my perception is primary, and further that my perception of 
the world is inseparable from my participation in the world. My question at this 
point is, What was is it about Kelly's theory and method that prevented them from 
being a mere "outcropping" of phenomenology? And how does that distinction hold 
in relation to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology in particular? 
There are two things about Kelly's theory that distinguish it clearly from a 
"merely" phenomenological view. The first is the explicit underlying assumption, 
characterized by his philosophical position of "constructive alternativism, " that there 
is a realty that lies in some silent way beneath any interpretation which we may place 
onIt. 24 The second is that while both Kelly and Merleau-Ponty hold a dimensional, 
24Note that one of the central arguments of Heidegger and others is that there is,, in 
our experience, no uninterpreted realty-simply because it is always presented to us 
already with an interpretation, and this is not lessened by its being our interpretation. 
That is, it is reality for us precisely through our interpretation. Kelly would, I 
believe, agree with this. Heidegger actually equates existence with interpretation. I 
exist in so far as I interpret a reality. I exist through my constructs. 
So I can have no 
notion of an uninterpreted reality. Yet my interpretations do not rise 
from nowhere; 
they are interpretations of something. To interpret is a transitive verb. Something is 
outside my construction, but it is only some thing in or through my construction. 
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essentially geometric view of experience, Kelly's personal construct theory goes on 
to produce a method-essentially a geometry-for articulating, reflecting on and 
reconstruing our experience by being explicit about its dimensionality. As a techne,, 
if personal construct theory is phenomenological, it is a methodology for a personal, 
experimental phenomenology. 
There have been numerous summaries of personal construct theory, and 
indeed, the axiomatic presentation by Kelly hi I imself in the early chapters of The Psy- 
chology of Personal Constructs is so clear, that it is not necessary to summarize it 
again here. There are, however, a number of important things to say about the theory 
and method. To draw together comments Kelly made in several different contexts, it 
might reasonably be said that his allegiance was not to psychology as it is, but to 
what it might become. The theory, generated out of the central metaphor of "man 
the scientist" and the principle of constructive alternativism, constitutes more than a 
psychological theory; it is also a philosophy of science. It is a philosophy of science 
which, in the line of Dewey, puts human experience squarely at the centre, thus one 
which includes the scientist. As Einstein put it, "The whole of science is nothing 
more than a refinement of everyday thinking" (Einstein, 1950, p. 59). From this per- 
spective what Kelly's theory is about is not so much everyday life as science but 
rather the qualities of everyday living the refinement of which is the formal 
endeavour we call 44science. " In other words an individual life already exhibits a 
"Scientific" character, the refinement and formalization of which is science proper. 
In developing not merely a framework for theorizing about that character but also a 
method for practicing it Kelly was bridging the gap between the science of a posited 
objective reality and the phenomenology of personal experience. 25 Personal con- 
structs are the "ways in which [a person] anticipates events" (Kelly, 1963, p. 46). 
They are not themselves objects of experience; they are, in Merleau-Ponty's terms, 
pre-objective. Constructs are the dimensions of personal meaning. And as Radley 
emphasized in "Living on the Horizon, " they are not first had and then used. They 
are not dimensions simply of our knowledge of our environment; they are the 
dimensions of our relation with our environment, dimensions of experience itself. 26 
251t IS significant in this regard that he pursued his personal study of it by engaging 
with people, psychotherapy clients and graduate students, one way or another in the 
throes of dealing with life. 
26Perhaps the most widely known aspect of Kelly's work, and one which relates 
directly to what I am calling its geometrical character, is the repertory grid 
methodology. In practice, this methodology is a way to get at the dimensionality of a 
given "class" of experience, that is, of the distinctions among experiential elements 
of a given kind. Its limitation is that it only refers to contexts in which the elements 
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111.4 Construction and Embodiment 
In the years since Kelly's own clinical application of the theory, Personal 
Construct Psychology has seen a steady expansion into a thriving djscjpljne with an 
ever wider range of application. Articles in the literature of this discipline seem to 
fall into a number of categories: those having to do with the development and 
refinement of the associated technologies (e. g. statistical analysis or computer 
implementation of repertory grids), applications to clinical practice, applications to 
education, demonstrations of applicability to other fields,, and finally those 
addressing philosophical questions. Kelly himself made it clear that viewing a 
person's behavior in ternis of personally constructed meaning is itself a way of 
construing. It is not surprising then that many of the specific applications have been 
directed towards serving the needs of clinicians or educators. There are many 
situations in which one person seeks a fruitful way of construing another person's 
construing in order to understand or interact with It'27and much of what happens in 
educational situations has to do with teachers and students construing each other and 
both of them construing some particular subject matter. 28 There are varying degrees 
are all in some way the "same kind of thing. " It relates to the ancient relation of 
genus and species. So on a given grid, what is revealed are the attributes by which a 
person distinguishes the species within a genus of experience. The particular 
methodology does not provide means for being explicit about relationships among 
bits of experience of different kinds, elements which are, for instance, causally 
related to each other. For this reason it is difficult to use in relation to a person's 
construction of processes, unless it is convenient to view the process involved as a 
series of events which can be treated as objects. Then the method can reveal the 
dimensionality of their construction as objects. There are other practical means 
available, for example, "structures of meaning" for dealing With those other aspects 
of a person's modeling of their experience. The present point is that this variety of 
practical means does not undercut the importance of Kelly's basic approach (grids 
were,, after all, only one of several techniques he proposed for dealing with various 
aspects of a person's construing) nor does it argue against the claim that the entire 
perspective can be considered as a "geometry of experience. " It is possible, using 
"relationships grids" treating "before" and "after" or a series of events as elements 
etc., to elicit dimensions of meaning in relation to process. It is seldom convenient, 
however. And,, as Kelly himself emphasized many times, this way of interpreting a 
person's construing of the events in their experience is itself a construal. 
27MOSt general collections, such as Bannister 1977, Bonarius et al 1981, Adams- 
Webber and Mancuso 1983 and Fransella and Thomas 1988, contain several articles 
in this group, and there are others,, such as Landfield and Leitner 1980 and Mancuso 
and Adams-Webber 1981, that are focused on these issues. 
28The general collections just mentioned also contain many articles concerning 
education (note e. g.. J Novak, "Personal Construct Pedagogies" in 
Adams-Webber 
and Mancuso 1983, which has an interesting discussion of the connection to 
Dewey. 
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Of explicit recognition or interest in the whole construing person (and varying 
constructions of what constitutes that wholeness). Indeed the great utility of the 
theory and its associated methodologies lies in their being applicable to an infi , inite 
variety of specific areas of personal meaning across a wide range of levels of 
abstraction. As with any kind of abstraction, there can be great convenience in being 
able to treat construction without regard to embodiment. Whether I am trying to 
make sense of another person's behaviour or my own, what counts as "behaviour" is 
already a matter of personal construction and is dependent on the level of abstraction 
of the "events" involved. Although Personal Construct Theory may contain a 
recognition of the embodied continuity of personal experience, what it is about is the 
elaboration of details within the dimensionality of personal meaning. Kelly's is a 
formal theory in that it applies in structurally the same way in relation to any level or 
domain. Again , its general utility lies in its being independent of them. If however, 
it is myself that I am trying to make sense of, then beyond the convenience of taking 
any level on its own ground, even beyond the freedom that derives from skill in 
moving between levels, I face questions to do With the relationship between the 
dimensions of my construction and the continuity of my own bodily experience. 29 
A recurring philosophical theme that relates to my work is summed up in the 
title of an article by Fay Fransella, "What Sort of Scientist is the Person-as- 
Scientist? " (Adams-Webber and Mancuso,, 1983, p. 127-135). The central question 
behind most of the philosophical branch of the literature has two forms, both of 
which are important for my own work: How is it that Personal Science is scientific? 
and, How is it personal? For me, much of the beauty of the person-as-scientist 
metaphor lies in its not always fully appreciated symmetry. There are long strands of 
debate about the aptness of the metaphor given the evidently 4; (. unscientific" 
behaviour that individuals often exhibit. There are references throughout the 
There are also applications to be found in the literature of science education, e. g.. 
Sutton 1980, Osbome et al 1983 and Preece 1984, which draw on Kelly's work. See 
also Pope and Keen, Personal Construct Psychology and Education, 198 1. 
29Two practical points on where the present work stands in relation to personal 
constructs-it will be seen later that, though it can produce therapeutic benefits,, it's 
goal is not to produce an effective therapyi even a psycho-physical one. Nor is its 
intent primarily educational. What I am seeking to develop is a basis and a 
methodology for self-inquiry, a personal science of personal action. In seeking to 
allow the person engaged in such a science to hold the widest, most integral view of 
their own action intact while engaging with the moment by moment embodiment of 
meaning in action,, there is a trade-off between the extent and level detail of the 
dimensions elicited and the leverage gained by sustaining explicit recognition of the 
dimensionality of the space beyond the accessible dimensions. 
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literature to both the utility and limitations of the metaphor (e. g. Mair, 1977) as well 
as a few more explicitly philosophical discussions. An example of the latter is F. 
Tschudi's article, "Constructs Are Hypotheses 1' (Adams-Webber and Mancuso, 
1983) which critiques a much earlier one, "Personal Constructs, Rules and the Logic 
of Clinical Activity. " (Michel, 1964) Essentially the point that both writers seem to 
have missed is that person-as-scientist implies both the positive and negative faces of 
the scientist. Just as a person may build and test theories "just like a real scientist , 
so they may also deny or distort data or even refuse to experiment,, in order to protect 
their theories-again "just like a real scientist. " A person may be a scientist, but a 
30 scientist is also a person. 
Fransella, in the article referred to above, describes Kelly as a "psychological 
physicist" (Fransella 1983, p. 135) and attempts to illuminate what sort of science h, e 
might have had in mind in his use of the metaphor. She compares Personal 
Construct Theory With David Bohm's notion of implicate order in a way that 
supports the view that if scientific knowing is a way of pursuing our relationship 
with the natural world, then there is always more to that relationship than can be held 
by the formal structures of our science. The whole discussion is summed up in her 
translation of a quotation from Bohm into the language of Personal Construct Theory 
(ibid., p. 133). 
The relationships constituting the fundamental law are 
between the enfolded structures that inter-weave and inter-penetrate 
each other, throughout the whole of space, rather than between 
abstracted and separated forms that are manifest to the senses (and to 
our instruments). (Bohm, p. 185). 
becomes, 
The relationships constituting the fundamental law are 
between the enfolded constructs that inter-weave and inter-penetrate 
each other, throughout the whole of the construct system, rather than 
between elicited and laddered construct relationships that are 
manifest to the senses (and to our grids). 
I would,, of course, argue that "the whole of space") is not only "the construct 
system" but the whole space of embodied meaning, or else that it is to the latter that 
"the whole of the construct system" really refers. This leads immediately to the 
second form of the question, How Is Personal Science "personal? " Two authors who 
have explicitly taken the matter of embodiment to be central to the matter of a whole 
construing person are Miller Mair and Phillida Salmon. Mair writes passionately 
30Cf. Connie Vaughn, "Commitment, Hostility, and the Scientist-as-Person, " J. 
Constructivist Psychology, 9-- 63-68,1996 
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about the "radical implications" of taking seriously the idea that knowing is 
"knowing personally" (Mair, 1985). In "The Community of Self' (StrInger and 
Bannister, 1979) he takes such situations as finding myself to be "of two minds" 
about something as the impetus for considering the usefulness of construing myself 
as a "community. " He pursues this metaphor out of a belief "that many of the 
possibilities in Kelly's writings are almost unreachable at present because of the 
route by which we approach them. " In practice it seems that, just as Kelly's 
constructive alternativism rests on an assumption that there is a reality which we 
construe, so construing myself as such a community of selves seems most useful in 
the context of an appreciation of the unity behind them. This is particularly so since, 
as Mair emphasizes, Kelly's theory is not about cognition or behaviour only, but is a 
theory of action. 31 
Particularly in "The Personal Venture" (Mair, 1979, p. 35-47) and in Between 
PsYchology and Psychotherapy: the poetics of experience (Mair, 1989) Mair argues, 
in effect, that the classical challenge to "Know thyself' is more costly and more 
perilous than we often recognize-which is why so few people accept it. Much of 
what we think of as knowing involves a great deal of not knowing, even of protecting 
ourselves from what it seems too costly to know. However, though it may be 
possible to conceive of "knowing that" or of "knowing how" in ways that seem to 
distance our knowing from the core of ourselves, "knowing as living personal 
experiencing" is another matter-knowing as being present in our own lives. It is the 
challenge to Kelly's construing person who "becomes a significant event" in their 
own experience. Indeed, for Mair 4ý(. personal knowing is Wider than impersonal, not 
narrower" (Mair, 1989, p. 13). Objective knowledge of any sort is always a personal 
matter, and sometimes intensely so, simply because "the act of objectifying is a 
personal act" (Mair, 1979, p. 40). 
Personal knowing takes all of you, all your sensibilities are 
relevant. Body as well as brain, feelings as well as intellect, reaction 
as well as reflection are involved. (Mair, 1979, p. 43) 
I'm not suggesting that anyone give anything up or stop doing 
what they value. I am suggesting that we take something more on 
board, so that our acts of knowing are owned as well as whatever 
objects we create from them. It is a widening of attention that I'm 
suggesting, so that we sense more of what we already do. (Mair, 
1989, p. Xiv) 
31Cf Radley's argument in "The Opposing Self, " that the most productive focus of 
our investigation is not so much a person's constructs, or the construction of an 
opposing "self, " but rather the act of construing. (Radley, 1978) 
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In characterizing a "conversational psychology" he says that, "It will be about close- 
up knowledge, knowledge that affects the knower. It will be knowledge in practice 
(not applied to practice). " (ibid., p. 216) This is certainly the sort of knowing 
referred to by both Dewey's phrase, "thinking in activity, I)i and Merleau-Ponty's, 
"knowledge in the hands. " 
Phillida Salmon's Living in Time: a New Look at Personal Development 
includes a chapter titled "Embodied Living" in which she examines some 
implications of the ways in which we construe our own bodies, especially as we age. 
Though such curious statements as, "Some individuals live in close communion with 
their bodies" seem to reveal that she continues to face the same basic dualism that 
she seeks to illuminate, the chapter lays out some of the ways in which we are 
limited by the common construal of our bodies as a sort of entity separate from 
ourselves which we struggle to control. They seem to become more recalcitrant with 
age, never quite doing what "we" want them to, and at times through their 
unconscious expressions subversively contradicting what we consciously intend. By 
pointing out that these experiences are the consequences of our ways of construing 
our own bodily experience, she frames an invitation to reconstrue that experience, 
and thus our own physical selves. Further, she notes that there are ways of 
generating new experience that can open us to such reconstruing and that, having 
engaged in them for a time, it is possible to find that, 
somehow you have come to gain access to your own experience, to 
achieve a greater grasp of your own life. In this, you have acquired a 
kind of personal freedom, through which you are, potentially, less 
imprisoned in the shackles of habitual reactions. (p. 100) 
Though Salmon invites us to consider our own embodiment as a matter worthy of 
reconstruing, it is much more than that. In light of what Mair had to say about the 
intensely personal nature of knowing, our embodiment may be seen as the central 
matter of construction, the central context of all construing. If construing, like 
ying, is a personal act, " it is an act performed not by a self who "inhabits' a objectif cc * 
body, but by a person whose embodiment is inseparable from their existence. Of 
course, as in any domain,, we are free to construe the physical dimensions of our 
experience in relation to the "bodies" which we "inhabit, ", but as always, such a 
construction has consequences. What I have sought to in this work is to 
develop a 
conversational framework for personal inquiry into these dimensions of my 
experience. In relation to the issues raised by Mair this framework is intended to 
sustain the primacy of personal knowing by making explicit the interplay 
between 
the dimensionality of experience and its continuity in action. It may be that as we 
become more articulate we will become more courageous in pursuing our inquiry 
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into ourselves. It may also be that as we become more articulate, both in our 
description and in our action, we will find the freedom Salmon spoke of as we 
embody more integral constructions of our own selves. 
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IV: THE POSTURE OF ANTICIPATION: KELLY AND ALEXANDER 
"The posture of anticipation ... silently asks questions, and earnest questions erupt in actions. " 
(Kelly, 1969 p. 3 1). 
IVA Earnest Questions 
Our actions, be they verbal, mental, bodily or whatever, be they directed 
toward ourselves, other people or the physical world, pose "earnest questions" to our 
world,, and thus each action is taken in anticipation of a reply. Every action a person 
takes, whether an action commonly thought of as thinking, perceiving, moving or 
even the act of constructing personal meaning, is an act of that person as a whole and 
thus is expressive of the conditions of the coordination of the whole person. Al- 
though methodologies such as, for example Kelly's repertory grids, tend to force us 
to focus on certain explicitly expressible aspects of a person's construing, we are all 
reminded from time to time of the deeper dimensions of our conversation with the 
world. There is open to us a wider sense of construing of a person's situation,, which 
encompasses the whole of their thoughts, feelings and actions in a single field, one 
which does not take Kelly's phrase, "posture of anticipation, " to be merely meta- 
phoncal. What has been lacking however has been a practical means of pursuing 
that Wider view. One of my central arguments is that the core of such a means is to 
be found in the work of F. Matthias Alexander. In this section I will provide a basis 
for considering Alexander's work from the perspective of Kelly's personal construct 
theory (and vice versa) in order to produce an approach to a wider view of both 
bodies of work. I have enlisted John Dewey to act as a bridge between the two. 
The genn from which Personal Construct Theory grows, Kelly's Fundamen- 
tal Postulate, states simply that "a person's processes are psychologically channel- 
ized by the ways in which he anticipates events" (Kelly, 1963, p. 46). What I want to 
do is open a fresh consideration of the particular sigmificance of the words 
"processes" and "psychologically") and the way Kelly explains his use of them. He 
makes it quite clear that "processes" is intended to refer to the actions of the person 
as a whole "behaving organism. " He goes so far as to say that, "For our purposes, 
the person is not an object which is temporarily in a moving state but is himself a 
form of motion" (ibid., p. 48). Regarding the word "psychologically" Kelly means 
"that we are conceptualizing processes in a psychological manner, not that the proc- 
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esses are psychological rather than something else" (ibid., p. 48). The Postulate does 
not say that a persons psychological processes are channelized, but that the person's 
processes, in the sense of the whole of their actions, are channelized in ways which 
May be construed psychologically. What is being delimited is our way of attempting 
to construe a person's processes and not the processes themselves. 
The whole notion of "Psychology" is based on the observation of "mental'" or 
psychological facts" which we find it convenient to construe "psychologically" as 
distinguished from facts which are "physical" or "physiological" and thus more con- 
veniently construed within a system of "natural science" constructs. The ranges of 
convenience of these alternate construction systems are not, however, exclusive. As 
Kelly points out, "the events upon which facts are based hold no institutional loyal- 
ties" (ibid., p. 10). A person's processes might be fruitfully construed physically, 
psychologically or both, but the processes themselves are, ". something else. '" In 
Kelly's terms, it is the constructs and not necessarily the elements that are psycho- 
logical. Constructs, as the psychological dimensions of whole experience, are the 
ways in which we may anticipate that an element of experience will be like or not 
like other elements. The essential point is that we need not construe them as being 
psychological in order to construe them psychologically. In practice, however, it 
seems to be rather easy to miss this distinction and to treat personal processes as if 
they could be sorted into distinct "mental" and "physical"' categories (standing, 
walking, making a tennis stroke, etc. being physical; thinking, perceiving, constru- 
ing, etc., mental). Of course we may sort them thus, but there is always a price to be 
paid. It may be convenient to view events in the first set from the perspective of 
physics, biomechanics, etc. and the second set from a psychological perspective, but 
we encounter many events which fall in the borderlands between the two realms. 
Are drawing a landscape from memory, improvising at the piano or making a presen- 
ing at a computer, composing a doctoral tation at a conference, or for that matter, sitti 
dissertation, mental or physical acts? In regarding these borderland acts, and espe- 
cially when 1, as a living person regard my own acts, the becomes not only the 
value of recognizing that I may construe events in either way, but that "mental-physi- 
cal' Is itself a very pervasive construct which may have become "inconvenient. " 
Constructs are abstractions in that they are drawn from experience and are not prior 
to it. Yet this abstracting is a two way process-elements of experience lead to ab- 
stract concepts which become a framework that structures experience. A preferred 
set of dimensionsý, that is,, an habitual way of anticipating the consequences of my 
actions, amounts to a constructive "posture. " This "posture of anticipation" is a 
stance taken up by a whole person in relation to their environment and is as physical 
ing an as it is metaphorical. Every act, including the act of construing, that is, of placi 
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Interpretation on events, is an act of the whole person-in other words, meani is ng 
embodied. 
To anyone familiar with Kelly's perspective, this may seem obvious. What is 
called for, however , is a practical way of taking the obvious into account in order to 
transcend it. Kelly himself asserts the essential scientific humility of his psychology 
of personal constructs by noting that "no one has yet proved wise enough to -pro- 
pound a universal system of constructs, " (ibid., p. 10) and then recognizing the con- 
stant need to be careful in our application of our ". miniature systems. " What an 
individual person needs is not so much a personal version of a universal system of 
constructs but a means of continuing the "conversation" about their own 
meaning-both the "explicitly formulated" or verbally expressible and the "utterly 
inarticulate" meanings which are embodied in the organization of their actions. This 
is no easy task. Emphasizing that since "many of one's constructs have no symbols 
to be used as convenient word handles, " it is difficult to bring them within the 
organization of the "verbally labelled parts of the system, " (ibid., p. 110) Kelly notes 
that this makes it very difficult to be articulate about how one feels or to predict 
one's future actions. For example, 
A person may say that he will not take a drink if he is offered 
one tomorrow. But when he says so he is aware only of what he can 
verbally label; he is not fully aware of what it will be like tomorrow 
when tomorrow's situation actually confronts him. The situation 
which he envisions is,,, to be sure, one in which he would not take the 
drink. But the situation which actually rolls around may loom up 
quite differently and he may do what he has promised himself and 
others he would not do. There may be a failure of his structure, or, 
more particularly, that part of it which is verbally labelled, to 
subsume adequately certain aspects of the rest of the system. (ibid., p. 
110) 
It is little wonder that we so often seem to others to be unwilling, and to our- 
selves, unable to reconstrue our situation-or to do very much to change matters. 
Often the only parts which we can conceive of reconstruing are those parts which we 
can explicitly become aware of having construed, and so long as the conversation is 
limited to the verbal or conceptual domain,, too much of our construction lies hidden 
in the inarticulate. We cannot reflect on this unarticulated experience 
because we 
lack a language in which to converse about it. Kelly says that the reality of a concept 
"exists in its actual employment by its user" (ibid., p. 106). But to employ a particu- 
lar construction is to act out of a commitment to it, not merely to project it into some 
disembodied abstract space. Meaning, for me, is a relationship between myself and 
the situation in which I find myself and in which I must act. The construction of 
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meaning has to do not only with the anticipation of events, but with anticipated 
action. Thus an action is not only a behavioural "experiment, " but my engagement 
in conversation with my world, and an event in my experience is not only the result 
Of an experiment, it is a response. To act out of commitment to a construction is to 
"live in anticipation" of that response. The task at hand is to find a means of bring- 
ing my part in the conversation to a more reflective level. We shall see that Alexan- 
der provides a means for meeting just that task. 
IV. 2 "Body" and "Mind" 
In my view John Dewey provides a natural bridge between Kelly and Alex- 
ander. Kelly says of Dewey that his "philosophy and psychology can be read be- 
tween many of the lines of the psychology of personal constructs" (ibid., p. 154). He 
finds Dewey's view "that we understand events through anticipating them" (ibid., p. 
157) beneath his own claim "that our lives are wholly oriented toward anticipation of 
events" (a claim with which Dewey would have agreed). I have already cited 
Dewey's biographical statement that his ideas of mind-body etc. required his work 
with the Alexander brothers "to transform the into realities. " 
In a talk given to the New York Academy of Medicine in 1927, Dewey dis- 
cussed what he considered the vital importance of the issue at hand. After lamenting 
the fact that the mind-body split is so pervasive in our experience that we seem to 
have no way of even expressing the unity except by such hyphenations as "mind- 
body, " which actually serve to perpetuate the split, Dewey proposed that the way out 
the trap is to centre our attention on "unity in action. " And he felt it vitally impor- 
tant that we do find a way out. The talk was later published under the title, "Body 
and Mind. " (Dewey, 193 1, p. 299) He writes,, 
Thus the question of integration of mind-body In action Is the 
most practical of all questions we can ask of our civilization .... 
Until 
this integration is effected in the only place where it can be caffled 
out, in action itself, we shall continue to live in a society in which a 
soulless and heartless materialism is compensated for by a soulful but 
futile idealism and spiritualism ... 
for materialism is not a theory, but a 
condition of action ... and spiritualism is not a theory 
but a state of ac- 
tion. (ibid., p. 304) 
it is precisely in the practical continuity of human action that Dewey finds the unity 
III ident in our of mind and body. Indeed, he finds in the degree of their unity that is ev 
actions, a measure of humanity. 
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The more human mankind becomes, the more civilized it is, 
the less is there some behaviour which is purely physical and some 
other purely mental. So true is this statement that we may use the 
amount of distance which separates them in our society as a test of the lack of human development in that community. ( ibid., p. 304) 
In order to find this unity, or rather this continuity, of mind and body in action, we 
must be able to distinguish other dimensions of meaning within our actions. 
We need to distinguish between action that is routine and 
action alive with purpose and desire; between that which is cold, and 
as we significantly say inhuman, and that which is warm and sympa- 
thetic-, between that which marks a withdrawal from the conditions of 
the present and a retrogression to split off conditions of the past and 
that which faces actualities, between that which is expansive and de- 
veloping because including what is new and varying and that which 
applies only to the uniform and repetitious; between that which is 
bestial and that which is godlike in its humanity; between that which 
is spasmodic and centrifugal, dispersive and dissipating, and that 
which is centered and consecutive.... What most stands in the way of 
our achieving a working technique for making such discriminations 
and applying them in the guidance of the actions of those who stand 
in need of assistance is our habit of splitting up the qualities of action 
into two disjoint things. (ibid., p. 305) 
It is certainly possible to read Kelly's ideas between the lines here and say 
that Dewey is speaking for an alternate way of construing the quality of human ac- 
tion. But why do we then seem to be "unwilling to reconstrue" ourselves and our 
actions in this new way? Dewey points us in Alexander's direction in search of an 
answer when he refers to Alexander in pointing out that, 
Until we have a procedure in actual practice which demonstrates this 
continuity [of mind and body], we shall continue to engage in some 
other specific thing, some other broken off affair, to restore connect- 
edness and unity [and thus] increase the disease in the means used to 
cure it. (Dewey, 1958, p. 296) 
IV. 3 A New Field of Inquiry 
The opening chapter of The Use of the Se4(, "The Evolution of a Technique , 
(Alexander, 1932) is Alexander's own account of how he came to develop Just such 
a procedure. In 1890 F. M. Alexander was a young Australian with a promising 
career before him as an actor and recitationist. He was, however, plagued by one 
II ing on stage, his voice serious, recurring difficulty-at some point during an even' 
would become hoarse, sometimes so much so that he could scarcely speak by the end 
of the performance. His doctors could find nothing medically wrong and could ad- 
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vise no treatment beyond rest for his voice. After this happened at one particularly 
important engagement, young Alexander decided to find out for himself just what 
was causing his troubles and what he might do to prevent their return. He reasoned 
that as he only had his vocal difficulty while on stage, there must be something dif- 
ferent about the way he used his vocal mechanism in the act of reciting that caused 
his trouble. His years of patient self-observation opened up what he saw as a "new 
field of enquiry" about the "psycho-physical" functioning of the human individual as 
a whole. His investigations produced a set of principles and an evolving method of 
putting those principles to practical use in daily activity. What Alexander discovered 
about himself was that his difficulties, and the means for addressing them, could not 
be separated into distinct categories of mental and physical. He found that every 
specific act was taken in the context of the functioning of the entirety of his "psycho- 
physical mechanisms" and thus that the quality of every act was determined by the 
conditions of the coordination of his whole self This proved to be equally the case 
for the "mental" conception of the act to be perfon-ned, the "physical"' movements 
made in carrying out that conception and the "sensory appreciation" by which he 
judged the fit between the two. 
He found himself in the midst of a serious dilemma, however. Having be- 
come accustomed to performing the act of reciting in his familiar way, his sensory 
appreciation had become as habituated as had his muscular efforts. Thus even when 
he had demonstrated that he was not doing what he thought he was doing, it never- 
theless "felt right. " Worse still, he found that at the "critical moment" of actually 
initiating some movement, the moment, as he experienced A, of putting his intention 
to speak into practice, he relied on that very same faulty sensory appreciation to 
guide his action. These habitual patterns, both the specific patterns which defined 
acts such as "reciting" and the more general patterns which constituted what he 
called the "general manner of use"" of himself, involved components which interfered 
with the very coordinating processes which otherwise would have brought about the 
result he desired. One could suppose that Alexander might have elicited a set of 
constructs underlying his conception of, for example, the act of reciting, a set of 
kinesthetic dimensions of how various ways of "using" himself in speaking differed 
from one another. From the perspective being developed here, however, his 
construction of any particular act to be performed would be inseparable from his 
construing of himself in the performance. This would include the interpretation pro- 
vided by his sensory appreciation and thus would be in large part what might be 
termed a kinesthetic construction. To be capable of performing an act in a different 
way was also to conceive of the act itself differently-and thus to reconstrue himself 
in the doing. This he found himself unable to do. Indeed, he labelled as a "delusion 
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which is almost universal" the assumption that because we find ourselves able to act 
at will in carrying out familiar habitual acts, we expect to be equally able to do so 
when the act we conceive is unfamiliar and counter to our habit. No matter how he 
might reconstrue the act at a verbal level by telling himself to do it differently, when 
the moment came and in spite of his best efforts, he carried it out in the familiar way. 
In fact, he discovered, the situation was worse; it was because of his effort that he 
found himself trapped in the familiar, and the greater the effort, the more he seemed 
dominated by his habit and the greater the amplification of the interference with his 
natural functioning. This is a phenomenon Alexander termed "end-gaining" and it 
proved to be the root cause of his original vocal problem. Eventually Alexander 
came to realize that his original hypothesis had been only partially correct on two 
counts. It was not only his vocal apparatus that was involved, and not just in the act 
of reciting, but his habitual use of his whole self in every act he performed. It was 
the malcoordination inherent in his everyday speaking habits,, amplified by the effort 
of "reciting" as he construed it, which resulted in his loss of voice. 
How are we to account for this inability to change? The situation is very 
similar to that in Kelly's example of taking a drink. 32 In effect, when a way of acting 
becomes habitual all of the constructs used to conceive it become subsumed under 
the single kinesthetic construct "feels normal-feels not normal" or to use a common 
alternate label, "feels right-feels wrong. " As Alexander wrote, "The act and the 
particular feeling associated with it become one in our recognition" (Alexander, 
192-3), p. 132). We might also say that the associated feeling, as an element of expe- 
rience, becomes a figure symbol for, and thus hides, the whole system of underlying 
constructs. The situation is self-perpetuating because continuing to act in commit- 
ment to that construction makes extremely unlikely just the sort of "unfamiliar sen- 
sory experience" which could provide the basis for significant reconstruction. Kelly 
refers to habit as "a convenient kind of stupidity which leaves a person free to act 
intelligently elsewhere. " But he adds, "whether he takes advantage of the opportu- 
nity or not is another question. " (Kelly, 1963, p. 169) In Alexander's view this fail- 
ure to take advantage is not a matter of mere oversight. When what we hold fixed is 
just those aspects of our whole functioning which could coordinate our response to 
32There is a very similar illustration in chapter 11 of Dewey's Human Nature and 
Conduct where he writes of the man with a drinking problem, whose every effort to 
stop simply becomes another stimulus to drink. His drinking habit, Dewey says, is 
not merely a matter of failure "to drink water. " It is an active predisposition to a 
certain course of positive action under certain conditions. Dewey's 
description, 
explicitly based on his view of Alexander's work, is a practical prescription 
for 
reconstruing our situation as a whole, not only the verbally labelable parts. 
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changing conditions and requirements, we hold ourselves in that unfortunate state in 
which our every effort to improve makes our situation worse: 33 
The truth is that so far man has failed to understand fully what 
is required for changing habit if the change is to be a fundamental one because he has not realized that the establishment of a particular habit 
in a person is associated in that person with a certain habitual manner 
of using the self, and that because the organism works as an integrated 
whole, change of a particular habit in the fundamental sense is 
impossible as long as this habitual manner of use persists. 
(Alexander, 1941 p. 93) 
It doesn't matter what sort of habit we are speaking of Chronic muscular pat- 
terns, stereotyped reactive behaviours and rigid opinions or "fixed ideas" are all ex- 
amples of the same phenomenon, and, as Alexander noted, 
... the majority of people fall into a mechanical habit of thought as 
easily as they fall into the mechanical habit of body which is its im- 
mediate consequence. (Alexander, 1910, p. 20) 
Fixed construction, the inability to reconstrue one's situation, can also be seen as 
habitual in Alexander's sense. That is, it is just the doing-in this case construing-in 
the old way which prevents a person from being able to even fully conceive of, let 
alone carry out, doing in a new way. More precisely, in Alexander's view, it is the 
fact that the old way, however obviously unsatisfactory we may know it to be, "feels 
right" to us. We know we are performing a particular action "our way" by how it 
feels, and this feeling is a sensory interpretation which we place on our own physical 
response to our situation. It is itself constructed and constructive. When I am faced 
with a stimulus from my environment, I respond, in ways channelized by how I have 
construed the stimulus. What I "feel" is my sensations of my own response. I per- 
ceive my own movement. But I also construe the meaning of that feeling (sensory 
appreciation) and my awareness of "how I feel" becomes itself a stimulus to further 
response. I had a student once who, after working with me for several mmutes,, was 
able to release a good bit of habitual excess tension, particularly across the upper 
part of her chest. Her movements took on a freedom and quality of softness and 
grace that were immediately recognizable by her and her friends who were watching. 
But then she put her hand to her chest and said, CYou know what this is. " We were 
all puzzled, wondering what "this" referred to. We were even more puzzled when 
she continued, "This is defeat. " Here was a person who on several occasions in her 
life had felt a need to be "strong'7-and had done so in part by means of a certain 
33This situation is illustrated by the novelist in the second session on the videotape in 
Appendix 2. 
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pattern of pushing and holding up her chest. It had been, unnoticed by her, her way 
of embodying her concept of strength. The only times when she was without the 
feeling which she associated with this unconscious push had been on those occasions 
when her strength had not been enough and someone or something had "defeated" 
her. Hence,, when in the context of an improved general coordination she was able to 
give up her push, at first the only available interpretation she could find for the 
absence of the associated feeling was a construal based on past kinesthetic experi- 
ence. What looked to us like power and freedom, and despite the fact that she 
"knew" that it was, nevertheless to her "feelings" literally meant "defeat. " I have 
seen many other similar, if usually less dramatic, examples of this sort of kinesthetic 
conception. The change in, for example, a person's way of standing, is already the 
embodiment of a reconstrual, and the same context of general coordination within 
which it was possible also permits a reinterpretation of the meaning of the feelings 
that the change elicits. My defeated friend was able to recognize her felt interpreta- 
tion as such. She was able to feel what she felt and at the same time to appreciate 
that the feeling (or more properly, the meaning she attributed to what she felt) was in 
essence an opinion she held and was itself open to change. It is often claimed that 
emotional memories etc. are somehow "stored" in a person's body, and thus can be 
"released" when changes are made. What I have found in this and similar episodes is 
that rather than being stored in the tissue these states are embodied in dynamic pat- 
terns of movement. Thus to move differently is already to embody a reinterpretation. 
This doubly constructive process is elaborative. In principle, it may be either 
expansive or constrictive depending on the stance taken. To be habitual is, in 
Kelly's terms, to expect the duplication of events rather than anticipating their 
replication. 34 It is to see, and respond to, every event as a repeated instance of 
34There is a terminological difficulty which bears some mention here. The term, 
"habit, " as used by Alexander, and somewhat by Kelly, tends to carry the common, 
narrow sense of a routine or robotic pattem of behavior. Even when Alexander 
speaks of one's "general manner of use of the self, " the underlying construct could 
be alternately labeled as "habitual" vs. "non-habitual" or as "habitual" vs. 
"consciously directed. " There is a wider sense of habit, however, which underlies 
much of the philosophy of Dewey and of Merleau-Ponty, habit as the basis for our 
inhabiting the world in which we act. From this wider perspective it is evident that 
when I escape from a particular dominant habitual pattern, however general, I do not 
become free of habit, but rather I come to a condition in which my present response 
to my world is the product of one of the interplay of all of my habitual dispositions 
taken together. Thus for Dewey being "consciously directed" is not the opposite of 
being habitual; it is simply being intelligently so. To move beyond habit in the 
narrow sense is not to be freed from habit but rather to become free to embrace its 
wider dimensions. 
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something already known. Alexander saw it as a failure to recognize the psycho- 
Physical unity of our self in action: 
... man's most tragic mistake has been his failure to acquire knowl- 
edge of himself as an individual functioning as a psycho-physical 
whole in his daily activities, for this has deprived him of the key to 
knowledge which could give him a new technique in living 
(Alexander, 1941 p. 218). 
Whatever insights this discussion might provide into how we trap ourselves 
in this constrictive choice would be of only mild interest and indeed, would be,, in 
Alexander's opinion, so much "useless philosophical speculation" unless it helped us 
come into possession of a means for doing something about it, a means for demon- 
strating the continuity of mind and body in practice. It was the possession of such a 
means that was Alexander's goal- 
was concerned with a technique for dealing with the working of 
the living human organism as a whole, which called for a knowledge 
of the so-called mental (psychological) and the physical 
(physiological and anatomical) working of the human organism as an 
indivisible unity. (ibid., p. 135) 
In essence, what Alexander developed was a coherent way of implementing 
the experimental method in the context of that indivisible unity, a comprehensive 
method for being a "personal scientist" regarding the "new field of inquiry" of the 
directing of our own actions, and thus a context within which certain kinds of re- 
construing can take place, Among the conditions which Kelly discusses as 
"unfavourable to the formation of new constructs" is the unavailability of a labora- 
tory, a space in which to "try them out" (Kelly, 1963 p. 169). But a laboratory situ- 
ation implies that there is not only a space in which to experiment, but also a method 
of experimenting. If we recognize that when Kelly speaks of anticipating or constru- 
ing he is not referring to "mental" acts, but to acts perfornied by the person as a 
whole in relation to their situation, and if we further take explicit note of the fact that 
such acts, like any others , involve just that 
"unity of mind-body in action" to which 
Dewey referred, then Alexander's work can be seen as providing just the sort of 
experimental method needed for the laboratory of new constructs. Such a method 
will prove equally vital whether the matters being reconstrued are those commonly 
thought of as physical, mental or otherwise. 
54 
The Posture of Anticipation: Kelly and Alexander 
IVA All Together, One After The Other 
it is easy to see how a rigid habitual stance also sustains Kelly's other two 
unfavourable conditions. We find it difficult to reconstrue in a context of "threat. " 
In our ordinary habitual mode, where there has been a reduction to the "feels right 
vs. feels wrong" construct, any new, unfamiliar experience can only "feel wrong. " 
Thus any unfamiliar new sensory experience is by construction, threatening. Also, if 
the primary kinesthetic criterion for evaluating the performance of any habitual 
action is that it feels essentially the same as it always has, we are kinesthetically 
always preoccupied with "old material. " Construing is an abstractive process of 
interpreting experience in terms of similarity and difference. Habitual action, by 
focusing us on what feels the same , marks a withdrawal 
from the conditions of the 
present" by attempting to escape their uniqueness. It is as if the dimensions of the 
familiar so dominate a person's experience that they have no access to the very fresh 
material in the present conditions which might lead them to a new construction. A 
common, but nonetheless curious, illustration of this channelling of experience is 
seen, or rather heard, in the case of phonological differences between languages. In 
English the letters I and r represent distinct phonemes. Native Japanese speakers 
have notorious difficulty with the pronunciation of these sounds. The situation is 
more subtle than it at first appears, however. The "obvious" explanation for the 
Japanese speakers' difficulty is that their native language does not have a phoneme 
corresponding precisely with either the English 1 or r, and thus, if they have learned 
English later in life,, they lack the requisite experience with producing those sounds 
and therefore often interchange them. Japanese does have a phoneme which does 
rom the English point of view, lies not precisely correspond with either I or r, but, f 
somewhere between them. The influence of their experience with this phoneme in 
their native language does lead to an imprecision in producing the English sounds. 
IV ish "listener. " It What is most curious, however, is the experience of the nati e Engl 
is as though their auditory perception system includes a construct that could 
be 
labelled "sounds like /-sounds like r. " Or rather, if for example hearing the word 
"around" and thus anticipating the sound of r, there is a simultaneous use of two 
constructs-the one above and another, "sounds like r-sounds not 
like r. " The effect 
then is that any sound that is not quite the anticipated r sound is perceived as an 
1. 
Similarly any imprecise pronunciation of I is perceived as an r. The hearer of course 
attributes the switching of the phonemes to the speaker. 
The same switching often 
occurs when native Spanish speakers pronounce the 
English b or v,, and of course 
with native English speakers trying to pronounce the 
Japanese or Spanish phonemes. 
V, rhat is strange is that any sound which is not quite right should always sound 
like 
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the "'wrong" sound. 35 Similarly, any feeling we have in association with our action 
which does not quite "feel right" tends to feel "wrong" rather than "nearly right. " 
There are, however, some conditions which are favourable to the formation 
of new constructs'. use of fresh elements, experimentation, and availability of 
validating data. (ibid., p. 161) Alexander's experimental technique meets each of 
them. The experimentation, by achieving a means of using aspects of one" s physical 
experience normally frozen in habit as validating data, provides a context within 
which the fresh elements of unfamiliar sensory experience become possible. Indeed, 
as I will discuss later, this is precisely what Dewey found most significant about 
Alexander's work. It is a method for generating new experience, and what is more,, a 
new kind experience. 
There is, I believe, one more significant parallel to be drawn between Kelly's 
insistence that it is only by engaging in the full cycle of experience that we begin to 
see the significance of a person's construing, and Alexander's insistence that it is 
only in relation to the use of the self as a psycho-physical whole that any specific act 
has meaning or utility. In Kelly's case it is not merely the whole of experience that 
matters, but the whole cycle of experience. To Alexander, an individual is not only 
.C whole, " but an organi.: ed whole, and it is attention to the organizing principle of the 
functioning of the whole that is the key to his experimental "new technique in liv- 
ing. " For both men there was a clear sense that a person's processes are both integral 
and sequential-in a phrase Alexander liked to use, "all together, one after the other. " 
The implicit logical structure of these processes is what I refer to as "conductive, "36 
and from the present perspective a persons dynamic engagement with that logical 
structure is an engagement in "conductive reasoning. " 
It is in this interplay of thought and action, of the ways in which meaning is 
embodied and bodily action is meaningful, of the all together and the one after the 
other of our "posture of anticipation, " that a view which is both constructive in 
Kelly's sense and psycho-physical in Alexander's promises to be very fruitful. As a 
person reflects upon their own construing, the more dimensions of that process that 
can be brought explicitly into the conversation the better. 
35The case of Arthur Keostler, mentioned earlier, is a somewhat related 
phenomenon. 
36See "A Conversational Introduction to Conductive Reasoning" for the derivation. 
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V: EVOLUTION OF A TECHNIQUE AND A TEACHING METHOD 
V-1 The Alexander Technique as Conversational Personal Science 
Alexander, though neither trained nor working within the scientific com- 
munity, took pride in the assertions of Coghill, Sherrington and others concerning 
the scientific character of his work. There has been , in addition, a good deal of 
effort and discussion among his supporters in the years since to establish its specific 
benefits and, for example, the physiological reality of "primary control. 1137 However 
important the principles Alexander discovered may turn out to be, that they are "in 
harmony With what physiologists know about the muscular and nervous structure, " 
(Dewey, Introduction to The Use of the Seýf, p. xvi. ) does not imply that Alexander's 
work was itself "scientific. " Newton's laws of motion are certainly "scientific 
principles" of the first magnitude, but what was most important about Newton's 
work was not the laws themselves, but the systematic methods that he developed to 
establish them. Dewey, in particular, was convinced that Alexander's work has a 
similar character and potentially a similar value. Dewey's colleagues and students 
always assumed that his support for Alexander was merely an expression of gratitude 
for certain physical relief that he had received, but Dewey's own view,, expressed 
consistently in his introductions to Alexander's books and elsewhere, was that what 
1 1. c was important about Alexander were precisely the philosophical onsequences of the 
practice of his work and its "unwearied" experimental character. Jones refers to 
Alexander's technique as "nothing more than the application of experimental 
method to problems of everyday behaviour. " (Jones, 1976, p. 160) From that view- 
is point, Alexander can be viewed as unique kind of "personal scientist. " In thi 
section I want to return to the question of just what it was that Dewey saw in 
Alexander's work beyond the specific benefits of his technique. Drawing primarily 
from Dewey's introductions to Alexander's books, I will consider this scientific 
character of Alexander's work and its importance as such an experimental method 
for a science of personal action. 
The scientific method is generally understood in the natural sciences to con- 
sist of a series of interrelated steps: 
37See e. g. Jones, 1976 and Garlick, 1990 
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1. Observation-we observe some phenomena of interest, gather and attempt 
to interpret our observations. (Note that even our most basic observations are condi- 
tioned by our prior habits of perception and our earlier theories. ) 
2. Theorizing-we build a theory to account for the apparent order in our ob- 
servations. (Note that what kind of theory seems reasonable to us Is conditioned by 
our prior experience and observation. ) 
3. Hypothesis-we use our theory to propose claims about possible new ob- 
servation. That is, we anticipate the character of new experience. 
4. Experiment-we devise and carry out experiments, which are essentially 
procedures designed to give us new experiences of events as they would not ordinar- 
ily happen, to test whether our hypothesis is bome out. 
1. Observation-our experiments provide new observations which may or 
may not support our hypotheses, may or may not fit our current theoiy. 38 
Since observation is both the first and last step in the procedure, the scientific 
method is an endless cycle of exploration rather than any kind of completed package, 
and the process results not in an ever-rising pile of fragments of "truth, " but rather in 
a series of constructed theories that are ever more effective approximations to truth, 
what Plato called "likely stories. " This situation is what Kelly calls "constructive 
altemativism. " As he characterizes it in "The Psychology of the Unknown, " 
Our venture as scientists, then is not to press with one hand on 
what is presumed to be known for sure and reach out With the other 
into the unknown for more bits of the puzzle, but rather to proceed 
from propositions which are admittedly faulty, in the hope that we can 
complete fully the experiential cycles which will enable us to 
formulate new propositions that are perhaps less faulty. 
The central point of Dewey's argument, in the introductions to Constructive 
Conscious Control of the Individual and The Use of the Seýf, is that it is precisely in 
38Two points about this basic description- First, many practicing scientists consider 
this "classical" description to be oversimplified if not naive. However, if the four 
phases are viewed as dimensions of the process of scientific effort rather than as non- 
overlapping sequential stages, then it still provides a good basic description of the 
essence of experimental science. Secondly, Thomas and Harri-Augstein's proposal 
of a conversational science paradigm as an alternative to either the objectivist natural 
science or the subjectivist personal science paradigm by no means calls on us to 
abandon this fundamental framework. Conversational science is 
both natural and 
personal. Indeed it is simply the recognition of the unity of a natural world that 
includes in it sense-making persons. A personal science that is cognizant of myself 
as an embodied subject cannot be a science without being conversational. 
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the bringing together of observation and principle that the scientific character of 
Alexander's work is to be found. 
Those who do not identify science as a parade of technical 
vocabulary will find in this account the essentials of scientific method 
in any field of inquiry. They will find a record of long continued, 
patient, unwearied experimentation and observation In which every 
inference is extended, tested, corrected by further more searching 
experiments. (Alexander, 1932, p. xiv. ) 
Any sound plan must prove its soundness in reference both to 
concrete consequences and to general principles. What we too often 
forget is that these principles and facts must not be judged separately, 
but in connexion with each other. Further, whilst any theory or prin- 
ciple must ultimately be judged by its consequences in operation, 
whilst it must be verified experimentally by observation of how it 
works, yet in order to justify a claim to be scientific, it must provide a 
method for making evident and observable what the consequences 
are- and this method must be such as to afford a guarantee that the 
observed consequences actually flow from the principle. And I 
unhesitatingly assert that, when judged by this standard, that is, of a 
principle at work in effecting definite and verifiable consequences, 
Mr. Alexander's teaching is scientific in the strictest sense of the 
word. It meets both of these requirements. In other words, the plan of 
Mr. Alexander satisfies the most exacting demands of scientific 
method. (Alexander, 1923, p. xxv. ) 
Dewey implies in these passages that it is the ongoing detailed interaction of 
principle and concrete observation that matters, and that the interaction is an ongoing 
effort, governed by an ethic, 
But the essence of scientific method does not consist in taking 
consequences in gross: it consists precisely in the means by which the 
causes that are used to explain the consequences, or effects, can be 
concretely followed up to shew that they actually produce these con- 
sequences and no others. (ibid., p. xxviii. ) 
The method, what Alexander would call "working to principle, ") is every- 
thing. Otherwise we have not science but merely assertion. Dewey makes a predic- 
tion: 
To this process of simultaneous development of principles and 
consequences, used as means for testing each other, there is literally 
no end. As long as Mr. Alexander uses the method., it will be a proc- 
ess tending continually towards perfection. It will no more arrive at a 
stage of finished perfection than does any genuine experimental pro- 
cedure, with its theory and supporting facts. (ibid., p xxxvii. ) 
Indeed one might even say that the importance of the principles discovered is pre- 
cisely that they generate new observations, and this is the case whether it is Mr. Al- 
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exander himself or any other person who uses the method. It is not enough to ac- 
count for what is already known, nor to speculate about what is unknown. The ex- 
perimental method is , in a sense, a 
bridge between the two, and that bridge must be 
built of real, personal experience. This is true Of science generally39-but how much 
more so when the subject of the science is nothing less than the scientists them- 
selves. How can we possibly understand ourselves if we begin by taking our habitual 
perceptions of ourselves at face value? 
This, of course, is precisely as if a scientific man, who, by a 
process of reasoning had been led to a belief in what we call the 
Copernican theory, were then to try to test this reasoning by appealing 
to precisely those observations, without any addition or alteration, 
which led men to the Ptolemaic theory. 40 (ibid., p. xxxi. ) 
If we are to come to a fuller understanding of ourselves, much less of a world 
in which we play an active role, then we require new sense data. It is often forgotten 
that however "public" scientific knowledge may be, science is always a matter of 
personal experience. The problem for the scientist is often one of finding the ap- 
propriate kind of experience. What then is the kind personal experience appropriate 
to the study of myself as an active participant in my world, rather than an observer at 
some remove from it? How, as well, am I to go about gathering such data? 
A scientific man is quite aware that no matter how extensive 
and thorough is his theoretical reasoning, and how definitely it points 
to a particular conclusion of fact, he is not entitled to assert the con- 
clusions of fact, until his senses have been brought into play. With 
respect to distinctively human conduct, no one, before Mr. Alexander, 
has even considered just what kind of sensory observation is needed 
in order to test and work out theoretical principles. Much less have 
thinkers in this field ever evolved a technique for bringing the requi- 
site sensory material under definite and usable control.... After 
studying over a period of years Mr. Alexander's method in actual 
39This also applies to the process of learning a science. 
40There is an interesting double irony in this last passage. For that is just what 
Copernicus did (though at the time, of course, he had no choice). It was Kepler's 
effort to make sense of Brahe's new observations which provided the evidence 
for 
the superiority of the Copernican view. Kepler's account of his struggles with these 
new data, and with his preconceived notions about the nature of the solution, is a 
very atypical scientific treatise. Rather than just giving a clear derivation of 
his final 
successful calculations, he provides a detailed account of all his blind alleys and 
failures. It gives an unusually full picture of the origins of what became Kepler's 
Laws, and is very important in spite of the fact that it doesn't "look like" a scientific 
paper. It has much in common with Alexander's account in "The Evolution of a 
Technique" (Alexander, 1932, chapter 1). 
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operation, I would stake myself upon the fact that he has applied to 
our ideas about ourselves and our acts exactly the same method of 
experimentation and of production of new sensory observations, as 
tests and means of developing thought, that have been the source of 
all progress in the physical sciences. (ibid., p. xxx) 
V. 2 Towards a New Science? 
In these passages, Dewey has clearly taken the role of apologist for Alexan- 
der. My intent in including them here is not to assume that role myself, but rather to 
extend Dewey's claims about the scientific character of the work to that of any indi- 
vidual who is willing to carry out such an experimental exploration in their own life. 
The significance of the method lies not in the fact that they were "applied to our 
ideas about ourselves" by Alexander, but that it is a method that each of us may 
fruitfully apply to our own. If I as an individual want to join Kelly in describing my- 
self as a "personal scientist" in a way that is more than vague analogy, I require a 
method. Every specific scientific discipline requires its own implementation of the 
scientific method appropriate to the domain of its inquiry, its own special equipment, 
experimental protocols, theoretical frameworks, etc. An experiment in astrophysics 
looks very different in many ways from an experiment in molecular genetics. What 
is needed for a person to live their own life, to reflect on their own experience and to 
direct their own actions in a way that has a scientific character is an implementation 
of the experimental philosophy that engages both the continuity and the dimension- 
ality of personal experience. It is my claim that while Kelly"s personal construct 
theory provides the framework of theory and practice for conversing about the 
dimensionality, a personal employment of Alexander's method can provide a way of 
engaging its embodied continuity. A personal practice of Kelly's work and of Alex- 
ander's can be viewed as complementary components of a personal experimental sci- 
ence, but if and only if each person as scientist is scientific in Dewey's sense. An 
individual person is fully a scientist in their own life only if they are living 
cc scientifically" in a fully embodied way. 
It is clearly Dewey's view that from a methodological stand-point 
Alexander's work is science, but more than that, it constitutes a new science. It has 
Importance beyond the needs of the individual. It is indeed a vital missing piece in 
the larger fabric of Science, a piece that we have acquired none too soon. In a 
passage which Alexander later quotes in concluding his last book, The Universal 
Constant in Living, Dewey says, 
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Through modem science we have mastered to a wonderful 
extent the use of things as tools for accomplishing results upon and 
through other things. The result is all but a universal state of confu- 
sion, discontent and strife. The one factor which is the primary toot 
in the use of all these other tools, namely ourselves, in other words,, 
our own psycho-physical disposition, as the basic condition of 
employment of all agencies and energies, has not even been studied as the central instrumentality. Is it not highly probable that this failure 
gives the explanation of why it is that in mastering physical forces we have ourselves been so largely mastered by them, until we find 
ourselves incompetent to direct the history and destiny of man? (ibid., p. xxxii, quoted in Alexander, 1941, p. 240) 
There is much at stake in this matter of a new science beyond the develop- 
ment of the quality of life of an individual personal scientist. Science with a capital 
S is upside down. We have become slaves to our own tools-and that precisely 
because we have neglected the primary tool, ourselves. Our general predicament is 
like, in Oppenheimer's description of the nuclear arms race, being on a train careen- 
ing toward a precipice-and what is worse, anything we might do about our situation 
only tends to cause the train's speed to increase. Our difficulty lies not in our tech- 
nology, but in ourselves. What is wanted is a science of ourselves, a science that can 
bring us "under control" and at the same time grant us our freedom. By bringing 
ourselves and our own personal actions within the domain of science-or rather 
expanding science to encompass them-we make Science more complete and ulti- 
mately more humane: 
Mr. Alexander has demonstrated a new scientific principle 
with respect to the control of human behaviour, as important as any 
principle which has ever been discovered in the domain of external 
nature. Not only this, but his discovery is necessary to complete the 
discoveries that have been made about non-human nature, if these 
discoveries and inventions are not to end by making us their servants 
and helpless tools. (Alexander, 1923, p. xxix) 
One of the hallmarks of science has always been that it depended on public 
"objective" observations. Knowledge which I might have within myself had no 
place simply because it could not be shared, could not be submitted to the rigour of 
the scientific method. As the physicist Hermann Weyl describes it, rather plain- 
tively, in an appendix to his Philosophy qfAl athematics and Natural Science, 
The way of constructive theory, during the last three centuries, 
has proved to be a method that is capable of progressive development 
of seemingly unlimited width and depth; here each problem solved 
poses new ones for which the coordinated effort of thought and 
expenment can find precise and universally convincing solutions. In 
contrast the scope of understanding from within appears practically 
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fixed by human nature once for all, and may at most be widened a lit- 
tle by the refinement of language. (Weyl, p. 283) 
Dewey's claims for Alexander's work imply that it provides nothing less than 
a means of applying "coordinated effort of thought and experiment 1)13 to 
cc understanding from within. "41 
Mr. Alexander has found a method for detecting precisely the 
correlations between these two members, physical-mental, of the 
same whole, and for creating new sensory consciousness of new atti- 
tudes and habits. It is a discovery which makes whole all scientific 
discoveries, and renders them available., not for our undoing, but for 
human use in promoting our constructive growth and happiness. 
(Alexander, 1923, p. xxxii) 
Dewey seems to have delighted in the opportunity to retrace Alexander's 
journey of discovery: "Each lesson was a laboratory experimental demonstration. " 
(ibid., p. xvi) How could it be otherwise? From the beginning, Alexander was ap- 
plying the scientific method to nothing more or less than himself What he evolved 
would remain ever after a science of the human individual, considered whole and in 
action-and from that individual's own point of view. I might add, what better van- 
tage point could there be for reconsidering our knowledge and use of the world out- 
side ourselves? Indeed, as Dewey seems to have believed, any science which does 
not find its ultimate foundation in the scientific quality of just this kind of personal 
experience, and which thus ignores the "continuity of experience" cannot fail to lead 
us awry in the end. 
How then are we to pursue such a science? Jones described Alexander's 
contribution as being like that of Galileo's at the beginning of modem physical sci- 
ence-that of the pioneer who not only makes fundamental discoveries that begin a 
new science but,, more importantly, establishes methods and/or develops tools or 
procedures for carrying on that new science. In physics Galileo's pioneer role can be 
contrasted with that of Newton, who brought the early discoveries together under a 
comprehensive theory which in its turn laid the groundwork for an even more 
detailed and fruitful method. As Jones said, the new science of individual human 
action that Alexander's work opens has yet to see its Newton. (Jones, 1974, p. 6) In 
one sense, filling that role is the intent of my work, but in perhaps a more important 
sense each individual who accepts the challenge of conversing about their own ac- 
tions within this reflective experimental framework takes on the role of being their 
own Newton. 
4'This can be observed in Appendix 2, especially in the fourth session on the tape. 
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VI: COMMENTARY ON PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING T"E ALEXANDER TECHNIQUE 
I would now like to give a brief summary of the central principles underlying 
Alexander's work. The statements are drawn from Alexander's WrItIng, but the in- 
terpretations are my own. 
VIA Use and Functioning 
... a close connection exists between use and functioning (Alexander, 1932, p. 12) [and] ... our manner of use is a constant in- fluence for good or ill upon our general functioning. (Alexander, 
194 1, p. 12) 
At first consideration, in view of the fact that to use is a transitive verb, the 
concept of the "use of the self' might seem inherently dualistic. It makes sense to 
say that I "use" nails to hold the boards of my bookshelf together or that I use a 
hammer to drive the nails. I may even say that I use my hand to hold the hammer 
and I use my arm to swing it. There has been, however, a subtle shift in my use of 
"use. " For although the hammer and nails are not parts of myself, the hand and arm 
are. So I have in some way split myself into the "I" who holds the hammer and the 
"me" whose hand I use to do so. This is where we face the phenomenological dis- 
tinction between being for-itself and being-in-itself in daily life. An alternative 
construction would be to say that I have "incorporated" the hammer in the act of us- 
ing it to drive the nail. That is, rather than treating part of myself as if it were not 
myself I treat an external object as if it were. In either case, the central issue is the 
instrumentality, the drawing on available conditions, whether internal or external, 
and somehow directing them toward some intended end. If we focus on the unity of 
the action in its relation to the intention rather than on questions of self and not-self, 
then my use of my hand is not dualistic but paradoxical. What Alexander found in 
his experiments with his own actions was that the functioning of his whole self was, 
in Dewey's term, "instrumental. " By his use of the phrase "use of myself' 
he was 
not implying a view of his bodily movements as something separate from 
himself but 
only that these movements were precisely the means to his end, and further that the 
quality of the relationships within this use of himself as a whole had everything to 
do 
with the quality of the outcome. Indeed we may say that it was only when 
he con- 
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ceived of his task separate from himself or his use of his vocal apparatus, for in- 
stance, in isolation from the rest of himself that he was being dualistic-not in theory 
but in practice. 
VI. 2 Primary Control 
... there is a primary control of the use of the self, which gov- 
erns the working of all mechanisms and so renders the control of the 
complex organism comparatively simple. (Alexander, 1932, p. 59) 
Every movement of a part of myself occurs in the context of the whole. For 
example, if I raise my arm to take a book from a shelf, the obvious movement is that 
of my arm-but there is also a redistribution of weight on my legs that accommodates 
the change in my centre of gravity; some of the muscles in my upper back area may 
contract to provide a stable reference from which my arm extends; some of the pat- 
tern of muscular action associated with standing upright releases in order to allow a 
slight lean forward. These are not things that I need to "do; " nor are the parts 
involved "controlled" by the functioning of other parts. The action,, as a whole, is 
self-orgamzed. If we could imagine a complex set of equations of motion that repre- 
sented the change in balance, distribution of forces, etc. required to carry out the 
movement, then the self-organization of the action embodies the solution of those 
equations-by which I mean that there is no need to solve them nor to "apply" the 
solutions. The temporal structure of the action is the solution. The equations could, 
however, also contain parameters that describe conditions of the environment or of 
the intended goal. The matter is only "psycho-mechanical" if the system (myself) is 
psycho-physically coordinated. Alexander comments in Constructive Conscious 
Control of the Individual that, though for each of us, our functioning as an organism 
may be complex in that it is composed of "a large number of factors or means which 
are related to one another, " it is, in "the act of using them ... one and simple. 
" The 
working of these "psycho-mechanical structures" is only complicated when they are 
r, out of order. " (Alexander, 1923, p. 14) This is the fundamental level of what 
Dewey was referring to in his insistence that we must seek "the unity of mind and 
body in action. " 
This complex simplicity of natural coordination is for each of us a ready to 
hand paradigm case of self-organization. In physical terms, or perhaps more pre- 
I ns which cisely, in blomechanical terms, there are three simultaneous global functio 
must be maintained as the context for any specific action. I must continue to be 
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mechanically supported; otherwise I would crumple in a heap on the floor. At the 
same time I must continue to be balanced; otherwise I would topple over if I raised 
my arm. I must also be free to move various parts of myself in relation to each other 
in order to accomplish the intended action. I do not have three distinct support, bal- 
ance and movement systems, however, only the one whole system which is myself 
Thus whenever I move (which is, of course, throughout my life) various parts of my- 
self are contributing in varying degrees to each of these functions. Naturally, the 
support is provided primarily by compressive forces accepted by my skeleton. There 
is a subset of my muscular system which has as its primary function the maintaining 
of the components of my skeletal structure in such an orientation that they can pro- 
vide the most efficient support. Other muscles are then free to produce movement 
around that support. As my relationship to the conditions of my environment (such 
as gravity, or the surface I walk on) change, a given muscle may be recruited into 
either the support, balance or movement function or some combination of these. The 
ability to seamlessly pass these functions among the parts of myself is one essential 
characteristic of coordination. A typical example of a condition of malcoordination 
(considered for the moment in only its mechanical dimensions) is what happens if I 
am already standing before the bookshelf using undue tension. I am literally pulling 
myself off of my optimum balance and out of the orientation where my skeletal 
structure can provide the required supporting forces. Following that habitual pattern 
then requires me to recruit muscles, primarily in my back and legs, into the support 
function, acting somewhat like the cables on a suspension bridge. I thus enter a 
vicious cycle in which it is the very excess contraction that maintains the conditions 
which make it necessary. Even worse, the muscles being used for support are 
therefore unavailable to contribute to either the specific movement of raising my arm 
or the general action of maintaining my balance as I do so. I am thus limited in the 
quality With which I can make the movement, I am working far harder than neces- 
sary to support myself during the movement and, since I do not have the flexibility of 
movement to make the constant small adjustments to balance that maintain my 
natural unstable equilibrium, I stiffen my leg, s and further tighten my back in an 
attempt to approximate a stable equilibrium. I am operating within a very restricted 
number of degrees of freedom, in both the mechanical and experiential terms. There 
is a now little used term, equipoise, which carried something of meaning I want to 
convey here. Among other things, it includes the idea of counterbalance, which is 
what head movements accomplish. We speak of a person's head as being poised on 
the top of their spine. It is not merely positioned or supported, much less 
held-though this is often the practical effect of a rigid habitual mode of 
movement-but is poised. To refer to the equipoise of a person's head is to point to 
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its dynamic balance, the interplay of force and counterforce, movement and 
countermovement. It is a balance being constantly lost and regained. The more 
subtle that interplay, the more poised the person is. What Alexander is referring to 
with the concept of primary control is that there is an intimate connection between 
the dynamic sense in which we might say that a person's head is poised and the more 
general sense in which we would say that the person is poised. My preference for 
the older term, equipoise, is based on its emphasis on that interplay of influences that 
maintains balance by dancing on the precarious edge of imbalance which is the 
possibility of movement. Indeed, from this vantage point we can find a simple way 
to bring the natural initiation of movement within the realm of intentionality. For if 
this equipoise is maintained by allowing and compensating for perturbations in 
balance,, then any perturbation not compensated is already the initiation of a 
movement and no further preparation of effort is needed. 
"Primary control" is then but a consequence of my being a whole self-organ- 
ized system faced with those multiple functional requirements. In order for me, as a 
single system, to continue to integrate these functions in movement, the movement 
itself must be appropriately organized. Alexander's empirical observation that every 
action is an action of the whole person initiated by a change in the dynamic quality 
of the relationship between the person's head and its support on the top of their spine 
may have been merely the discovery of a primary mechanical consequence of the 
self-organized character of the actions themselves. It is a no less powerful discovery 
for that. Still viewing the matter in purely mechanical terms, my head is a relatively 
heavy weight supported flexibly on the top of my primary support structure, my 
spine. It is thus the most immediately available counterbalance and at the same time 
its every movement affects the whole spine in both its support and balance roles. 
What gives this whole matter its significance is that these factors are inseparable 
from my very conception of any act I engage in. Whether implicitly or explicitly, 
consciously or unconsciously, these factors are present, and have their effect "for 
good or ill. " It is not a matter merely of mechanics or biomechanics, it is psycho- 
42 mechanics. 
421 do not intend to imply a status of any sort of absolute reality to this psycho- 
mechanical relationship. In keeping with Kelly's position of constructive 
alternativism, I would only claim that although we are free to construe the 
organization of our own actions as we will, when put to the test in experience, 
differing constructions will have differing consequences (and thus differing 
meanings) and also differing predictive value. Thus it is not necessary to ask 
whether such a thing or principle as "primary control" is real. It is quite enough to 
use it lin the invitational mode and ask whether its use leads to fruitful "earnest 
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VU Psycho-physical unity of the individual 
... Nature does not 
whole (Alexander, 1910, 
rc mental" from "physical" 
(Alexander, 1932, p. 3) 
work in parts, but treats everything as a 
p. 55) [and] ... it Is impossible to separate 
processes in any form of human activity. 
In view of what was said regarding the primary control of the use of one's 
self in action, psycho-physical unity does not refer merely to a unity, but to an intri- 
cate, coordinated unity. It makes little sense, of course, to say that a structure is 
coordinated; coordination is an attribute of the functioning of a system. It is the in- 
terrelatedness of the levels of organization expressed by that functioning within some 
context of action-and thus is also always to do with meaning. The properties of self- 
organization that seem to "emerge" within the action of the individual can be seen as 
the product of the way we ask our questions about that action. For instance,, what do 
we find when we consider a person as a functioning whole and then ask si- 
multaneously about support, balance and movement? And then what do we find if 
we expand our use of those terms beyond their usual blornechanIcal range of conven- 
ience? One practical consequence is that we find available in the language of 
cc qualitative dynamics'1ý11 not a model of reality, nor even merely an Invitational hy- 
pothesis, but simply a way-a sort of grammar-of carrying on a conversation about 
questions. " It is useful to make a distinction between prescriptive and descriptive 
principles. A descriptive principle is a statement about how something will behave, 
being the kind of a something it is, in the conditions in which we find it. Planets 
move in elliptical orbits around the sun because it is in their nature as massive bodies 
in a gravitational field to do so. They are not in any sense "required" to; they just do. 
A prescriptive principle on the other hand is a rule. It is a statement that something 
-ought to" operate in a certain way or that we consider it "good" if it behaves that 
way, according to the principle. Behaving honestly, taking risks or doing what "feels 
right" all imply prescriptive principles. There are descriptive principles underlying 
my functioning as a natural system. It makes no sense to speak of my violating them 
because they are descriptive of my very definition as a natural system. To be 
"unnatural" in that sense would be a contradiction. The prescriptive principles by 
which I organize my actions however, may or may not be consistent with those 
descriptive principles. In these terms what I am in essence proposing (as a 
descriptive principle) is that life will be better if they (that is, the principles by which 
I direct my actions and the principles which describe my functioning) are consistent 
with each other, and that we would do well to treat that consistency itself as a 
prescriptive principle. 
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the quality of the functioning of myself as a whole system. It becomes a conversa- 
tion about coordination as a state of inner democracy in which any part that has a 
contribution to make to my intended action-no matter how physical or otherwise I 
May conceive that part to be, or how small or subtle the contribution-is free to make 
it. 
VIA End-Gaining 
[Many people employ a direct procedure when endeavouring 
to gain a desired end. ] This direct procedure is associated with 
dependence upon sub-conscious guidance and control, leading, in 
cases where a condition of mal-co-ordination is present, to an 
unsatisfactory use of the mechanisms and to an increase in the defects 
and peculiarities already existing. (Alexander, 1923, p. 10 fn. ) 
Thi I am is concept of Alexander's relates directly to what H and 
Thomas refer to as "personal robots" in Learning Conversations. If my attention is 
focused tightly on my end, or what is worse and perhaps more common, on my de- 
sire to attain my end,, then there is nothing to direct the actual process of reaching 
that end except for an associated unconscious habitual program, that is, a robot. 
Thus typically the act is not only under the general direction of habit, but of a habit 
which Dewey characterized as fixed and isolated. And as mentioned earlier, the 
more importance we attribute to our particular end, the more we will rely on the 
particular unconsciously held opinion about how to carry it out. Thus making 
greater effort merely means doing the same thing harder, and if this occurs under 
conditions of less than optimal coordination, the very effort to perform the act 
"rightly" amplifies the distortions, making matters worse. Contrasting with endgain- 
ing is Alexander's emphasis on attention to the "means-whereby" which 
for him 
must include, in fact must begin with, attention to the quality of my 
functioning as a 
whole psycho-physical system in the act of attaining my end. 
VI. 5 Faulty Sensory Appreciation 
Almost all civilized human creatures have developed a condi- 
tion in which the sensory appreciation (feeling) is more or less imper- 
fect and deceptive, and it naturally follows that it cannot be relied 
upon in re-education, readjustment and co-ordination, or in our 
attempts to put right something we know to be wrong With our psy- 
cho-physical selves. (Alexander, 1923, p. 150) 
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In the practice of the Alexander Technique, the concept of "faulty sensory 
appreciation" has always struck me as representing a rather pessimistic View. The 
problem With sensory appreciation is not that there is anything faulty about our sen- 
sory apparatus, or even our use of it. Our senses are not in general so much faulty as 
they are adaptive. The fault lies in our tendency to take relative sensory data in 
absolute ways, which is not itself a perceptual difficulty. It is a conclusion that I am 
drawing from my sensory experience. Indeed to say that I "feel" right or I "feel" 
wrong doesn't make sense. Strictly speaking, I cannotfeel right. "Right" is a con- 
clusion I draw from the set of sensory data which I feel; it is not itself a feeling. I 
can feet a certain pattern of muscular tensions, but whether that is right or wrong is 
not in the feeling. It is an interpretation, and the interpretation goes wrong when I 
treat it as, for example, not, I feel forward of where I normally am , 
but, "I feel 
forward of vertical. " That is drawing an absolute conclusion from relative informa- 
tion. Thus "feels right 111) is an improper translation of "feels normal" and to act on it 
is to employ a faulty appreciation of one's sensory data. 
it is basically a My own interpretation of faulty sensory appreciation is that III 
matter of faulty conductive logic. As an example of such, the person whose habitual 
way of standing involves tightening her lower back and pulling her upper torso back 
will interpret this backward inclination as standing upright. When, with some guid- 
ance. ) she comes to a stance which is 
"objectively" upright (that is, which can be ob- 
served to be so by everyone in the room, including herself if she is provided a video 
image or such) she will likely have the feeling that she is now off balance forward. 
In reaction to this construed forwardness, she pulls herself back. But since she is not 
actually forward, when she pulls back she must tighten in front to prevent herself 
from going off balance backward. She continues to feel the tightening in the front 
which seems to confirrn her opinion that she is leaning forward. All this muscular 
effort is quite "logical" as far as it goes. She is engaging in a bit of faulty conductive 
I ic prem- reasoning in which the muscular conclusions she draws from her 
kinestheti 
ises do not follow. Indeed, I have often observed an alternative invalid conclusion in 
which the person comes to a vertical stance, looks momentarily 
disoriented and then 
leans noticeably forward just before reporting, "Oh, I feel forward. " They have pro- 
duced muscular effort that seems retroactively to "justify" their perception. 
Sensory Appreciation is unreliable as a guide to how I organize my actions 
because I never know whether what it seems to be telling me is what is actually hap- 
pening or not. In other words, I cannot assume that if something 
"feels right" then it 
actually is right. If the problem with sensory appreciation were simply one of inac- 
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curacy, then the obvious solution would be to modify it so that now I can rely ýonit. 43 
The problem is both simpler and more subtle than that, however, and so the more 
useful solution is to learn a way of organizing my actions that doesn't depend on 
whether my interpretation is correct or not so that I can use the infon-nation as far it 
will go without blindly assuming that it's correct, nor on the other band blindly as- 
suming that it is not correct. That trap, to say in effect, "I have learned that my 
senses are unreliable so I ought to ignore them, " throws me all the more strongly into 
my unconscious habitual guidance. If instead I can learn how to take account of the 
fact that I don't know whether my senses have adapted or not, I find not only a free- 
dom from the pitfalls of sensory illusion, but the possibility of finding ways of tran- 
scending the obviousness of my own history. 
VI. 6 Inhibition and Conscious Direction: Prevention on a General Basis 
... the primary requirement in dealing with all specific symp- 
toms is to prevent the misdirection which leads to wrong use and 
functioning, and to establish in its place a new and satisfactory direc- 
tion as a means of bringing about an improvement in use and func- 
tioning throughout the organism. " (Alexander, 1932, p. 45) [The 
application of this principle requires] " ... consciously 
inhibiting inter- 
ference with the employment of the primary control. " (Alexander, 
1941, p. 66) 
As an illustration to distinguish the idea of direction from the common notion 
of control, consider the task of the orchestra conductor or the theatre director. What 
a good director does is give "directions" to the actors in such a way as to leave them 
individually free to bring their own creative work to their parts and yet also in such a 
way that these multiple individual acts of creation all blend together into a single co- 
herent production with a clear interpretation of the script behind it. The conductor 
must perform a similar task in blending the individual creative work of the musicians 
into an orchestral interpretation of the score. Neither the director nor the conductor 
can play all the parts themselves, and if they direct their artists as if they were surro- 
gates in such a process the result is inevitably poor art. Yet if they fail to commum- 
43Early on, Alexander believed that "surely if it is possible for feeling to become 
untrustworthy as a means of direction, it should be possible to make it trustworthy 
II tic of a again. " (Alexander, 1932, p. 21) Unfortunately, although this was character's i 
very early stage in the evolution of his technique, many teachers and their students 
still believe this sensory retraining to be its primary goal. 
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cate a clear intention to the actors or musicians the latter will have great difficulty 
being simultaneously creative and coordinated with each other. 
Alexander sometimes described his work as being about "prevention on a 
general basis, " that is, rather than either doing something specific to "cure" some 
difficulty, or even doing something to specifically prevent it, one can endeavour to 
bring about new general conditions which are less conducive to the difficulty. This 
is the sort of approach we take when we combat weeds in our garden by taking the 
trouble to amend the soil rather than continuing to do battle with the weeds in any 
direct way. It is all too easy to overlook the fact that we are not free to engage in this 
endeavour while we are still carrying out our commitment to our old familiar 
strategy. Perception of new options is always relative to what we would have been 
doing otherwise, and having a habit means that there is always a default. That 
default is usually subject to the blindness of familiarity. Thus to even consider not 
doing things in our usual way in order to leave our ourselves free to discover as yet 
unknown new ways feels like giving up any action whatever. This is why inhibition 
in Alexander's sense seems so elusive. It is not that the new way is difficult; it is 
merely unknown. The problem is that we have become so "skilled" in carrying out 
our habitual conception that it requires no attention, no consciousness whatever, and 
thus we expect that anything else would be difficult in contrast. 
Inhibition is usually thought of as a negative term,, as a refusal to do or allow 
something. Rather than a refusal, it is an insistence on the continuing openness of 
unknown alternate responses, an insistence on that small dramatic space within 
which a true spontaneous response can be found. The words "react" and "respond" 
are quite often used interchangeably, but if we are more careful we find that "ReactIll 
carries a Newtonian connotation,, as in act and react. To respond, " however, is ac- 
cording to the second or third listing in several dictionaries, "to act as if in answer 
to. " It is to act conversationally. Thus inhibition is a only refusal to immediately 
give an obvious reaction. It is thus a prerequisite not only to spontaneity, but to all 
conversation. 
VI. 7 Indirect Action: The Means-Whereby Principle 
[There is a] ... psycho-physical activity, associated with con- 
stiructive conscious guidance and control and with the consequent 
satisfactory use of the mechanisms, which establishes the conditions 
essential to the increasing development of potentialities. [To act ac- 
cording to this principle] ... involves a reasoning consideration of 
the 
causes of the conditions present, and an indirect instead of a direct 
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procedure on the part of the person endeavouring to gain the desired 
". end. " (Alexander, 1923, p. 10) 
One defining feature of a coordinated movement is that anything that is 
identifiable as a "part" of the moving system is doing what it does according to its 
own local conditions. These local conditions are being determined by what all the 
other parts are doing, and so there is no separate need for the parts to 
communicate. " They are already connected in such away that the whole provides 
the context for the part. (In physics such phenomena are referred to as 
(cooperative. ") Thus if any given part just does what it does under its own condi- 
tions, the action of the whole will already be organized. It does not require control, 
either external or internal, to make it so. As a consequence, much of the monitoring 
and control activity which we learn to engage in is, in fact, superfluous and, indeed, 
often interferes with optimal natural interplay of our parts. The way out of this diffi- 
culty lies in the recognition that among the implicit network of relationships between 
functioning and conditions, some relationships are more general than others. As a 
simple example, an action such as throwing a ball can be viewed as a process com- 
posed of a sequence of smaller actions. Something that occurs toward the beginning 
of the sequence is going to have a greater effect on the conditions under which the 
parts are working than something that occurs later. A change in the quality of my 
overall balance as I bring my arm forward will have a greater effect than will a shift 
in the motion of my wrist relative to my forean-n, simply because the later takes 
place within a context given by the former. If I can take this consciously into ac- 
if I can make a choice count , if I 
happen to know what events happen when, and i 
about the quality with which these events happen, then I will have a much greater 
effect on the overall quality of the process if I make that choice earlier rather than 
later. If I do make that choice about the quality of early events, then I may be freed 
of the need to have a distinct perception of or make a separate choice about the sub- 
sequent details. The course of a river is much more easily influenced near its source 
than farther downstream. Or as we commonly say it, "an ounce of prevention ...... 
The details of the continuing action are implied by the conditions I have brought 
about. It is in this way that the control of natural movement can be said to 
be indi- 
e rect. Indeed , it is possible to 
leam to be more intelligently directive and at th same 
forts not at my intended goal or time more "natural" in my actions by directing my ef 
end, but rather to the bringing about of those conditions which are that end's natural 
antecedents. This is the essence of an indirect method. In Alexander's context 
those 
natural antecedents have always to do with the conditions of the sustaining of my 
own psycho-physical coordination. Thus making that choice of quality that sustains 
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MY optimal condition of general coordination is the first means toward any particular 
end. To reverse that priority and make my end primary in My attention so as to ne- 
glect those conditions is the essence of the "end-gaining" discussed earlier. In con- 
trast, if I can learn to recognize the early stages of an action,, or even its prerequisites, 
and so become able to prevent my habitual way of carrying out that action, I leave 
myself free to make choices about the quality of the action as a whole. 44 
Again Alexander's contribution was not merely to recognize the psycho- 
physical continuity of this coordinated whole functioning and to point toward the 
possibility of a way of thinking and acting in a self-directed way (what he called the 
plane of "constructive conscious control"), but beyond that to develop a practical 
method for exploring and becoming more skilled in acting in concert with the factors 
involved in that continuity. Kelly similarly not only emphasized, but also developed 
a methodology for making explicit its dimensionality. 
Indirect action is related to the idea of "'non-dolng, " an Idea which is often 
confused, on one hand with not doing, and on the other hand with inaction. As any 
action, any object, has meaning only against a background of alternatives, non-doing 
has meaning in any specific instance within a context of habitual construction. In 
other words, an object is this sort of thing rather than that sort. I am doing this rather 
than doing that, performing this action rather than some other. Because "what I am 
doing" is already an abstraction, in this sense "doing" something is carrying out a 
concept. "Not doing" is reftaining from carrying out that same concept. The action,, 
as conceived, is given up, but the construction, the concept, remains intact. In an 
habitual context it is often impossible in practice to distinguish between such not 
doing and "doing the opposite, " which is the carrying out of a (possibly) new concept 
44There was a research project which I heard about in the mid 1970's in which an 
attempt was made to use a sort of biofeedback to teach monkeys to control epileptic 
seizures. I never learned whether or not the details of the story were true, but it is the 
kind of story that is so illustrative that one feels if it didn't actually happen, it should 
have. As the story went, a group of Rhesus monkeys were surgically made epileptic 
and then put in front of oscilloscopes on which they were shown their own EEG 
traces. The idea was to find out if the monkeys could learn to recognize the 
characteristic changes in their EEG's during the onset of a seizure and thus learn to 
control it. What actually happened was that the monkeys learned to recognize subtle 
changes, previously unknown to the researchers, which occurred some time before 
the onset of seizure and so they stopped having seizures. To be able to learn to 
engage in that sort of strategy intentionally (that is, learning to recognize the 
"hidden" precursors) is an important aspect of the present methodology. 
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defined by the same construction. One of the unfortunate ironies of this lack of 
distinction is that we continue the original "doing" and merely add "doing the 
Opposite" to it, and "thus we increase the disease in the means used to cure it. " 
(Dewey, 1958, P. 296) "Non-doing" is also refraining from carrying out a concept, 
but in a way that is open to reconstruction-what is given up is the concept; there may 
well be action, but it is action outside the confines of the prior conception. 
Thus in a case of "non-doing, " what I am significantly not doing is what I would 
have been doing ordinarily. That is, non-doing is not inaction; it is rather a refrain- 
ing from engaging in habitual action. Habit, whether in the sense of the general 
background of predisposition to act under present conditions or in the sense of spe- 
cific habitual reactions to a given stimulus, provides the context for meaningful non- 
doing, for the meaning of what one is not doing lies in the relation to what one would 
have been doing otherwise. In particular, if the habitual action has any quality of 
direction to it, then so will the non-doing, and strange as it may be to think about, it 
often happens in practice that a person who does manage to refrain from such a 
directional habitual act actually perceives the directional quality of their non-doing. 
It is not surprising that they often find this quite a disconcerting experience. This 
experience is a projective cousin of the kinesthetic afterimage discussed elsewhere. 
What is disconcerting is the perception of the absence of what one is not aware of 
having expected to feel. 
VI. 8 How We Got This Way (Comments on the evolutionary account) 
At an earlier stage in human development, according to Alexander's account, 
the conditions of daily life tended to be constant from generation to generation. 
Thus the habitual, unconsciously directed "use of the self' of any individual tended 
to be in tune with that individual's environment. A child who unconsciously 
acquired the habits of their community would grow to an adult with the same uncon- 
scious but well suited habits as the previous generation. There was never any 
bio- 
logical need for any other than unconscious direction. Furthermore, most of the day 
to clay actions of an individual were closely related to matters of life and 
death, 
which tended to insure that the common habitual mode was suited to the relatively 
unchanging conditions as maladapted habitual patterns tended not to 
be passed on. 
There was a continuing close relationship between these unconscious general pat- 
terris of organization and the needs of daily life. However as time went on the 
'on to the i actions of human individuals, exercising their intelligence in relati ir envi- 
ronment, began to change those external conditions more and more rapidly 
(even to 
75 
Commentary on the Principles Underlying the Alexander Technique 
today's exponential situation). At first the rate of the change was very gradual, how- 
ever, as it is also in the daily life of any gi III and so the same uncon- 
scious direction of use continued. There gradually came to be, however, a 
misalignment between the individual and their enviromnent, and thus also between 
the individual's perception of self-m-movement in relation to the environment and 
the facts of the situation. Alexander seems to have derived much of this evolutionary 
view from his reading of Herbert Spencer, and like Spencer's view it is reasonable 
and illustrative so long as one does not try to push it too far. It is of particular 
significance in its lack of a separation between cultural evolution and individual 
learning. This is clearly illustrated in Man's Supreme Inheritance in Alexander's 
definitions of instinct and intuition as the products of accumulated unconsciously 
and consciously directed experience respectively. It is a definition of instinct that 
transcends the question of nature vs. nurture. From the individual's point of view 
there is no practical distinction between patterns genetically inherited and those 
learned before the individual could tell the difference. In some regards this is true 
for the individual's offspring as well. What my child learns from me at an early 
enough age might as well have been genetic. What Alexander considered the great 
evolutionary significance of his work was that this is not the end of the story, be- 
cause it is possible to direct the same kind of reasoned attention to ourselves that we 
have brought to bear on the outside world. We can set about having experiences 
which are consciously directed, and thus may come to be, in his use of the terms, less 
instinctive and more intuitive. 45 
This whole matter of sensory reliability and its evolutionary roots is illus- 
trated by a piece of research done by Laurie Thomas some years ago. Blindfolded 
subjects were handed small metal rods, one by one, and were asked to sort them into 
five categories according to length, judging the length of each only by holding 
it 
between thumb and forefinger. The subjects soon became quite adept at discriminat- 
ing among rods of differing lengths. As the sorting process went on, 
however, and 
unknown to the subjects, the experimenter began to hand the subject rods of gradu- 
ally increasing length. If the increases were small and gradual enough, 
the subject 
would continue making accurate relative judgments of length without ever noticing 
that the absolute lengths of the rods were becoming greater-even to the point where 
45Note that Alexander's instinct vs. intuition construct cuts across the usual rational 
vs. irrational construct. Rather than being in some way counter to reason , intuition is 
intimately bound up with it in that reason is a essential component of 
the prior 
conscious direction that makes intuition possible. 
76 
Commentary on the Principles Underlying the Alexander Technique 
those being judged shortest were the same length as the longest had been at the be- 
ginning. All this without any awareness of what was happening, until, that is, the 
rods became long enough that a slight stretch of the skin lying between the thumb 
and finger was great enough to be separately observed. At that point the subject was 
able to recalibrate their perceptions to the new scale. Generalizing this result to the 
question of a person's habitual perception of self in the environment, it might be 
concluded that, because perception is always perception of significant difference, if 
the conditions in which they find themselves change slowly enough they will never 
notice. There is never enough relative difference. They will continue making effec- 
tive relative judgments without ever becoming aware that the absolute relationships 
have changed. More than this, if the person is operating habitually and they implic- 
itly assume that those absolute relationships are unchanged-and if they then act on 
that assumption-they are bound to be led into error. They will suffer unnoticed dis- 
tortions in their "sensory appreciation. " This is precisely what Alexander claimed 
we all do suffer, as a species and as individuals. It is important to make clear that 
the defect is not one of sensation but one of 'c appreciation. " It is a failure to recog- 
nize the relative rather than absolute nature of perception and thus, even when the 
distortion is kinesthetic it would be more nearly correct to say that it is faulty think- 
ing rather than faulty feeling. 
VI. 9 Which Alexander Technique? 
There are a number of practical questions regarding the implementation of 
these principles. Dewey's assessment of the value of Alexander's work was as a 
method for generating a new sort of personal experience and it is significant that 
these principles were derived and born out through years of Alexander's own 
practical experience and experimentation. The question is whether what Dewey was 
referring to, indeed whether what constitutes "The Alexander Technique, " was what 
Alexander did on his own as described in "The Evolution of a Technique" or 
whether it was his use of his hands in his teaching work. A key fact relating to this 
central question is that Alexander, having no teacher but himself, had to 
find ways of 
generating new experiences for himself The question that arises relative to 
Alexander's pupils is whether what he did with his hands was the method of 
generating new experiences for the pupil or whether the pupil generated their own 
new experiences by the same means as Alexander had, though 
facilitated by 
Alexander's use of his hands. Of course,, the pupils had a kind of experience that 
Alexander never had, the experience of being assisted by expert guidance. This 
guidance has been often (and I believe mistakenly) described as "giving the pupil an 
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experience. 11) It is often assumed that because the pupil begins in a state of unreliable 
sensory appreciation there is practically no hope of escape from their habitual mode 
without that external expert guidance, and Alexander himself wrote of the need for 
the teacher to take responsibility for the pupil's movement in order to free the pupil 
from the inevitable effects of their attempts to "get it right. " This is in spite of the 
fact that it was precisely such an escape that Alexander himself made. Nor was he 
alone in this. After some years, Alexander's brother, A. R., joined him in his 
teaching practice. According to various accounts A. R. 's "training" consisted of 
somewhere between two and six "lessons, " and according to their niece, Marjory 
BarloW, 46 it was A. R. 's "proud boast that F. M. never touched him. " Unless we 
assume that there was a special gene in the Alexander family, it is clearly possible to 
learn to make these kinds of changes in self-use without the mediation of a teacher's 
hands. That it can be very difficult seems undeniable, though to be more precise, the 
problem is not that the new is difficult but that we are so inescapably skillful at the 
old and familiar. It is for this reason that teacher's skilled use of their hands appears 
essential to the process. 
The pupil in a "typical" lesson may be lying down, sitting in a chair or 
standing; they may be engaged simply in leaming to stop unnecessary "doings" that 
they bring to even these simple activities. They may perform more complex tasks, 
moving a leg, or standing up or taking a step, or perhaps even more complex tasks 
like speaking or singing or playing the clarinet. Many teachers see the matter of 
inhibiting habitual response as so central-and so difficult-that it is the focus of the 
whole lesson. In this classical arrangement the pupil's task is to do nothing, to only 
give their directions" (that is, to specify the commands for the "means-whereby" for 
the new manner of use) without attempting to carry them out. Other teachers may 
take the integration of this inhibition/direction process into the pupil's chosen 
activity (for example, leaming to sing while consciously refusing consent to one's 
habitual way of singing) as the central focus. These two sorts of lessons can 
look 
and sound very different, but the approaches are not contradictory. 
In either case an 
important part of the teacher's task is to manually guide the movements involved in 
such a way that the pupil can have an experience of acting outside of their 
habitual 
conception of what they are doing. The question remains, 
however, What does an 
Alexander Technique teacher teach? Do they teach pupils to use the same technique 
460ne of Marjorie Barstow's colleagues in Alexander's formal teacher training 
program in the 1930's and still actively teaching in 
1996-reported at the Third 
international Congress of Teachers of the Alexander Technique in Engelberg, 
Switzerland, 1991. 
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Alexander used himself, or do they use Alexander's teaching technique to get 
something else across? 
Dewey claimed that of necessity people come to Alexander's work for the 
CC wrong reasons, " that is, seeking the solution to some specific problem, and that it is 
only as we have experience with the process can we appreciate that how we achieve 
our solution and the context within which we achieve it is far more significant than 
the particular solution itself By this very argument, of course, the vast majority of 
lessons in the technique involve pupils who would disagree with Dewey. In theory 
most teachers would agree with him, but in practice the meaning of the principles for 
any given teacher, and even more the means they employ in the endeavour to put 
them into practice, are greatly affected by those initial problems. Nor is this_ a 
criticism of such teachers; they are in practice to benefit their students,, and the 
approach any given teacher uses is a product of their own understanding of the 
principles, their own training experience and their underlying model of learning. 
The divergence of various schools and styles of teaching has more to do with these 
divergent lines of practical experience and learning models than anything to do with 
the principles of the Technique as such. Thus the question "Which Alexander 
Technique? " is historical, and political within the community of teachers, but only 
reveals the absence of an adequate definition of what constitutes the foundation of 
the Technique. The Alexander Technique does not constitute a coherent theory, but 
is rather a body of practice grounded in the principles which Alexander derived in 
practice. What is common to all of its practitioners is their adherence to the 
I it, principles discussed above, the fundamental premise being as Alexander put i 
that by means of a conscious employment of the primary control of 
use we can with confidence ensure the best possible use of ourselves 
at all times and in all circumstances, and that by this indirect means 
our psycho-physical self can be energized and controlled to the best 
advantage, no matter what our activities may be. (Alexander 1941, p. 
215) 
Whatever form a lesson may take, whatever problem or potential improvement the 
pupil may bring to it, and whatever the teacher or pupil may take "teaching" to 
be, 
what it is about, that is, what an Alexander Technique teacher teaches, is a means of 
acquiring this "conscious employment of the primary control. " 
There is,, however,, a context in which the earlier question of whether it was 
what Alexander did with himself or what he did with his hands that is The Alexander 
Technique is still relevant. While the scientific and philosophical importance that 
Dewey attributed to the work is, I think, clearly consistent with the former, the 
Alexander Technique community has always seemed, in practice, to tend towards the 
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latter view. Kelly said of psychology that he was not so interested in what it is-to 
which I would add an implied, and how do we do it well-but rather in what it might 
become. If we consider Alexander's Technique from the same perspective, Dewey's 
comments become an invitation to take the same view of it that Kelly took of 
psychology. Alexander's followers seem collectively to have taken the other view,, 
which may account for the fact that aside from historical articles and the 
physiological research noted earlier there is almost no literature whatever concerning 
the underlying nature of the work, why it works as it does, etc. And though they are 
as pleased with his endorsement as was their originator, they seem collectively to be 
as uninterested in taking up Dewey's invitation to a wider exploration as were 
Dewey's own colleagues and students. This is not really surprising, considering that 
each teacher's experience-and this was as true for Alexander himself as for any 
, other teacher-is affected by the perceived needs of those who come to them as 
pupils. Dewey's colleagues never understood the nature of his interest in and 
support of Alexander's work, and neither have those who have continued that work. 
It is not a criticism of anyone who practices the technique to say that it has evolved 
as a means for self-improvement rather than the method for self-inquiry that Dewey 
saw in it. But that has often seemed to me to be a great opportunity missed, and it is 
the point at which my own work diverges from the Alexander Technique as such. 
Regarding the illustrative sessions in the appendices, one might ask, "Are these 
Alexander Technique lessons or not? " On the single criterion given above they 
certainly are, although they differ from most lessons in their explicit treatment of the 
student as a self-organized learner. They also differ in that their primary intent is not 
that enhanced "conscious employment of the primary control" as such, nor even any 
specific self-improvement (though such purposes are certainly present) but rather the 
employment of the principles of the Alexander Technique to open the possibility of a 
non-habitual response at the micro-level, in turn making possible the contrasts in 
I ir expenence that allow elaboration of dimensions of learner's embodiment of the* 
personal meaning. 
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N'll-I Socratic Method and Beyond 
The most significant source of my current understanding of all these matters 
remains my own teaching practice and the insights gained in collaboration with my 
students. It is in the context of my teaching work that I have encountered all of my 
questions about meaning and how it is embodied as well as constructed-where, in 
the words of one of my students, I continually, "meet consciousness on its own 
ground. " Sometimes the issue at hand is evidently "physical"' either dealing With 
some chronic pain or tension or some notion of "posture" etc. At other times it Is 
"mental" having to do with learning, memorizing, expressing, being self-composed 
in difficult situations, etc. Sometimes the "problem" is an habitual muscular pattern, 
sometimes it is a fixed or limiting idea; occasionally it is perceived as an emotional 
fixity. But in every instance the domain, the "field of inquiry" is the investigation, 
by an individual, of their own self as a unity in action. The central question then be- 
comes,, What is the nature of that field of inquiry? And further, how does a person 
learn to engage in that inquiry in a self-organized, and embodied way? And what is 
my role in assisting this process? 
Over the years, as I have continued to teach, my teaching experience has 
taken on a more and more explicitly conversational quality, and the collaborative 
quality of my own personal action research. I have found the experience I share with 
these individuals to be a realm that embraces-and confronts us with-my broadest 
range of personal questions, be they phenomenological, biophysical, aesthetic or 
whatever. The work, in practice, has become a conversational synthesis of the in- 
sights I have drawn from Kelly and Alexander, and the "conductive conversations" 
are rapidly evolving into a way of working explicitly and concretely with what I find 
implicit it their work. 47 
As I reflect on my teaching experience it seems that my own fundamental 
view of my role as teacher is not the providing of knowledge, but the asking of ques- 
47Rather than attempting to fully describe these conversations, I have included a 
taped sampling in the second "volume. " Refer also to the "Conversational 
introduction to Conductive Reasoning" which Is Intended, in part, to aid the reader in 
engaging in such a multidimensional conversation on their own. 
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t1ons. I see myself as engaged in a Socratic conversation with my student. The sub- 
tle temptation for any teacher is to fall into a narrow role of teacher-as-provider-of- 
knowledge to the learner, but to do that is to usurp the learner's role, in fact, it is an 
attempt to do their teaming f6r them. Further, it is to take knowledge itself as 
something already finished. To consistently take the learner to be a self-organized 
learner is to let the conversation be driven by the needs and changes in the learner's 
knowing. From the beginnings of my teaching career, tutoring other students when I 
was in high school, my teaching has been intuitively conversational, though I did not 
have an explicit framework for viewing it as such. My task even then was most 
often to get the student to come to a clearer sense of what they were already doing 
and how they were already understanding things. I remember from my early school 
days having a sense that what separated the "good" students, for whom things came 
easily, from the average and "poor" students, who struggled, was not so much differ- 
ences in ability as the fact that the good students had found ways of working that 
were easy-because they were effective-ways which the others were capable of em- 
ploying if anyone pointed them out. But no one did, and so most students struggled 
through, having no choice but to make greater effort in using the less effective 
strategies they happened upon. I felt frustrated even then at the apparent operating 
principle that each person was expected to discover the "secrets" on their own,, and if 
they didn't-that was "too bad. " Later as an instructor in college level classes in 
physics and philosophy, I freely gave away the secrets, letting the students know why 
I did things as I did and what knowledge I wanted them to demonstrate. I do this to- 
day in my psycho-physical teaching work, partly because several of my students 
intend to become teachers themselves and partly because I intend that each of my 
students will become at least their own teacher . 
48 Of course, giving away the secrets 
of the fortunate few is not a matter of just telling them, though sometimes that is an 
important simple part of the conversation; the craft of teaching often lies in guiding 
I or them and students in discovering them. It is the middle road between do ng it f 
leaving them to their own devices. In my philosophy courses I developed a style I 
called "learning in public" in which I would come to class purposely "unprepared" to 
discuss the content of, for example, one of Plato's dialogues. Then the class and I 
would ponder it together. That way what I was offering them was not a presentation 
of knowledge that I already had but rather a model of how do go about gaining their 
own. The reward for me was that I not only sometimes came to a different appre- 
Joyed I but that I en clation of the meaning of a dialogue because of their contributions 
481will be using the term "teacher" to refer to the role of one who assists a more or 
less self-organized learner in their endeavors. 
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the fascination of how they went about producing those contributions. The Dialogues 
were excellent candidates for that kind of conversation as their endings were all so 
fruitfully inconclusive. 49 We had no difficulty imagining Plato's own students at the 
Academy asking, on the day he brought one in and read it to them for the first timel 
"Well, what was the answer? What is courage then (or virtue, or beauty)T4' To 
which, of course, Plato responded with some equivalent of, "What do you think? 
Let's talk. " Whether the matter at hand is algebra or physics, or philosophy, or 
indeed the psychomechanics of the organization of one's own actions,, becoming 
more capable of asking one's own questions is always of greater value than gaining 
any particular answer. And such learning is always a collaboration. The teacher in 
such a conversation is motivated as much by a passionate curiosity about the 
learner's knowing as by any desire to be of service. I have found this view of the 
conversation to be quite liberating for me as a teacher as well, because it frees me 
from, among other things, the need to possess in advance the knowledge that the 
learner is to acquire. It is quite literally possible for me to teach what I do not know, 
and indeed to teach someone who is more knowledgeable than I am. Indeed, to do 
so is to take knowledge as something open and not as something yet complete or 
fixed. My task as a teacher in this Socratic mode is to ask questions that reveal the 
learner's knowledge, and its possible implications, to both of us. Actually, though I 
describe my preferred teaching mode as Socratic, it is at least one step beyond the 
classical method of Socratic questioning. For it is not only a matter of asking ques- 
tions to elicit answers that express knowledge that students don't realize they already 
possess, nor even asking leading questions that reveal to a student the implications of 
what they know (even at that, the boundary between a true leading question and a 
statement masquerading as a question can be subtle). I have found over the years 
that whether I am conversing orally or with my hands I seem to be at my best as a 
teacher when I am asking questions designed to trigger the asking of the learner's 
own questions so that both of us may learn something from how they answer those 
questions. For example, if I am curious about your perception of the neighbourhood 
in which you live I may ask you to draw a map of that neighbourhood. However, as 
we both watch the map emerge under your pen, and in response to your own cunos- 
Ity about just what it is that you find significant in your neighbourhood, you may 
become aware of things about your own perception or knowledge of your 
ore This may lead you to wider neighbourhood that you had not realized bef - 
49ThIS was, of course, ordy to be consistent with Plato's idea of what knowledge is, 
and what it is not, namely, something that can be gained by long reflection by one 
person and then just given to another by just stating the answer. 
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questions about your ways of perceiving and acting. And, in fact, it may be precisely 
in anticipation of this revelation that I may ask you for the map. This intention places 
our interaction even farther from the common model of teacher as dispenser of 
knowledge, for neither of us can have a full conception of the question, let alone the 
answer we seek before we have found it. This is, of course., one of the major 
problems in Plato's dialogue between Socrates and Meno. Indeed, in some 
translations Socrates refers to this paradox of seeking what one does not know as an 
-old philosophical joke. " The willingness to persist in such a search is a hallmark of 
the self-organized learner. One day when my daughter was four, she and I and a 
visitor sat around the kitchen table. She was drawing and colouring geometric 
shapes as the visitor and I talked. These drawings happened to be very different 
from her characteristic artistic style of the period and I commented that they looked 
like the kind of thing people did in art classes when they were learning about art. 
She replied, "I'm teaching myself art. " The visitor then said, as adults often seem to 
when trying to encourage children, "I think deep inside you already know it. " The 
four year old artist stopped to consider this for several seconds, then with looks and 
pacing clearly designed to ensure that her adult listeners got the point, she said, "On 
the inside I'm teaching, on the outside I'm learning. " This was at a time when I was 
teaching an undergraduate course in Greek philosophy, so Socrates, of course, came 
immediately to mind. Here was the answer to Meno-and the very definition of 
education. If I take her "on the inside" and "on the outside" to be essentially the 
roles of teacher and learner, even when the two roles are played by different people, I 
find myself engaged in a conversation in which I can quite well teach what I do not 
know, but I cannot teach what I am not willing to team. 
The first challenge of a conversation about life, and thus about learning, is 
the discovery that we are already in the middle of it. There is no starting line at 
which a teacher or learner can say, (. 4 Here we begin. " We always find ourselves al- 
ready "in action. " So the beginning of the conversation between teacher and student, 
and the first task of the teacher, is to call the student's prior view of things into 
question. The first step is to undermine their presupposition that everything is as 
they take it to be. This idea goes back even before Plato, of course, and similar 
views are explicitly expressed by Alexander, Kelly, Thomas and Harri-Augstein and 
others. In practice this often means that the teacher must begin the 
formal conversa- 
ti jI implicit one that is already ongoing. In effect we ion by on ng the learner in the 
must run along side and begin pointing things out and asking questions about the 
learner's view of the passing scenery. 
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Perhaps the definitive discussion of the nature of teaching is found in Plato 1)s 
RePublic. In Book VI, in response to a request to say something about what The 
Good is., Socrates uses an extended metaphor of the Sun in relation to things visible 
and to the eye that sees them, and The Good in its relation to the knowable and the 
soul that knows them. His concluding point is that as it is the Sun that makes all 
visible things not only visible but ultimately possible, so The Good,, as the ultimate 
truth, is the source of both knower and known as well as the relationship between 
them. This is not enough for his listener, Glaucon, so he then describes what may be 
the first conceptual diagram in the history of philosophy, representing his model of 
the relationship between knowledge and the known. Faced with Glaucon's continu- 
ing sense of confusion Socrates relates the allegory of the Cave, describing in dra- 
matic form the evolution of an individual's awareness from the world of shadows to 
the light. Of course, his listener is still not quite sure about it all, so Socrates must 
explain the allegory point by point. At the end he says that one can no more put 
knowledge into a person's mind than "one could put sight into blind eyes. " The task 
of one who would teach, he says, is to get the person to turn toward the light (of 
knowledge), and remain facing the light long enough to get used to it so that they 
will then be able to see what was before them all the time. This situation would ap- 
pear to be an apt metaphor for the whole idea of the Learning Conversation. The 
1) 1. 
first task, and the focus of the "process dialogue , is to call the 
learner's prior view 
of things into question, in effect to make them sufficiently suspicious of the reality 
they thought they saw to get them to turn around and look in a different direction. 
The first consequence of turning toward the light, in Socrates' model is, of course, 
that one is painfully blinded by it, at which point the task of the teacher-and the 
focus of the "support dialogue"-is to encourage the learner to persevere with the 
process long enough for their eyes to become accustomed to the light. As this 
occurs, and the learner gains access to what was before them all along, they are faced 
with the task of making a new sense of their new perceptions. This is the focus of 
the "referent dialogue. " Indeed, the word "conversation" itself carries the root 
meaning of "a turning around. " This view of the conversation is not merely 
metaphorical however, certainly not in my teaching practice. For the "turning 
around" is not something that happens in the mind (or in Socrates' version, the soul) 
of the learner. It involves a change of their whole self. The action, and the 
knowledge that is discovered in it, are as much physical as they are mental. The 
conversation is not about making learning psycho-physical. It is about recognizing 
that it already is, and learning to make conscious use of that recognition. To pursue 
the analogy one step farther, an important thing for me to remember as a teacher is 
that when I join a person in the shadows in order to coax them into the light I 
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become accustomed to the dim light myself When I get them to turn toward the 
light not only are they blinded by the light, and less than willing to continue facing it,, 
but I myself am blinded too. The difference is that I know that it is all right, that I 
will get used to it. Also, the more experience of this sort that one has, the closer one 
can look to the brightest light, so while the light is always blinding, that continues to 
be all right. One of the insights behind the notion of a self-organized learner is this 
one-step-beyond-the- Socratic assumption that not only is a learner, any learner, 
capable of answering the questions; they are capable of, and can become 
increasingly skillful at, asking them for themselves. 
VII. 2 Reflections on Teaching "By Hand": Continuous Questions, 
Vector Questions and a Language of Quality 
The practice of teaching the Alexander Technique typically involves the use 
of the teacher's hands as well as their words to communicate with the student. My 
intention when I put my hands on a person during a lesson is not to manipulate them 
or to "give them an experience. " To do this would be a specific instance of what I 
referred to earlier as attempting to do the learning for the student. My intention is 
rather to ask a question. Though the questions are often leading-or even 
loaded-they are never merely rhetorical. They are , in my own construction, 
Socratic 
but real questions. In many cases a possible translation of the question might be, 
"Here is an available direction and quality for a potential movement; what is your 
response? " or "Are you willing to move 'like this'? " It is an "utterance" in what 
Kelly referred to as the invitational mode, a "suppose this, what then? " question. 
The precise way in which I place my hand on the other person and the direction and 
quality with which I move my hand while in contact with them constitute the 
"phrasing" of the question. 50 What is perhaps most vital in this "conversation with 
my hands"' is that the questions be both clear and real questions. There is In practice 
a great difference between the clear intention implicit in a questioning 
invitation and 
a preconception of where that invitation ought to lead. This quality of intention 
without preconception is characteristic of coordinated human action in general and is 
essential in particular to anyone who takes on the role of teacher in relation to a self- 
organized learner. 
Reflecting on my years of "hands on" lessons and on my view of them as 
fundamentally conversational, I find that the language in which those conversations 
50Cf. the earlier note on Carse's distinction between touching and moving. 
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are carried on has a number of unique features. " In a verbal conversation the con- 
versants typically take turns. If I ask a question and another person replies , it may happen that something of the intent of the question continues to be present through 
several cycles of response. Indeed, a question or answer may be repeated or modi- 
fied from one turn to the next, but each turn has a discrete quality. If the turns over- 
lap, however, if both people speak at once, the result is seldom anything but confu- 
sion. In this kind of manual or kinesthetic conversation, however, each question and 
answer has an extension in time. When I place my hands on a person's neck or 
shoulder in a questioning way, the question continues for as long as my hand remains 
in contact with that interrogative intent. Also, as the other person's response to my 
touch is just that-a response-it continues to be an answer to my question. My ques- 
tion may itself be changed in response to the other person, their movement response 
may also change over time, and thus we are in an actual conversation-but both 
changes occur continuously. The conversation also takes on a curious character 
(reminiscent again of aspects of Plato's cosmology) in which the question remains 
temporally simultaneous and at the same time logically prior to the answer. This 
leads to a kinesthetic elaboration of meaning of both the question and the answer, 
from both my point of view and my student's. Furthermore, - it 
is not only a conver- 
sation about action; it is a conversation in action. The conversation is constructive. 
If, as Kelly suggested, "one way to think of the construct is as a pathway of move- 
ment, " (Kelly, 1963, p. 128) then the conversation with my hands, in its interplay 
between the continuity of question and response and the dimensionality of personal 
meaning, is about movement of all sorts. A change in my interpretation of events is 
as much a movement in this broad sense as is a displacement of my limbs. Kelly 
states that,, "the classical threefold division of psychology into cognition, affection 
and conation. has been completely abandoned in the psychology of personal con- 
structs. " (ibid-, p. 130) The interweaving of the verbal and manual conversations is a 
way of conversing in a space beyond that division, moment by moment. 
There is a second unique characteristic of the "conversation with my hands" 
hidden in the above discussion. When I place my hands on a student in the context 
of a lesson, we are, as I have said, engaged in a conversation both verbal and manual. 
The questions which I ask with my hands are primarily about the direction and qual- 
ity of movement. The continuous character of the conversation implies that the 
questions and answers are equally about action and perception, and the continuity of 
the verbal and manual conversations implies that the motor and kinesthetic aspects 
are continuous with all of the other dimensions of meaning in the activity in which 
eatures are illustrated in practice in the first session in Appendix 2. 5' These f111 
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the student is engaged. Further, it is sometimes possible to ask questions about sev- 
eral directions and/or qualities of movement simultaneously with a single directed 
touch. Thus the concept of "direction" has a fruitful ambiguity in the conversation. 
The dimensional quality of my questions take on a "vector") quality. If the student 
has been engaging in a general pattern of tension, 52 perhaps bracing and shortening 
their entire body in order to play a violin., then the idea of "lengthening" becomes the 
idea of a release into many degrees of freedom rather than a release in a single di- 
rection. 5', I may place my hand on a person's shoulder with the question in my mind 
being about the quality of how that shoulder is moving. I may also put my hand in 
the same place but with the intention of asking a question about the relationship 
between that shoulder and the rest of their movement as a whole. I then find myself 
in possession of an awareness of what is happening with their back and knees and 
arms,, etc. as well as that shoulder, and of a sense of their whole coordination. More 
to the point, so does the person, and they are thus able to give consent to a much 
more complex pattern of release. The effect of this release of tension will be ob- 
servable, both kinesthetically by that person and visually by an outside observer, as 
changes in various relationships in varying directions. If the person is engaged in 
activity such as speaking, singing or playing an instrument, the effect of the change 
will also be audible. There are also moments at which the continuity between the 
physical dimensions of the quality of a person's movement and other dimensions of 
personal meaning become explicit. This happened recently when a student was no- 
ticing a particular nexus of tension in her lower back while walking. We decided to 
find a movement she could make that would provide a context in which she would 
be able to release that tensing so that she could have some contrast that would allow 
her to gain more choice in the matter. As she leaned forward and her back began to 
lengthen, she suddenly stopped, put her hand on her back and told me in a slightly 
apologetic tone that the tightness in her back meant that, "I have to make a lot of 
money. " We were suddenly conversing at several levels at once and in a matter of 
52AIthough I use the noun form "tension" I intend it in the sense of a "tensing" as an 
activity that they are engaged in doing, rather than a "tension" as an object that they 
have. 
53"Lengthening" is a term commonly used by teachers of the Alexander Technique to 
refer to the effect of releasing undue contraction as distinct from trying to do 
anything to make something longer. If I have been contracting a muscle and I cease 
doing so, the muscle returns to its "resting length" and so gets longer. If I try to 
make some part of my body longer I will in fact contract some extensor muscles 
rather than ceasing to contract flexors. Thus "to lengthen" is both active and 
passive; it is active in that it follows from a specific intention and passive in that the 
intention is to allow something to occur rather than attempting to cause it to occur. 
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seconds she was walking much more gracefully and easily, and the tight spot in her 
back was much freer. It seemed curious that such an interpretation should present it- 
self with such specificity, the more so as she reported that several body workers 
whom she had known associated money worries with lower back problems. Several 
days later, as I was having a conversation with myself about some tension in my own 
lower back, I suddenly found the answer in the form of a sentence that had essen- 
tially the same meaning in both the financial and mechanical contexts: "I must sup- 
port myself " Supported vs. not supported is a dimension of personal meaning which 
informs many aspects of my experience, as is supporting myself (by some effort of 
my own) vs. being supported (in the natural course of events). The interplay of these 
dimensions across the other set of dimensions, physical vs. emotional, muscular vs. 
financial, etc. gives rise to the dimensional quality of my embodiment. Thus it is 
that, for example, a muscular tension can have a financial meaning. This meaning- 
fulness of the same event in multiple domains may be seen as an example of the 
metaphorical quality of embodiment. 
had a curious experience of this sort multidimensional conversation myself 
some years ago in a lesson with Marjorie Barstow. She was working with me as I 
sang in front of about 70 other workshop participants, singing in front of groups of 
people being something that I very rarely do. As we worked I became gradually 
more free, both physically and in terms of the quality of my performance. At one 
point Ms Barstow put her hands on my left shoulder in a way that suggested that I 
had the option of allowing it to move out into freer movement. In quite rapid suc- 
cession I had the following impressions. First I had the clear sense that there was 
some kind of "emotional issue" tied up with, or in, the tension54 in my shoulder. 
What that emotional issue was, I didn't know,, but there seemed to be reasons why I 
did not want to know consciously. The second impression was that I had two 
choices. I could either allow my shoulder to follow her suggestion and get an expe- 
nence of better quality in my singing, but at the cost of having to deal with whatever 
the hidden emotional meaning was. Alternatively I could leave it safely sealed away 
in my shoulder, but at the cost of missing a great opportunity for new experience. 
The third impression, which followed surprisingly on the heels of the others, was that 
there was a creative third choice. If I was really in some way "storing" an emotional 
54Here again it would be more precise to say that I was embodying the emotional 
meaning, in part, by tensing my shoulder in a certain way. The use of "tension" as a 
something that I could have in my shoulder was a metaphorical aspect of the 
meaning at the time,, and in fact, reconstruing that tension more clearly as something 
I was doing was what the learning was about. 
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Problem in my shoulder, then it might be possible to temporarily "move" it some- 
where else. That this reasoning may have been blatantly metaphorical did not lessen 
its practicality. I made my choice and my experience of what followed was that I 
was able to move the emotional issue to a new location, without "looking" at it or 
being very specific about "where" it was going. I was then free to accept the Inv'- 
tation to allow my shoulder to be freer with the result that the general quality of my 
breath and the resonance and rhythm of my voice improved markedly in ways 
observable both by myself and my audience. The clear "lesson" of the experience at 
the time seemed to be that if I could indeed move an emotional fixity, then I was 
capable of processing it in such a way that it was never quite necessary to bring it all 
the way to consciousness. I have since that time worked with a number of 
individuals in more dramatic versions of the same situation. In each case they faced 
a dilemma in which they seemed to have a choice between continuing to, what they 
might call, "hold myself together" or to allow a physical release that would open 
emotional floodgates. They could hold off anticipated great emotional pain only at 
the cost of great physical pain. Using my voice and my hands, I carried on a con- 
versation with them about how they were embodying their emotional meaning. The 
import of the conversation was not to try to map their embodiment, any sort of "this 
pain here means that" but simply to explore how what they were doing was but one 
way of embodying that meaning, and conversely that the felt meaning of any 
particular tension was but one interpretation. In other words, they had a wider range 
of choices than they were aware of and one way into that range of choices was 
through conscious attention to the quality of their coordination. it is significant that 
each of the individuals with whom I had these conversations had already had some 
actors involved in that experience with, and thus had some skill in altering, the f 
coordination. This allowed me to say in effect, "Here are some conditions in which 
you can now do what you already knew how to do but didn't think you could. " But 
then this is the case for anyone met in conversation as a (to some extent) self- 
organized learner. Thus in the manual part of the conversation, as in any other, it is 
less a question of supplementing the learner's skill with that of the teacher as it is 
I or the work one of sustaining conditions in which the skill the learner has is enough f 
of the moment. 
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect that emerges from considering the inter- 
action between my hands and my student as a conversation is the question of the 
language in which that conversation takes place, for it turns out to be a language that 
has no nouns. The invitations and responses are given at an immediate level of kin- 
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esthetic and/or movement constructs. 55 In Dewey's discussion in the second chapter 
of Human Nature and Conduct, he finds the very conception of an act to be per- 
formed to be grounded in a persons habits, which are themselves derived from their 
Prior experience. Thus he says, 
Now in fact a man who can stand properly does so, and only a man 
who can, does .... Only when a man can already perform an act of 
standing straight does he know what it is like to have a right posture 
and only then can he summon the idea required for proper execu- 
tion .... The act must come before the thought, and the habit before an 
ability to evoke the thought at Will. (Dewey 1957, p. 30 ) 
To refer to an act as an object, as a "something to be performed, "' as the sort of thing 
for which a noun is the appropriate part of speech, is to refer to its habitual concep- 
tion. To carry on a conversation that refers only to the dimensions in which those 
conceptions take their meaning, but explicitly in the absence of the conceptions 
themselves, is to converse about stepping into the unknown. If I wish to transcend 
the obviousness of my habitual conception of, in Dewey's example, standing prop- 
erly, it is not a matter of finding a new concept of standing and then putting that con- 
cept into practice, for that would put me in the old searching-for-the-unknown 
dilemma. I cannot have a concept of the new "proper" way of standing until I have 
already done so. "The act must come before the thought .... 
1`56 The only way I can 
discover a means of standing that is superior to my habitual concept of standing is to 
stand in a way that is unknown to me, a way of which I have no concept. The proc- 
ess of discovery is a conversation about the dimensions of meaning, largely kines- 
thetic and motor,, out of which I construct a new way of standing. We could, of 
course, substitute any other act for that of standing. The key issue regarding 
habit-whether habitual conception, habitual perception or habitual action-is that 
having a concept is both convenient and limiting. 57 Here again, conception, 
55Frorn a stricter linguistic perspective it might be proper to object that it cannot BE 
a language if it has no nouns. It must be admitted from this stricter perspective, 
however,, that much, and sometimes all, of what happens in a conversation is extra- 
linguistic. Thus what I find myself engaged in is at the very least a conversation 
without nouns. 
question of how I can acquire my 56There is of course the addi I concept of 
"proper" in the first place. Alexander, according to some of his students said, 
"Everyone wants to be right, but no one stops to consider if their idea of right is 
right., ' (Maisel, p. 11) 
571n practice, this is always a sticky business. There seems to be no immunity to the 
tendency, every time we name a construct, to already begin treating it as if it were an 
element, albeit often at a different level of construction. In personal construct theory 
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perception and action are not independent; the dimensions of perception are 
conditioned by those of action, etc. In the continuity of expenence,, such distnbution 
of dimensions of meaning are not orthogonal. 
Now, if I am engaged in conversation with a student with the intention of 
aiding their discovery of ways of acting that are beyond their habitual knowing, then 
I need to find ways of asking questions and of making invitations about qualities of 
action which are not only outside what they know, but indeed outside what I know. 
My questions must be real questions. Teachers, according Paolo Friere, should not 
ask questions to which they know the answers. Reflecting on my own teaching 
practice, I have come to the realization that much of what I might do that would give 
me the feeling that I am being a "good teacher" might in fact interfere with my stu- 
dents' learning. But beyond that is the rather unnerving realization that not only are 
the extra efforts that make me feet good unhelpful to my students' learning, but 
indeed so are the essential parts of what actually constitutes "good teaching" as I un- 
derstand it. Indeed it is sometimes the case that it is by my being a poor teacher that 
my students learn best. I may give my students the best opportunities for learning by 
being a poor teacher, but of course, it must be the right sort of poor teacher. 58 In this 
way I often find myself faced with the double conversational nature of the learning 
conversation. For the learner the conversation is about how they are going about a 
given task but also how they go about the task of learning. A teacher who is working 
with a student in a conversational mode faces the same layered task, helping this 
particular learner to learn this task, and at the same time leaming how to teach. To 
teach conversationally is to be always calling into question my own understanding of 
what a teacher is. The art is in teaching beyond my present concept of teaching. It is 
always moving out into the unknown. I have occasionally described my view of my 
it is the elements that play the role of nouns. They are the objects in our experience. 
Constructs are described as "ways of anticipating. " The conversation in which we 
make explicit these "ways") in the interest of gaining the ability to better anticipate is 
often a matter of treating something which is not a noun in a noun-like way while 
being careful not to complete the task of making it into a noun. It is a process 
fraught with peril, but sometimes one is rewarded by being able to catch oneself in 
the very act of objectifying. As my students and I have found on many occasions, 
there can be great leverage in such a discovery. 
58The story is told of the composer Paul Hindimith, famous for his rather dissonant 
twelve-tone music, who while conducting a rehearsal of one of his compositions, 
rapped his baton to stop the orchestra. "No, no, gentlemen, " he told them, "even 
though it sounds wrong, it's still not right. " (quoted in R. Smullyan, p. 34) 1 have 
often found myself and my students faced with a kinesthetic version of just this 
dilemma. 
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role to students as that of a guide. The safari is theirs and so the choice of where to 
go is always theirs. The guide's role is not to direct the journey but to know what 
questions to ask along the way, to know where the dangers may lie, or the beautiful 
waterfalls just over the next ndge. Laurie Thomas once responded to my description 
of my interaction with my students by saying that it was "'the opposite of tourism. " 
One purpose I may have for hiring a guide to help me go farther into the unknown 
than I might be able to go on my own is precisely to extend the range of how far I 
can go on my own. And whom should I hire as such a guide? If I want to go some- 
where that I have never been, I might find someone who has been there before to act 
as a guide. If I want to go to a forest or a desert where no one has gone before, I 
would do well to find someone who has spent a good deal of time in forests or 
deserts. To push matters one step further , if I wanted to go "where no one has gone 
before" the best guide would be a person who had made a practice of going places 
they had never been before, a person who was used to being in the unknown. And if 
a person should suddenly realize that they are lost in uncharted territory with only 
their own wits to guide them, there is a simple method for proceeding: 1) look 
around, explore, 2) figure out a way to get home and, 3) take notes. 
Another aspect of the hands-on conversation is that it establishes a frame of 
reference that provides the leamer with information about their own relationship to 
movement that they don't initially possess. When moving "on our own" the only 
external reference we usually have is empty air. If they do nothing else, the hands of 
another person may provide a more solid reference against which to perceive 
changes in the patterns of our way of moving. But if my student is gaining useful 
information in interaction with my hands, several important questions immediately 
present themselves regarding the wider learning conversation. How can they acquire 
for themselves the kind of information they are getting with my hands (With, not 
from my hands). What sort of questions must I ask, verbally and manually, and how 
must I ask them in order to help the learner learn to ask similar questions of them- 
selves? How do I design and carry out "conversational experiments" in this mode so 
that they will demonstrate both the principles involved and at the same time aspects 
of how to go about designing such experiments? 59 The common assumption in the 
Alexander Technique community is that no one can use their hands in this teaching 
mode until after they have acquired sufficient sensitivity in the "use" of themselves, 
that one can only convey with one's hands the level of kinesthetic perceptivity that 
59See the "find something you want to change" experiment in the "Conversational 
introduction. " 
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one has acquired. 60 However, If one is teaming to work in the questioning mode de- 
scribed earlier, then it may well be that even that sensitivity is but another skill that 
one may learn in a conversational way. It may well be that two individuals working 
together may come to a level of skill far beyond what either of them began with by 
providing this active reference frame for each other. The first summer I worked with 
Ms Barstow there were times at which the workshop broke up into small groups in 
which we worked together with our hands-most of us having little clue about 
precisely what we were meant to be doing. Yet I remember clearly the moment 
when I put my hands on another person who had been studying with her for some 
time already and he had a good clear experience of increased lightness and freedom, 
and learned something in the process. Of course it felt good to be of help to one 
"more advanced" than I was, but more to the point it was a clear early demonstration 
that the teaming was not transference. On coming home after four weeks and being 
asked by a friend to show her what the workshop had been about, I put my hands on 
her head in the course of my description, and she had the same characteristic 
experience of "lightness. " Indeed over the years I have observed that people teaming 
to teach (at least those teaming in the experimental style of Ms Barstow and her 
students) tend to go through three phases. In the first, as they play With using their 
hands, they "don't know what they are doing, " and this lack of preconception often 
leads to surprisingly good "results. " In the second phase, after they have learned a 
good deal, they think they understand, and so, often things don't go so smoothly. 
Eventually they enter a third phase,, in which they come to a deeper appreciat on that 
in fact they don't after all "know" what they are doing, and they are thus free to work 
effectively with intention but without preconception. We may well find that there 
are things which it practically impossible to learn working alone, because it is so 
difficult to generate the necessary contrasting experience in isolation, but this does 
not imply that we can only learn these things from someone else who "knows" them 
already. This fact of conversational teaming is a common operating assumption of 
or teaming to be more any self-organized leamer, and is as much the case f 
* 61 kinesthetically acute as it is for any other skill. 
60This presupposes that there is a "correct" conception of what "use" is that can be a 
basis for having enough of "it. " 
611t is an almost universal belief within the Alexander Technique community that 
one must have a skilled teacher because one cannot learn without this external 
reference. The prime counter example was of course Alexander 
himself, though it 
might be argued that he developed his skill through years of interaction with 
his 
pupils. This raises the possibility of a conversational "training course" in which 
pairs of students learn the kinesthetic skills they require by conversing in this way 
94 
Teaching Practice: Reflections and Implications 
VIIA Implications of hands-on work with animals and infants 
I have on occasion had the opportunity to carry on this sort of manual con- 
versation with non-human subjects, namely cats and horses. The cats seemed 
slightly offended by my impertinence and uninterested in conversing, so I will briefly 
discuss the horse conversations and what I think they may imply. It may be the case 
that,, because no human vocabulary is needed, this manual conversation about quality 
of movement can be carried on quite successfully. As I put my hands on the horse, I 
was in effect asking, "What is happening here? What can I perceive about the global 
quality of your movement? And, by the way, how will you respond to this sugges- 
tion"" At one point in a "conversation" a friend and I were having with a particular 
horse she was at his head with her hands on his neck and shoulders while I was at his 
midsection. I moved to his left hind quarter and suggested a direction from his body 
down into his leg and a freer quality of movement in his stance. His leg eased out 
under my hands and he turned his head and gave me the most bemused sort of "What 
in the world are you doing back there? " look. But he seemed to like the effect. The 
into easiness of his standing continued to increase, and when his rider took him back * 
a trot and a canter afterward his gait was significantly improved. Other similar in- 
I is non- teractions with animals lead me to conclude that this kind of leaming, in thi 
verbal, non-conceptual, channel is indeed possible, most likely because that is the 
way in which the animals are functioning. Perhaps these are the dimensions of 
meaning in the horse's experience that are similar enough to dimensions of my 
experience to establish a shared space in which we are able to converse. I have an- 
other friend who has worked as a nurse in infant intensive care units. She 
does a 
similar sort of work with severely distressed, usually premature, newborns, in effect 
helping them to unlearn the patterns they have teamed from their brief but intense 
experience with respirators and other life-support equipment. These tension patterns 
actively interfere with the natural reflex sequences that infants need to go through, 
but in the system of meaning that the newborns have already acquired they can often 
carry the meaning "absolutely necessary for survival. " The primarily manual con- 
versations in which the nurse helps the infant to discover that they can release 
that 
pattern of survival effort and release themselves into their own natural 
functioning 
are quite astounding. It shows, however, that just as it is possible to converse with a 
horse about the organization and quality of its movement, at its own level, it is also 
and providing a kinesthetic reference 
for each other. The development of such a 
course, however, is a matter 
for future research. 
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possible to converse with an infant on its level. I have had a few very much less 
dramatic interactions of this sort with infants. That these conversations are non- 
conceptual by no means implies that they are not meaningful. My impression has 
been that they are carried on at a level which the phenomenologists would call "pre- 
objective, " and may indeed provide evidence for their claim for the primacy of that 
level of experience. This same kind of transaction can be carried out With older hu- 
mans as well, but in that case, if there is not also a corresponding conceptual inter- 
action., it becomes a subtle kind of operant conditioning rather than an engaging of a 
whole person in conversation. The significance of the work with animals and infants 
lies in the degree to which conversations about meaning carried on at this pre-objec- 
tive level can be effective. I have found in them direct experience of what I have had 
to say about the continuity of experience and how within it the dimensionality of the 
experience itself is prior to any drawing out of particular dimensions. 
In its full implementation the conductive conversation is a systematic way of 
conversing about meaning-meaning as something which is personally constructed, 
being dimensional and elaborative in character, but which is also embodied in per- 
sonal action. It is a conversation about distinctions, not only the distinctions which 
are the dimensions of a person's interpretation of events in their experience, but the 
distinctions embodied in their transactions with their environment. It is the distinc- 
tions within a person s perception of their whole self in action that give rise to the 
capacity for giving simple consent both to qualities of action and to the following of 
unknown paths toward their chosen goals. Thus, within a conversation about the 
dimensions of our embodiment of meaning, we can come to an appreciation, and a 
conscious employment of the dynamic, conductive quality of personal meaning. 
VH. 5 The "Evidence" and Report of Findings 
As I indicated at the beginning of this section, while the conceptual founda- 
tions of my conversational approach to embodiment are largely derived from the 
ideas of the contributors I have discussed, its evolution as a concrete practice has 
taken place in practice, working with individual learners in the context of their own 
purposes. That is, my findings have been drawn from the whole of my teaching 
experience. My teaching, as a reflective practice, has been throughout, action 
research, and in a sense both the data and the conclusions drawn from it are difficult 
to provide because they are embodied in the ongoing practice itself The 
"Conversational Introduction to Conductive Reasoning" in Appendix I is intended as 
an opportunity for the reader to share in that experience first hand, and in keeping 
96 
Teaching Practice: Reflections and Implications 
with the conversational intent of this work, I repeat the invitation to do so before 
going on to my findings. In order to make these matters more observable, I have also 
provided, in the form of the videotaped sessions in Appendix 3a, a representative 
sampling of my experience working with individuals. The following is a general 
discussion of these sessions in the context of that wider experience, and the findings 
I have drawn from it. More detailed written descriptions and timelines for the indi- 
vidual sessions themselves are also provided in Appendix 2. In Appendix 2c two of 
these sessions are reconsidered with explicit reference to the Learning Conversations 
model. 
These videotaped sessions are in one way artificial, having been set up in the 
hope of explicitly demonstrating aspects of what I have discussed earlier, but each 
session takes on its own reality, both in the straightforward sense that the focus is on 
some purpose of the learner, and in a more resonant sense that the people I am con- 
versing With share my fascination with the process itself Thus it is action research 
not merely in that they address their wants and I get my data, but in our being col- 
leagues in the research at several levels. It is significant that these individuals are in 
that respect quite representative of those with whom I have worked. Recall what 
Dewey said about people coming to Alexander's work for the "wrong reasons. " 
What was true for Alexander's work seems even more so for mine, and it is often 
surprising how early in the conversation people add the satisfying of an intense cun- 
osity about how they are achieving the changes to their list of purposes. This ac- 
quisition of learning how they are learning as another learning goal is, of course, an 
essential aspect of a learning conversation. An example of how this plays out over a 
longer time frame is given in the audiotape also in Appendix 3b. 
A Catalogue of Purposes 
At first sight the purposes people have at the beginning of their conversations 
with me fall into a small set of convenient categories. As I look back on them, 
how- 
ever, I find instead a continuous spectrum of purpose, and one of the 
features that 
emerges in each case is an evolving recognition of the relation 
between the initial 
purpose and that wider spectrum. Of course, finding new purposes along the way is 
an essential characteristic of the learning process, but there seems to 
be something 
more in this relatedness. Perhaps it is simply that whatever the initial task 
focus of 
the conversation, a conversation about the embodiment of personal meaning is al- 
ways intimately woven into the "life conversation. " 
The most straightforward initial purpose is the relief of pain or chronic ten- 
Ion. These conversations begin with at least a suspicion on someone s part that s' I 
97 
Teaching Practice: Reflections and Implications 
there is a learned component to the pain, that is, that it is at least in part the product 
Of some aspect of how the person has learned to do something-whether it be danc- 
ing, typing, merely sitting, or compensating for an injury. Sometl Is imes the problem i 
not the pain or tension itself but the fact that it makes it impossible for the person to 
accomplish something of vital importance-a pianist, or a dancer or a singer may find 
themselves unable to practice or perform. The novelist in the second session had to 
quit writing near the completion of his novel due to pain in his neck and forearms. 
Perhaps the most extreme example of this that I have seen was a young man who had 
been a singer-guitarist but could no longer manage to speak above a hoarse whisper. 
Indeed, the more important what he wanted to say, the more impossible speech be- 
came. He was able to improve by finding a way of making the ease with which he 
moved to speak more important than what he had to say. Though for a while the 
only sort of thing he could say clearly was, "I don't care if I speak or not, " he was 
thus able to prove to himself that he could in fact do so. 
There are two less severe situations that correspond to the two above. Many 
people who are not debilitated by their tension nevertheless have a sense of being 
limited by it. They confront not pain but a feeling of restrictedness or interference. 
This can range from a direct feeling of awkwardness or difficulty to a less tangible 
sense that they could be more effective and more "at ease" than they are. As in the 
more extreme version, sometimes the matter is focused on a specific task which the 
person wants to accomplish. This most often has to do with some kind of artistic 
performance, as in the case of the violinist in the third session, but also includes 
many other activities, such things as participating in business meetings or solving 
physics problems. While they are capable of performing, perhaps quite well, they 
are aware that there is something in their effort to do so that interferes with the qual- 
ity of the results they seek-that they are getting in their own way. This interference 
is sometimes experienced, in daily life, as a feeling of self-alienation,, a separation 
between one's intentions and what one actually does, and in a performance setting as 
an inability to ever quite express one"s artistic intentions precisely. This sense of 
limitation is, of course, not always negative. There are those who do not feel espe- 
cially dissatisfied but who simply want to find an ever increasing subtlety in the 
relationship between their intentions and the quality of their action. Accepting the 
principle that I often use in my teaching work that, "You don't have be bad to get 
better, " they simply want more of what they like. 
Whatever the specific issue is, whether physical, mental, emotional, or to do 
with performance in some technical sense, from the present "conductive)) perspec- 
tive the underlying learning process comes to be seen as one of bringing greater co- 
98 
Teaching Practice: Reflections and Implications 
ordination and intentionality to the embodiment of personal meaning. The learners 
themselves come to view their process as one of moving from a view of physical, 
emotional etc. as separate issues to a more unified view of themselves and their ways 
of acting. To varying degrees they come to view themselves as engaged in a self- 
science of their own ongoing action. 
Session I- Lynne 
The first session is an explicit example of action research in that while it is 
intended to demonstrate the conversational aspects of working with my hands-in 
fact, I asked this particular person to have the conversation because I knew her to be 
rather articulate about her experience of those aspects-Lynne has her own purpose 
which is the focus of the conversation, a sort of personal research project. She is a 
massage therapist and a teacher of the Alexander Technique. I have worked with her 
many times over the past several years, and had several informal conversations with 
her early in the evolution of the present work. I was not surprised by her choice of a 
perceptual issue to work with on this occasion. As a massage therapist as an 
Alexander Technique teacher, and also as an actor, she has developed an interest in 
coordination in a wider than usual sense which includes being coordinated with her 
environment, and in particular in the ways in which her openness to her 
environment, human and natural, is a product of her own coordinated action. So this 
session represents for her a specific bit of research within a more general 
exploration. Thus this session illustrates both the "basic" and "advanced" aspects of 
the multichannel conversation, the germ and the fruit. 
Session 2- Truman 
The second session represents in some ways the opposite end of a spectrum 
of skills. Truman is relatively new to the psycho-physical skills that Lynne exhibits. 
He is also a person in a typical dilemma. There is something he wants very much to 
accomplish, but he finds himself blocked by the consequences of the way 
he has 
gone about trying to accomplish it. His personal purpose is quite simple, to remove 
the blockage so that he will be able to complete his task. This was, of course, pre- 
cisely the situation that Alexander himself faced, and as with that prototypical 
example, Truman's difficulty and his way out of it have dimensions well 
beyond the 
evident physical ones. Truman had sold a novel and was completing the writing 
when, about three months from the end he found himself physically incapable of 
continuing the work due to extreme tension and pain in his arms and elsewhere. 
His 
debilitating physical tension had become incorporated into his conception of what it 
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means not only to engage in the physical act of sitting and typing but of the very act 
of creating fiction. In two sessions prior to this one he had already learned to rec- 
ognize ways in which he was causing his own discomfort, and indeed was able to 
gain considerable relief-as long as he was not trying to work on his novel. His frus- 
tration at the beginning of the session is that he seems to be unable to use what he 
has learned at the very moment when he needs it most 
is not "physical" at all. 
Session 3- Miriam 
Clearly his physical problem 
The third session is with a musician who simply wants to continue to improve 
the ease-and quality-of her performance on the violin. Miriam began studying the 
Alexander Technique several years ago in the context of her violin playing and has 
since also become a teacher. On the tape it is clear that she demonstrates 
considerable skill both in psycho-physical self-observation and in making the 
experiments that lead to the changes she desires. The contrast between her and 
Truman in their ability to perceive and articulate the similarities and differences in- 
volved also reveals dimensions within the conversational process. All of these ses- 
sions taken together illustrate the microscopic scale of the cycles of learning 
involved. As I discussed earlier the dimensions of experience at hand are not subject 
to recording for future reflection. What we are learning is how to bring a reflective 
quality to the experience itself, which results in events which often have the appear- 
ance of personal learning contracts of a few seconds duration each. I do indeed want 
to claim that a conversation about the dimensions of one's embodiment of personal 
meaning is being carried on at such a foundational level of meaning construction that 
there is a sort of indeterminacy between the quality and the sequence of events, the 
dimensionality and the continuity. It is an attempt to bring intentionality to that 
whole from which any other scheme for cycling meaning back into experience is 
abstracted. 
Because Minam,, like Lynne, is relatively skilled at key aspects of this way of 
conversing she is free to attend more directly to her goal of becoming more inten- 
tional about the place of the techni I act of performing. I have ical aspects in the whole 
often observed that when a performer puts their technical, artistic intention at the 
centre of their attention, what they must rely on to direct the actual playing out of 
that intention is their unconscious habitual control patterns. Thus what an audience 
perceives is the performer's intention, filtered through the limitations of those hab- 
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itS. 62 On the other hand, when a performer learns to work from their own whole, 
coordinated self, and finds a place for the specific artistic choice, as it were, on the 
edge of their attention, and at the very end of the act of performing, then what the 
audience is given is a glimpse of the performer as a whole human person refracted 
through that artistic choice. Thus, for example, an actor's audience sees a whole 
person on stage; the wholeness involved is, of course,, that of the actor herself, but as 
that wholeness is refracted through the character choices the actor has made, they 
will seem to see, not the actor at all, but the character as a whole person. 63 
The specific strategies for engaging this kind of attention vanes with the kind 
of technique involved. Musicians seem to find leverage in the "hire any musician to 
play it" game" illustrated on the tape. With actors I am more likely to invite them to 
attend to the specific differences between their way of walking, for example, and 
that of their character, or the idea, related to the first session, of attending to their 
own coordination in order to be open to the rhythm and meaning available in the 
language as written by the playwright. One particular example of this occurred when 
a woman in her sixties was reciting a poem. It was a sort of lost-love poem in which 
the beauty of the first three fourths quickly turns to bitterness at the end because the 
lover has gone. I worked mainly with my hands on this woman's head and neck, and 
as she recited while attending primarily to herself rather than the poem her voice 
became deeper and clearer, and the imagery of the poem became more powerful. 
Suddenly, just as she approached the line where the tone of the poem turned, she 
actually tightened and pulled away from my hands, not in the habitual way with 
which she had previously recited the poem, but ever so slightly in a way that brought 
a subtle strangled quality to her voice-which seemed perfect for that line. She then 
moved back out of it into the powerful bitterness of the end. She did none of this 
consciously in the sense of deciding to do it. Each tiny bit of action-including that 
of actually interfering with her coordination-was a product of her coordination in 
interplay with her intention and the language of the poem. While that may seem a 
good deal to read into such a small event, she and the rest of her audience expen- 
enced the moment in much the same way. 
62Thus the actor who always plays the same character, whatever the role. Of course, 
if there is a paying audience who likes that character, the actor may 
have quite a 
successful career. 
63Whether or not this is the inverse of Shaws statement concerning our seeing not 
,, tills woman as Ophelia, but Ophelia as this woman. " noted earlier depends on what 
he meant by "as, " but it is the heart of the matter. 
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The issues involved in performance are also inter-woven with the perceptual 
dimensions found in the first session. For example, a strategy I have often used with 
a person who was reading aloud is to ask them to attend to their own coordination in 
the context of the specific idea that if they are looking at the text the information is 
visually available to them. As their whole coordination includes not only their me- 
chanical parts but also the parts that process such visual information,, if they are not 
interfering with themselves all that is needed is to consent to that information 
- coming in" and being used. The simplicity and effectiveness of this strategy has 
proven itself many times. I also used it in reverse once, with rather dramatic results. 
An actor wanted to portray a young woman who was blind, and thus wanted to "act 
blind. " As she became gradually easier and more aware in her general way of mov- 
ing I suggested that there was visual information about the room around her available 
through her eyes. If she was capable of giving active consent to making use of that 
information in the context of her coordinated moving could she consciously Withhold 
such consent? She took on the experiment and proceeded to walk across the room 
with a kind of mixture of confidence and caution that seems to characterized one 
who is spatially familiar but visually denied. The impression was so convincing that 
everyone found it a bit frightening. She reported feeling frightened by her ability to 
lose contact with her visual space so easily, though of course she had never lost any 
contact; she simply declined to take advantage of it for a moment,, but it was a 
powerful moment none the less. The other actor present was also affected, as she 
reported, not so much by the "blindness" itself but as if the realism of it seemed to 
bring troubling dimensions in her own experience close to the surface. It was a quite 
dramatic moment. 
Minain Is intention on the tape is less dramatic but more common. She finds 
herself carrying some habitual patterns of effort over from a previous practice ses- 
sion. This makes her both physically uncomfortable and dissatisfied with her ability 
to produce in practice the musical qualities she wants in her playing. Getting better 
results with the same effort, or alternatively getting the same results with less effort, 
would either one constitute improvement. If it is the effort itself that is limiting the 
quality of the results, however, it often turns out that a performer gets better results 
and gets them more easily by finding a way of giving up the effort. It is important to 
remember that "better" is always open to construction by the person involved. The 
advantage of attending with some care to the dimensionality of "better" is that the 
person gains a much more subtly detailed, and wider,, range of choice in that con- 
struction. That subtlety and range of choice seems to be limited only by the person's 
ability to articulate the dimensions of the choice, and to free themselves of their pre- 
102 
Teaching Practice: Reflections and Implications 
conception of how it is to be accomplished-which is another way of saying that it is 
a matter of the level of their coordination. 
Session 4- Penny 
The fourth session falls naturally into two parts. The first part is a 
C4 conductive conversation" that sprang from an observation that Penny made that she 
was feeling more of the kind of general ease she was seeking in one part of herself 
and more of a quality of restriction in another. Penny's general learning goal has 
been to find more ease and comfort in the face of a rather stressful job. The basic 
premise we have been working from is that though we typically refer to a situation as 
"stressful" the stress is not in the situation, but in our response to it, indeed that 
stress is the response. Penny is representative of quite a number of "non-performers" 
I have worked with who,, confronted with many stimuli on the job, seek to team to 
respond in non-stressful ways. She has gained considerable skill at this relative to 
where she began. She is able to articulate and gain changes that she values, though 
not always as consistently or as fully as she would like. When the number or inten- 
sity of stimuli is great, or if she is simply tired, her skill can be overwhelmed and she 
finds herself struggling with tension that seems to be pressing on her from outside 
herself What she seeks is a way of being characterized by comfort and ease. 64 
From the point of view of a Learning Conversation this taped session is 
largely a matter the support dialogue. Though in one sense I am carrying the struc- 
ture of the conversation by asking questions and proposing experiments, it is, in the 
context of her longer term learning, a significant demonstration of her ability to 
consistently make and use the distinctions in her own experience,, to perform and 
reflect upon the experiments, to make changes that are of value in her own terms-all 
without the assistance of any manual guidance. One measure of a Learning Conver- 
sation over time is the extent to which the learner assumes control of the conversa- 
tion as it proceeds. At a verbal level it appears on the tape that I am maintaining the 
directorship, but what Penny demonstrates is that her ability to transforrn the verbal 
experimental structures into full psycho-physical experiments and then to carry them 
out is evidence of her taking over the learning process and making it her own. What 
cannot be seen on the tape is that most of her progress as a "self-organized learner" 
64Looking these words up in a dictionary after a class one day we found that 
-comfort" literally means "with strength" and "ease" carries the root meaning "being 
ready to hand. " Thus to feel these is to sense that one's present strength is enough 
for one's situation and that the resources one may require are "ready to hand. " 
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takes place between our conversations. She only comes to me when she wants help 
with what she has not quite mastered. Within the "guide" metaphor mentioned ear- 
lier65 one purpose a person may have in hiring a guide to accompany them into un- 
known territory is that they will become gradually more comfortable going alone into 
that territory. As they do so they will usually only hire the guide again to go with 
them when they are interested in going farther into new territory. So it is that these 
conversations remain much the same in some ways while constantly changing in 
others. What Penny does on this tape is a bit more consciously "conversational" than 
has been typical in my experience. Finding that she could be aware of both of the 
qualities in question, and that the awareness was different in different parts of 
herself, she found that she could explicitly converse within herself as well as with 
me. The session is an extended exploration of the articulation that can come from 
such a conversation. 
One of the most significant features of the first half of the session is that I 
remain off stage and do not use my hands at all. In contrast with the other sessions,, 
in which the manual channel of the conversations was quite important, even indis- 
pensable, the question arises, what then has the use of hands to do with this learning 
if she can carry it on so well without them? The second half of the session addresses 
that question directly. What is perhaps most significant about this second part is that 
my use of my hands is secondary to her use of my hands. While my manual guid- 
ance enhances the learning that Penny accomplished in the first part, it is organized 
and directed by her perception of that learning. 
Common Features 
Taken as a set these videotaped sessions illustrate the general shape of the 
work on which my conclusions are based. Each session is both a series of experi- 
ments with its own closure and also a microcosm of a longer conversation. From 
their point of view I am acting as a sort of experimental design consultant for the 
furtherance of their personal research. From my perspective of my purpose I am, in a 
way, recruiting them as "remote experimenters. " I suggest experiments that only 
they are in a position to perform and ask for their observations, which we then use as 
a basis for designing new experiments. The individuals involved do find improve- 
ment in the terms which they originally bring to them. Each of the people on the 
tape was already better, in their own terms, than they had been. They continue to 
seek more refinement or more consistency in their ability to pursue those ends 
in the 
65See page 82. 
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throes of whatever situation brought them in the first place. It is also typical, how- 
ever, that they are, in varying degrees, elaborating those ends themselves,, both ex- 
panding the contexts within which they seek the qualities they are learning to provide 
themselves and also seeking wider, more comprehensive ends. 
Ann's Retrospective 
Also included in the Appendix is an audiotape of a conversation With a 
woman who had been working with me for about five years at the time. It is a sort of 
retrospective of that more extended time ftame in which she reflects on how her 
purposes as well as her ways of going about meeting them have expanded over the 
years. Where the videotaped sessions illustrate various specific aspects of the work 
in practice, this conversation gives a larger scale view of the process over time, as 
the learner comes to take more control of the process as well as the content of the 
work. It shows,, ftom the perspective of the learner looking back over her own 
learning, how her purposes, and her awareness of the interconnections among them, 
have evolved and expanded. She continues to see me occasionally when she feels the 
need for assistance in applying what she knows to particularly difficult or elusive 
contexts, though sometimes that assistance is little more than providing an audience 
to help her focus her own process. 
Report of Findings 
I have found in these sessions and others like them that it is both possible and 
useful to think about embodiment in terms of the dimensionality of meaning. The 
dimensions of personal meaning are embodied in the continuity of human action, - and 
their interplay gives personal experience a conductive character which may usefully 
be engaged conversationally. What this work has been about is the evolution of 
ways of becoming intentional about that process of conductive reasoning. The 
underlying "model" being played out is one that assumes that experience is 
meaningful and that we draw meaning from it. The meaningfulness of events is 
lived; meanings are retrospective. We do then use the dimensions of meaning, how- 
ever, to shape our anticipation of present and future experience. There are advan- 
tages and disadvantages to this reflectivity, as for instance when we treat an experi- 
ence as primarily "visual" and elaborate its meaning in visual dimensions. Some 
dimensions become more clear and others more deeply hidden from view. 
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In a general sense we might say that dimensionality is the "space-like" char- 
acter of experience; continuity is its "time-like" character. Conti II I- inuity is the possi 
bility of anything happening; dimensionality is the possibility of its being something 
in particular. What I am calling conductivity is then the "space-time"" of experience. 
It Is its dynamic quality. Bringing that conductive quality into the conversation in an 
intentional way opens up not only new choices but new kinds of choice 
Second, I find that within the view of action as a conversationat, conductive,, 
process the quality of the coordination of the person is the quality of the action. That 
is, the level of self-organization of the person, their psycho-physical coordination in 
action , is expressed in the free play of the dimensionality of meaning of whatever 
kind. Thus a freely coordinated individual, to the extent that they are unimpaired by 
the rigidity of fixed construction-whether conceptual, emotional, kinesthetic 
etc. -will be free to find a natural quality in their action. That free play of embodied 
meaning is observable from the outside as a quality of presence. It often happens 
that when a person comes into a fuller enjoyment of that quality, witnesses to the 
event, at a loss to say specifically what is different, will say something like, "They 
just seem to be more there. " To the practiced eye there also appears an increase in 
both unity and complexity, an "integratedness" in which they seem to act as a sim- 
pler whole to which more of their parts are free to contribute, and at the same time 
less of a sense of separation between the person and what they are doing. 66 The 
musician's muscular effort is audible in the sound of the instrument. The dancer's 
concern with getting the steps right is visible in the flow of the movement. The work 
of filling in the spaces between an actor7s character choices is something an audi- 
ence can feet. When each of these lets their performance derive from their own 
coordinated action rather than conceiving it as something separate, we are treated to 
an expression of humanness that resonates with the depths of our own experience. 
And what is true in Performance is no less so in Ordinary Life. However abstract our 
conception of our task,, in the moment of action "knowledge in the hands" the 
prototype of all knowledge. And whatever the conception of a particular act to be 
performed or whatever parts of the person are most evidently involved, to identify an 
event is already to make an abstraction the dimensions of which are embodied in on- 
going action, and thus inseparable from the coordination of the whole person. 
66This quality of being "integral" is in fact a significant perceptual dimension in my 
own interactions with these individuals. It is central to such questions as how I 
decide when and how to use my hands or what level of complexity of experiment to 
propose. 
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Third, I find that it is characteristic of this conductive conversation that it 
moves us toward greater personal coordination. It is a process for collaborating with 
nature without imposing a preconception of its meaning. It is not that there is an a 
priori mapping between meaning and embodiment, anything like a "this is what that 
movement or that feeling means. " Choosing to act in accord with the nature of 
things does not require a preconception of what that nature 1S. 67 Indeed freedom 
ftom such preconception is a hallmark of coordination. It is simply that when we 
view the unity of action as dimensional we find a relatedness., a qualitative unity that 
knits experience together into a whole experience. The conversation is a kind of 
search for what we have always had; as we discover the ways in which we interfere 
with our natural coordination, and open them to reconstruction, we find not just new 
ways of thinking about things, but new ways of acting in relation to them. This is 
especially vital when the "things" are our own intentions. As we pursue the conver- 
sation we find ourselves in increasing contact with a coordination which is beyond 
the separate domains of (". cognition, affection and conation. " We find an Increasing 
sense of wholeness in ourselves and our actions, and a paradoxical quality of atten- 
tion to ourselves that puts us more in touch with the world around us. 
Fourth, this improved coordination, together with an ability to more clearly 
articulate the dimensions of the meaning of one's purpose leads to observable im- 
provement in the quality of one's performance in relation to that purpose. That is,, 
the method is practical. I find that individuals In practice become not only more 
coordinated within their environment, but also more coordinated with it. They are 
67There is a useful distinction to be made between prescriptive and descriptive 
principles. A descriptive principle is a statement about how something will behave, 
being the kind of a something it Is in the conditions in which we find it. Planets 
move in elliptical orbits around the sun because it is in their nature as massive bodies 
in a gravitational field to do so. They are not in any sense "required" to; they just do. 
A prescriptive principle on the other hand is a rule. It is a statement that something 
"ought to" operate in a certain way or that we consider it "good" if it behaves that 
way, according to the principle. Behaving honestly, taking risks or doing what "feels 
right" all imply prescriptive principles. There are descriptive principles underlying 
my functioning as a natural system. It makes no sense to speak of my violating them 
because they are descriptive of my very definition as a natural system. To be 
-unnatural" in that sense would be a contradiction. The prescriptive principles by 
which I organize my actions however, may or may not be consistent with those 
descriptive principles. In these terms what I am proposing (as a descriptive 
principle) is that life will be better if they (that is, the principles by which I direct my 
actions and the principles which describe my functioning) are consistent with each 
other, and that we would do well to treat that consistency itself as a prescriptive 
principle. 
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able to, as it were, invite the outside factors of their situation into their own coordi- 
nation, drawing the whole context within which they are pursuing their purpose into 
a single field of attention that is continuous with their own organized functioning. 
Whatever the specific dimensions that constitute the meaning of "better" for an 
individual, whatever their specific end, since the changes are occurring in the context 
of their personal action as a whole, it often happens that the very activity that began 
as a problem at hand is transformed into a vehicle for general improvement which 
opens new horizons, with perhaps new challenges. As we approach these horizons, 
as we discover new potentials to fall short of, then master, then leave behind5 we 
learn. To learn is to change, but such change can be seen as the elaborative ex- 
pression of the possibilities implicit in the coordination of what we are at any 
moment. In the end what a conductive conversation is about is the ongoing relation- 
ship between coordination and learning. 
Fifth, regarding the question of how these conversations map onto the 
components of the Leaming Conversation model, the process followed is clearly 
consistent with the MA(R)4S heuristic. The format is similar to that of a series of 
very brief Personal Leaming Contracts with the addition of a "Conditions" step in 
the proCeSS. 68 In the end this focus on conditions is the key to the working question 
with which I began, "How can we go beyond recognizing that it is the whole person 
who is engaged in conversation to carrying on the conversation itself in a more fully 
embodied way? " For this is simply a request for a particular kind of referent 
dialogue. The project of bringing together Kelly's and Alexander's work within the 
conversational science paradigm adds little to the nature of the Process or the 
Support dialogues within the Learning Conversation. Nor has it been a matter of 
treating the ideas derived from the Alexander Technique as content which could be 
better learned in a conversational way (a potentially fruitful project, but not the one I 
have been engaged in). Regardless of the content, or the learner's purpose, a learner 
requires of a frame of reference constructed of dimensions of meaning in which they 
can evaluate their performance and their learning, referents not bound by the limits 
of the construction with which they began. How else can they evaluate their learning 
in terms which incorporate what they have learned? If beyond that the learner is 
recognized as an embodied individual, and learning as thus an embodied process, 
then that reference frame must incorporate the dimensionality of meaning embodied 
in the continuity of their action. It is in relation to this referent dialogue that the 
conversations represented here combine the context-independence of the learning 
68See discussion in Appendix 1. 
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conversation as a methodology with the recognition that human learning is never 
really independent of the one pervasive context of human embodiment. 
Finally, in regard to the method by which the conversation is sustained there 
are a number of points to be noted. Like any learning conversation there are times 
when the learner does well to turn the navigating of the process over to someone 
already skilled in such things. This frees them to attend to the dimensions of their 
own meaning in ways they would find difficult under other conditions. The role of 
the teacher is not to substitute nor even to supplement the skills of the leamer, but 
simply to sustain conditions under which the leamer's present skills are enough to 
continue building with. In a given circumscribed learning domain we may seek an 
appropriate set of representations of meaning about which to converse. The meaning 
behind these representations is what I have been referring to as "embodied meaning" 
and the ultimate difficulty With conversing about any set of representations ab- 
stracted from the whole web of meaning is that so many of the dimensions are hid- 
den from the conversation. In a given domain it may be very convenient to do that, 
but the conversation we have been pursuing is precisely about what gets left out, the 
price one pays for that convenience. This brings us to the value of the manual chan- 
nel of the conversation, to the teacher's use of their hands. 69 The problem in practice 
with attempting to simply describe how to have such an embodied conversation and 
expecting a learner to be able to do so is not that there is anything difficult about the 
process to be carried out or the distinctions to be made. It is that, due to the nature 
of habitual perception, it is too easy for the learner to engage in a conversation which 
is not the one they think they are having, to do things which are not the experiments 
they think they are performing, and then to draw conclusions based on what they 
mistakenly believed they have done. It is in relation to this problem that the use of 
hands in the conversation has its utility. It is simply a matter of finding the most 
appropriate and effective language in which to communicate. Representations of 
meaning, however elaborate, are not embodied, or rather they are embodied in the 
medium of the representation, whereas personal meaning is embodied in ongoing 
personal action. The manual channel of the conversation simply provides the easiest 
access to the dimensions of meaningful movement, and ways of asking questions that 
minimizes losses in translation. 
691 aMstill using "teacher" not in the sense of one who gives knowledge, but of one 
who asks ýquestions in the interest of another's learning. 
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The Full Cycle Reconsidered 
At the beginning I said that I had found my work to be a pattern braided 
together out of several strands of study and practice. As I reflect back over the evo- 
lution of this work I find that the germ of that pattern was contained in two short 
articles which I encountered quite early on. These were Kelly's "The Psychology of 
the Unknown" and a sort of companion piece by Alan Radley, "Living on the Hori- 
zon. " I found in the first of these an articulation of the essential idea of the theory of 
personal constructs, not just as a psychology, but as a model of a philosophy of sci- 
ence for a science that is continuous with everyday experience. I now see the fun- 
damental "posture" expressed in the psychology of the unknown as a means of 
choosing the search for meaning over the quest for certainty, 70 and as a fundamen- 
tally "conversational" posture. It is only conversational in practice, however, within 
the "full cycle of experience, "' including its embodiment in action. Thus I found in 
the second article, a call to a construction of personal construct theory itself which 
emphasizes that knowing is only part of experience, 71 and its "attempt to make room 
for the broader and deeper conception of the term 'personal construct" implied in 
Kelly's Writings" has been ever in the background of my own efforts. I have said 
that my intent in this work is not to establish priority, nor is it to give account of the 
derivation of ideas. It is rather an endeavour to find means for putting the ideas into 
practice. What I am primarily interested in is a science of myself. Taking the per- 
son-as-scientist metaphor full cycle, I am seeking a framework for a science in which 
I am both subject and object, both investigator and investigated. Such a personal 
science can only be science by being conversational and it can only be fully 
conversational if the conversation is carried on in an embodied way. When Kelly 
writes of abandoning the "division of psychology into cognition, affection and cona- 
tion" he is pointing towards a science which is beyond psychology as it is commonly 
ramework of such a sci- conceived, towards a unified human science. Within the E 
701twas Dewey's belief that "meaning is wider in scope as well as more precious in 
value than truth, and philosophy is occupied with meaning rather than truth. 
(Philosophy and Civilization, p. 4; cited in Kestenbaum p. 2) 
71As Dewey put it, "being and having things in ways other than knowing them, exist, 
and are preconditions of reflection and knowledge. " (Experience and Nature, I st ed. 
p. 18; cited in Kestenbaum p. 2) 
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ence I see human leaming as neither more nor less than the dynamics of personal 
meaning-with all its embodied character. More than that., such a human science 
could in turn provide a foundation for a natural science viewed as a study of a world 
in whi 72 'ch we participate rather than one which we merely observe, My purpose in 
all of this is not speculative, but experimental. I am not seeking to justify such a sci- 
ence, but to develop a method for practicing it. Nevertheless'. in drawing to a con- 
clusion I have decided to revisit these two articles that started me down my present 
road and to reconsider them from the vantage of all the work I have done since I first 
read them. It is a way of bringing part of my own thinking full circle. 
From this vantage I see the intersection of the views expressed in the two 
papers as the recognition that it is the dimensionality of bodily experience that gives 
it its anticipatory quality, and further, that it is this anticipation that is the foundation 
of any science and indeed, of any intelligent action. Kelly begins his paper by 
pointing out that when we endeavour to make a rational theory to account for the 
behaviour of another person, or of ourselves, we may forget that the rationality 
involved is properly an attribute of the theory rather than of the behaviour. This, of 
course leads us to view everything on which our theory is silent as "Irrational, " and is 
but an example of a general tendency to confuse elements of our experience with 
those of the theories we use to account for it, indeed, a tendency to forget why we 
construct theories at all. Plato's disparaging characterization of physics as no more 
than "likely stones"' is perhaps nearer the mark than we might expect. Whether we 
are physicists or psychologists or simply persons seeking to be more scientific in our 
own lives,, these "likely stones, " the alternate constructions which we place on 
events,, are our means not merely of representing experience but of transcending it. 
72As long as we fail to recognize the continuity of science with everyday thinking 
(especially with , thinking in activity") two sorts of problems with continue to 
follow. It is the isolation of physical concepts from experience that makes them hard 
to grasp, and makes our use of them inflexible. Concepts in "science, " being 
divorced from personal experience rather than abstracted from it,, are very difficult to 
learn and even if one can learn to treat the science as a game with its own rules, so to 
speak, one can learn to play the game in a way which is internally successful but 
which has little effect on the rest of one's life. The anatomist with poor posture, the 
physiologist with poor coordination or the physicist who drives too fast on wet 
pavement may be said to have "knowledge" which they are not 4, using. " Thus, in 
Dewey's wider sense of knowing, they do not "know" so much. The other problem 
is that because the methods of science are learned as something separate from daily 
life, they seldom get applied to daily life-we too seldom engage in the kind of 
systematic, reflective self-observation through which we could learn much from our 
daily experience. Reincorporating science and daily life will have significant impact 
on both. 
III 
Conclusion- Field Notes from the Honzon 
Their usefulness is less in capturing truth from past experience than it is in anticipat- 
ing dimensions of future experience. What Kelly says of words like "love" and 
"hostility" is no less true of "energy" or "electron, " They "refer to notions we have 
ourselves erected,, not to events so obvious as to be invulnerable to human interpre- 
tation. " Mere representation or reproduction of events is never quite enough. 
Radley points out that "there is an element of the future in everything which we do. " 
(Radley, p. 223) There is also an element of the past in everything we know. If we 
seek certainty in the elaborating of the details of what is already known, then the best 
we can hope for is more of the same. The obvious becomes ever more so. But a 
theory that seeks only to simulate events rather than to construe them is no theory at 
all, and as Kelly says, "every artist knows" that we can and do "do better than 
that. 1173 We can participate in our world, involving ourselves in its ongoing life and 
committing ourselves to action beyond the horizons of what we know. Indeed, it is 
by finding constructive ways of beginning our search with a recognition of what we 
do not know that we may transcend the limits of what we do know. The point I have 
sought to make, and the focus of the method I have sought to develop, is that it is 
possible to engage in this search for meaning in a way that more fully recognizes its 
embodied character, and to live beyond the false horizon of a presumed separation of 
thought from action, mind from body. 
731tis common to view science and art as utterly distinct, indeed, antithetical ways of 
interacting with the world around us. Upon examination of their products, however, 
the distinction between them is not so clear after all. The production of every work 
of art embodies questions such as whether the intention of the artist can be expressed 
in the chosen medium-in a sense asking questions of Nature about whether a certain 
kind of wood will hold a certain shape, whether a certain combination of pigments 
will produce the impression of a chosen quality of light, whether a certain 
juxtaposition of musical tones Will produce a desired emotional effect etc. The 
finished work is then presented to a community in anticipation of a response. Thus 
every work of art, both in its creation and in its presentation to a public , is an 
experiment. In the realm of scientific endeavor, it is no less true that every well 
designed experiment is a work of art, required to satisfy not only conditions of 
logical rigor but also conditions of balance, interrelationship, etc. which are 
fundamentally aesthetic in nature. Theoretical work is no less artistic,, the theories 
judged of highest quality being characterized primarily by attributes of elegance and 
ability to evoke fruitful response from its "public. " I make this point because I wish 
to draw together two defining statements, the one by Einstein noted earlier about 
science being cc nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking, " and Dewey's 
claim that, "art is the intensification of experience. " If, as Kelly has it, every person 
is a scientist in the sense that science is a refinement of the dimensional, anticipatory 
and elaborative qualities of daily experience, then that person is also an artist in the 
sense that art is the intentional intensification of the productivel expressive and 
aesthetic qualities of that same daily experience. 
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What makes this way of thinking and acting with unity seem so difficult is 
Our unfortunate tendency, both in thought and in action, 
to accept familiar constructs as downright objective observations of 
what is really there, and to view with great suspicion anything whose 
subjective origin is recent enough to recognize. The fact that familiar 
constructs have equally subjective-though possibly more remote- 
origins usually escapes us. We continue to refer to them as objective 
observations, as the "givens" in the theorems of daily existence. 
(Kelly, 1977, p. 5) 
This is where Kelly's work meets Alexander's most directly. For our fixed habits of 
action and perception are the embodiments of our familiar constructs. It is just the 
weaving of "knowing"' into the wider fabric of "having" experience, the weaving 
together of the continuity of experience and the dimensionality of meaning, that 
gives substance to my title phrase, "dimensions of embodiment. " It is not just a 
matter of constructs as the dimensions of the interpretations we place on our bodily 
experience, but of the dimensionality and continuity of that bodily experience itself. 
Alexander's Technique has been described as a method for generating new expen- 
ences. But what good is having new experience if one has no means for reflecting 
on, and thus learning from, that experience? What Kelly provides to Alexander is a 
means of attending to the dimensionality of meaning, a way of "analyzing" experi- 
ence while respecting its wholeness. 74What Al exander provides to Kelly is a practi- 
cal means of attending to the quality and sequence of the movements that are the 
embodiment of our concepts in order to render them observable, not as "'objective 
measurements" but as personal data which we can use to engage conversationally 
with our own process, and thus a means of conversing about the "broader and deeper 
conception- of constructs within the continuity of experience. Together the two 
provide a conversational framework for a conductive reflective engagement with 
one, ) s experience. 75 
Here too is where personal construct theory "veers away from" and is re- 
stored to connection with phenomenology. If phenomenological "personal science" 
74Cf. Polya's discussion of Pappus on analysis and synthesis. Analysis is a matter of 
mind, a reflecting on conditions, a making of a plan. Analysis works from the end, 
the intention, back to present conditions. "What will be the synthesis? Translating 
ideas into actions" (Polya, p. 145). Synthesis is the carrying out of the plan, moving 
from present conditions to the intended end. 
751n practice, not attending to dimensionality can lead to getting stuck with one's old 
c , onstructions. 
Not attending to continuity can lead to distortion of the act of 
reconstructing-and thus of any attempt to act in commitment to a new 
construction-by malcoordination in one's whole system. 
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asserts the primacy of personal experience,, it does not assert that experience is arbi- 
trary. Physical science asserts that the world is real-the world as a whole, that is-not 
necessarily that any given object is real. Individual objects are intersections of 
attributes and so their reality is a matter of personal construction. We are free to 
construe-and we find that alternate constructions vary in their consequences. The 
essence of the Dewey's pragmatism is that meaning is inseparable from conse- 
quences. Any useful sense of the meaning of a proposition, let alone its truth, lies in 
the consequences of our acting in commitment to it. Meaning is constituted, and re- 
constituted , in the full cycle of experience. Meaning as,, in Dewey's term, a transac- 
tion, has an ongoing, conversational quality. The "conversational science" paradigm 
is then not at odds With either physical science or phenomenology; it is an alternative 
construction of events,, including my construction of events as an event, which is 
both a physical science and a personal science. It is the implementation of a psy- 
chology of the unknown. This is then the point at which all of the tributaries of my 
work converge. Merleau. -Ponty and Dewey have provided a philosophical grounding 
and Kelly and Alexander, practical means of attending to the dimensionality and 
continuity of experience. My own point of departure has been the idea explicitly 
stated by Dewey, though also clearly implicit in the work of the other three, that the 
continuity of experience, the unity of mind and body, is to be found "in action. " I 
have endeavoured to bring fully into the fabric of conversation about meaning 
dimensions that otherwise can only be mentioned from a distance. 
Whether one is a scientist or a graduate student or simply a person trying to 
cope with the "day to day world of obvious meanings" (ibid., p. 12) it is commonly 
supposed that the proper place to begin an inquiry is by laying out what is already 
known. We then expect to build our way from this foundation to some greater 
structure of knowledge. This is but the expression of our common preference for 
certainty over meaning, and our habitual, robotic mode of action is the embodiment 
of that quest for certainty. Whether conceptually or physically, however, "certainty" 
lies always in the past, and it is the future that stretches before us beyond "the hori- 
zons of our thoughts" (ibid., p. 6). There is a clear recent example from natural sci- 
ence. In the study of systems whose behaviour is dynamically complex it proved nec- 
essary to abandon prediction precisely because only the whole history of the system 
contains enough information to say where it Will be at any given future moment. 
just so with human experience. To attempt to know something for certain is to sup- 
pose an unwarranted regularity; it is to treat myself, or human nature, as something 
complete. To act habitually is similarly to assume that the conditions within which 
I 
act are fixed, are indeed the average of all the similar situations I have 
faced in the 
past. What then are we to make of error? What do we make of the tricks our senses 
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play, or of the faulty conclusions we draw from them? Kelly advocates an alterna- 
tive approach, a way to begin our inquiry with what we do not know, as he calls it., a 
psychology of the unknown. What we seek is an approximation to the truth of 
things, not fragments of it. We seek an expression of what we know which is true 
not in part" but "in some respects , not a reproduction of past events but an antici- 
pation of the dimensions of the similarity of future events. To begin an inquiry with 
a statement of our "admissible ignorance 1, ý is an act of both humility and audacity. It 
is to place our confidence, not in the bedrock of truth itself' (ibid., p. 6) but in the 
fabric of our conversation. To recognize that "truth comes only through experience,, 
does not imply that we are limited to our experience; we are ever in pursuit of new 
experience bearing new meanings. This has always been the essence of good sci- 
ence. As I quoted Kelly earlier 
Our venture as scientists, then, is ... to proceed from propositions 
which are admittedly faulty, in the hope that we can complete fully 
the experiential cycles which will enable us to formulate new propo- 
sitions that are perhaps less faulty. (ibid., p. 11) 
By saying what we admit is inarticulately expressed, we commit ourselves to a con- 
versation which may take us to a new vantage from which we can at least see what it 
was that was faulty about our original view of matters, and if we are fortunate, to a 
more satisfying expression. There is nothing really new here, 76except the realization 
that it applies as much to ourselves and our own actions as to any other domain of 
our experience. "Scientific" is a quality that may be attributed as fittingly to the 
action of muscle as to that of mind. Such an endeavour also requires courage, how- 
ever', for to immerse oneself in the full cycle of experience is to enter perilous wa- 
ters. For once a person enters these waters, 
... 
he will have to cope with his circumstances inarticulately as well as 
verbally, primitively as well as intelligently, and he will have to pull 
himself together physically, socially, biologically, and spiritually 
(ibid., p. 11). 
He finds himself not merely having a chat about the dimensions of meaning, but in- 
volved in a conversation the continuity of which spans the whole of his experience. 
This conversation can be profoundly disturbing to one's equilibrium and, in Dewey's 
761ndeed, science always begins with a kind of articulate ignorance. Every major 
innovation in natural science has evolved from an effort to clearly articulate what we 
do not, or cannot, know. All of thermodynamics, for instance, derives from 
statistical staiements of what cannot be known a bout the individual behavior of large 
numbers of particles. It was the abandonment of attempting to predict the complex 
behavior of "chaotic" systems that opened the way to a whole new science of 
complexity. 
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sense, dramatic. If we are not to be merely tossed about by experience,, we must not 
only involve ourselves in it, we must be committed to something. Kelly defines 
commitment as "self-involvement plus affirmative anticipation. " The person who 
commits himself to a course of action "becomes a significant event himself, and 
hence a factor in what happens" (ibid., p. 11). As did involvement, this commitment 
spans the whole continuity of the person's experience. It is a matter not just of 
meaning, but of embodiment, a matter not just of construing, in the sense of placing 
an interpretation on events from the outside, but of the dimensions of our engage- 
ment with them. 77 This is the "broader and deeper conception" that Radley speaks 
of He says,, 
Rather than being a theory about ways of seeing the world, Kelly is 
indicating that construing is also about a person's involvement in 
something, his faith in what is not yet actual and the commitment of 
himselfto his actions. (Radley, p. 222, emphasis in original) 
We are cautioned not to be misled by a too narrow use of the person-as-scientist 
metaphor. The matter of construing and reconstruing does not concern an individual 
only as a knower but as a "live creature" fully invested in an ongoing world. Some- 
times a person knows what goal they are striving for, or knows the question they seek 
to answer. 78 In such a case we may think of the person's system of constructs as a 
771fwefollow Kelly"s advise to take responsibility for our own constructs we may 
find that many of the apparently competing fragments of experience actually express 
subset relations among our constructs. No longer is it rational vs. irrational, mental 
vs. physical, even predict vs. anticipate, but in each case an attribute abstractedftom 
a larger domain of which it is a dimension. The opposite pole is but another 
abstracted attribute. It is not that the conception of an act is psychological and the 
carrying out of the act is physical, but that psychological and physical are attributes 
of the whole "psycho-physical" act. The practical task is learning to engage with my 
own actions in a way that opens both their psychological and their physical 
dimensions to observation and reconstruction, and that is what this work has been 
primarily about. 
78Sometimes, of course, one clearly defined goal is replaced by another in the course 
of events. An excellent example of such of flexibility of goals, and the value of 
reconstruing when conditions change, occurred in the 1993 Baseball All-star game. 
John Kruk is a batter known for his toughness. Randy Johnson is a six foot ten inch 
pitcher known for his 98 mile per hour fastball and a tendency toward "wildness. " 
Before the game Kruk, commenting on these latter two factors, stated that Johnson 
was the one pitcher whom he did not want to have to face in the game. So, of course, 
one of the first batters up when Johnson entered the game was Kruk. Johnson's first 
pitch was behind Kruk and several feet over his head. It had "slipped" from his 
hand. The next two pitches were very fast and precisely in the middle of the strike 
zone. Kruk, with semi-feigned fear, watched the first go by and made a half hearted 
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theory which they uve to predict what Will happen next. We may thus view the 
person's behaviour as an experiment that tests their theory. Sometimes,, though, the 
person may not be able to articulate what It is that they seek. These are the situations 
that Radley finds more revealing. The person's behaviour then looks to us more like 
exploration than experiment. Perhaps in such circumstances natural history would 
be a more serviceable metaphor than science. Sometimes we can "say beforehand" 
what we seek or expect, and go about answering our questions. At other times we 
cannot articulate these things, and we find our efforts have more to do With the 
posing of questions. We find ourselves faced with Plato's "old philosophical joke, " 
seeking a prize which is both known and unknown. We are required, like the hunter 
in the Russian folktale to, "Go to I do not know where and bring back I do not know 
what. " Like the hunter, if we want to succeed we must have a means of organizing 
our search despite the elusiveness of the goal, and also like him,, we may find un- 
expected help along the way. These are the circumstances in which it is clearest that 
construing is not just a matter of interpreting, but of "living in anticipation. " What 
we cannot articulate, we nevertheless embody. 
Activity is lived construing, which is anticipatory, directional 
and organized. In that sense the significance of a new question is to 
be found in a rationality to be sure, but not in a reason which we can 
articulate. (ibid., p. 245) 
It is this reasoning in action that I have called "conductive reasoning. " The reason 
which is the elaborating of the implications of what I can say is abstracted from this 
wider logic of how I embody meaning in my participation in my world. Radley 
argues that although it might be possible to read Kelly's original articulation of per- 
sonal construct theory as refemng to the narrow meaning of "constructs" by which a 
person "has" and then "uses" interpretations of experience, his later writing makes 
clear that he was referring to something much more. I would make an even stronger 
statement that such a narrow,, "intellectual" reading of Kelly is inconsistent in the 
first place. 79Whenever we look too intently at a construct it tends to coalesce into a 
pair of opposing objects instead of being a dimension of meaning. Just so, to read 
construct theory itself as if we could treat knowledge and action as separate things is 
swing at the second, clearly wanting nothing to do With them. After he had struck, 
out Kruk bowed in comic submission to Johnson. It was a moment of great baseball 
mirth. The point of the story is in Kruk's comments after the game. He said that 
when he came up to bat his goal was to get a hit, but after the first pitch, he said, his 
goal "was to survive. I thought I had a pretty good at bat. " The meaning of success 
is always in relation to one's purpose, and purposes can change quite suddenly. 
79A similar claim can be made about the corresponding narrow reading of 
Alexander's writing. 
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a product of a dualism that the theory itself will not bear. Indeed, pure intellectual- 
ism is self-contradictory. The great overlooked fact is that purely "abstract thinking" 
is itself an abstraction. As the concept of a frictionless plane is an extrapolation 
from qualities of flatness and smoothness in our experience of sliding objects,, so that 
of abstract thought is extrapolated from our experience of "abstracting" qualities 
from the experiences of which they are qualities. In either case, when we lose 
contact with the process and only the finished abstraction remains, difficulties 
inevitably follow. 
Regarding the problem which Radley takes up as the focus of his discussion, 
the pursuit of a goal which one cannot clearly specify, we may find ourselves ham- 
pered by the strategic limitation of supposing that there are some things which we 
can sav and some we cannot say, that we are either articulate or wholly inarticulate 
(not a conversational attitude), and that while we can be systematically reflective or 
experimental about the one we must accept the other as a mysterious realm beyond 
the horizon of choice. The solution to the problem in practice lies beyond the dual- 
ism, in recognizing that anything-anything-that we can articulate becomes a particu- 
lar through which we can attend towards other things. They are never the whole 
story, but they are the outline that gives the story its shape and propels it forward in 
one direction rather than another. When we cannot say "what" destination we seek, 
we may still be able to say something about "how" it differs from where we are now. 
We may be paradoxically able to be articulate about what we cannot articulate by 
attending to the dimensionality of experience. What Polanyi called "tacit 
knowledge"' is that knowledge embodied in our participation, and which we find 
ourselves unable to abstract from it-80 Constructs which we can make explicit, pre- 
dictions we can make, experiments we can perform, are all particulars which, by 
dwelling in,, we attend toward other things. 81 They are the "darkness in the theatre" 
8OThere was a verb in Middle English, "to acknow, 17 which meant "to come to know 
or recognize" or "to admit or show one's knowledge, "') and the noun, "acknowledge" 
referred to the explicit knowledge that was so "acknown. " (Donaldson 1993, p. 23) 
Knowledge can be implicit in action. We act as if we know, but we cannot say what 
we know. Acknowledge is only the small portion of knowledge that we can admit to 
or show. Donaldson argues that neither kind of knowing is limited to the cognitive 
domain and that if we could learn a way of processing our emotional meaning 
-abstractly" as we do our cognition it would lead to a "dual enlightenment. " 
8'Another of Carse's "finite-infinite" constructs is being trained, which is "to be 
prepared against surprise, ") and being educated, which is "being prepared 
for 
surprise. " It is a matter of which side of the 
horizon one is prepared to live on. 
118 
Conclusion: Field Notes from the Horizon 
needed to show up the performance. It is in this sense that "a construct is a process 
or vestibule through which the person exists. " (ibid., p-226) 
There is another side to all of this, however. Experience is not merely 
something that we undergo. Because we can anticipate consequences, we can direct 
our actions towards consequences we intend. Thus we are not only significant 
events in our own experience, we, and our actions, are instrumental in bringing about 
the events that we anticipate. Thus committed, we do more that cast our gaze 
towards the horizon, we choose a path leading we know not where and step into the 
unknown with our eyes open. 
Like any other kind of step, this one can be taken in a way that is either more 
or less coordinated. "As for the artist, so for the rest of us; to construe the surround- 
ing world is to visualize it in more than one dimension, " (Kelly, 1977, p. 4) and the 
more dimensions, the richer the experience. It is not, however, only a matter of 
visualizing but also of acting in more than one dimension, and the more dimensions,, 
the more articulate the action. Our habitual patterns of thought, action, perception 
and feeling are our ways of embodying the obvious, and every act dominated by a 
routine habitual pattern begins with a presupposed "certainty" and is thus an act 
bound by past construction. No matter what I am doing, "what I am doing" is al- 
ready an abstraction drawn from past habitual meanings. How then am I to act in a 
way that is open to reconstruction? If this psychology of the unknown is not just a 
matter of what I know of my world but how I live in it, then how am I to carry on the 
conversation? The task of transcending the obvious is not only a matter of recon- 
struction in the sense of reinterpreting experience as if from some vantage outside of 
it. It is a matter of the dynamic of embodiment. If we are to carry on this conversa- 
tion in the full continuity of mind and body in action, we require what Dewey found 
in the Alexander Technique, namely "a procedure in actual practice which demon- 
strates this continuity. " 
Several of the words that appear frequently in this discussion are used in 
fruitfully ambiguous ways. Three in particular are worthy of a slight digression to 
mention. The word "construct" itself carries both the meaning of "an interpreta- 
tion" and that of "to build. " It is within this overlap of meaning that we may think of 
meaning itself as something which we "make. " "Way, " as in "the ways in which" 
we anticipate events, is usually taken to mean something like "the alternate interpre- 
tations of events by which we anticipate, " but if we take anticipation as "a descrip- 
tion of the whole person, " (Radley, p. 227) then it also refers to the quality with 
which the act of anticipating is performed. It is thus a psycho-physical matter rather 
than just an intellectual one. Finally to "articulate" literally means "to connect 
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together by joints. " So although we use it as a synonym for "to say, " it would serve 
as well as a synonym for "to embody. " What we cannot articulate in words, we ar- 
ticulate in the qualities of our actions. 
Conductive Reasoning is a way of implementing something like the psychol- 
ogy of the unknown articulated in action as well as in thought. Like Kelly's student 
who sought to explore creativity by engaging the creative process full cycle, I have 
sought to involve myself with questions of embodiment by engaging in conversations 
about the nature of embodiment. Just as the student's task is to find ways of study- 
ing creativity that are themselves creative, mine has been to develop ways of con- 
versing about embodiment that are themselves embodied. Living the psychology of 
the unknown is recognizing that the only thing we must give up in our search is 
"knoWing in advance. " When I act in commitment to my preconceptions, including 
my expectation of how a given mode of action will "feel, "' I find that 
My spontaneous or natural actions are interrupted by my attempts to 
"be something" in particular. To the extent that I try to achieve such 
an image for myself, then I may act self-consciously with reference to 
this construction of self which I hold. Often this goes alongside con- 
scious attempts not to act in a certain way, and to suppress some par- 
ticular way of behaving. Again, the effect of this is to isolate some 
aspect of behaviour in our experience and, by objectifying it in this 
way, to try to operate upon it directly. (ibid., p. 240) 
This could serve as a statement of the rationale for Alexander's work, especially if 
we note that because we "hold" our self-construction as much in the muscular sense 
as any other, we require an "Indirect method" if we are to operate in a way that is 
unified rather than ftagmented. This indirect method is a kind of lived psychology of 
the unknown, a way of giving up my commitment to my preconceptions by attending 
to the dimensions of meaning in which movement itself is "anticipatory, directional 
and organized. " When I can give up that commitment, I find myself able to be even 
more intentional in my actions and at the same time more natural. Then, to some 
extent, I can converse about what I cannot articulate, and direct what I cannot 
control. 
Problem of a New Dualism 
Radley recogni4es the separation of my construction from my behaviour, and 
of both as possessions separate from myself, as rooted in old-fashioned mind-body 
dualisn-l- What is needed is a means of transcending the obviousness of that dualism,, 
however-, it is of little benefit to argue against dualism and then to continue practic- 
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ing it. 82 The attempt to dismiss the old dualism of mind vs. body as two distinct 
kinds of entity by describing ideas as "mental" phenomena and the carrying out of 
ideas as "physical" faces one of two difficulties. Either it merely replaces one dual- 
ism with another, or it suffers from a certain lack of symmetry pointed out by 
Dewey. If one is going to assert that there is no such "thing" as mind as a distinct 
entity, that to do so is to draw an improper inference from the "mental" dimensions 
of experience, then to be consistent, one must assert the same about "body. " Argu- 
ments such as, for example, that the mental is merely a certain order in the behaviour 
of the physical, or that mind is simply processes in the brain, are merely modern 
versions of solving the mind-body problem by claiming that one is real and the other 
is not. This dualism can be escaped, however, by recognizing that although ideas are 
mental, the act of carrying them out, that is, the act of embodying them, is psycho- 
physical. Both mental and physical are dimensions, or sets of dimensions, abstracted 
from whole experience. By way of physical illustration, this is the same sort of dis- 
tinction we find in the case of the wave-particle complementarity of photons. 
"Wave" is not an entity distinct from another sort of entity called 4. particle. " Nor is a 
photon any sort of combination of two such entities. Nor, however , is there a 
4; r wavy" quality of something that is really a particle, or vice versa. What is whole 
and real is the photon. In practice, physicists seem to hold to a philosophical 
position which might be called "cavalier realism. " In relation to any particular 
measurement or experiment they may treat a photon or an electron, etc. as if it 
absolutely, objectively, really is a particle. The next day, in relation to a different 
measurement they may grant equal rcreality" to the proton-as-wave. This attitude, 
ironically, is an antidote for the tendency, endemic among non-physicists,, to try to 
view photons as "really, really" one or the other. Recall Aristotle's insistence that 
what was real was neither form nor matter but individual substances. Any investiga- 
tion of how body works-or any intentional use of a body-has itself a mental quality. 
Any mental activity as such-and not only because it takes place "In" a 
body-has a 
is whole experience. Mind and body are bodily quality. What is real, priman 
equally qualities of experience, not entities separate from it. From this perspective 
consciousness is seen not as an entity which exists, or 
does not, but as an event. 
Dewey refers to the continuity within which consciousness is in the mind, or the 
mind in the brain etc., not "as marbles are in a box but as events are in 
history, in a 
moving, growing never finished process. " 
821n Aldous Huxley's novel Eyeless in Gaza (in which the character, Miller, 
is based 
largely upon Alexander) there is a scene in which Anthony Beavis 
discusses dualism. 
Miller tells him at one point, "Of course you are a dualist. You live your 
dualism. " 
(Huxley, p. 425) In our habitual mode, so do we all. 
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Within the dynamics of the life of such a whole person, physically, emo- 
tionally, cognitively, etc. are ways of being. Ways of being, for example, fixed or 
free. I can talk about myself physically or mentally or emotionally, but what I am 
talking about in every case is my whole Self 83 This realization is perhaps the core 
of the psycho-physical approach. Since I am a single whole system whose function- 
ing can be more or less ftee in a variety of ways, those ways will be related to one 
another. Thus it is quite possible that becoming more ftee physically can make a 
person less stuck emotionally etc. This is a distinction between different kinds of 
dimensions of meaning. There are many possible interpretations of ftee or unfree 
etc. and it is certainly conceivable that I could find myself free in one sense and un- 
ftee in another at the same time. What seems to be the case in practice, however,, is 
that for any given dimension, that is, for some particular sense of ftee vs. unftee, I 
cannot be free , in that sense, physically and simultaneously unftee, in the corre- 
sponding sense, emotionally. Further, I cannot be unfree in that sense mentally and 
at the same time free at the level of carrying on a political debate. These are, in ef- 
fect, global parameters of meaning, qualities which may be attributed to myself as a 
whole and which may be evident in physical, mental or even social ways. This point 
has consequences reaching far beyond the internal coordination of the individual. 
There is much discussion at this time of the need for greater appreciation of large 
scale concepts such as ecosystems, the global community, acting in accord with the 
natural world, etc. From the general perspective I am endeavouring to articulate here 
it appears that it is literally impossible for any individual to have such an apprecia- 
tion of these concepts without some concrete experience of their underlying attrib- 
utes. The only place in the natural world where the individual can find such concrete 
experience is in relation to the quality of their own physical existence. I cannot 
really understand the intricate coordination of the relationships that make up a forest 
unless I have had an experience of what "coordinated" vs. some other quality might 
mean for me. Without such experience the term "coordination" (and thus , in that 
intricate sense, the term "forest") can have no concrete meaning for me. It will be a 
mere abstraction. I comprehend the qualities of the world beyond my personal 
experience in terms of the meaning within my experience (by a sort metaphorical 
extension from it). The dimensionality of this relationship is not only conceptual; it 
is also functional. It is equally impossible for me to carry on a discussion in an open 
and flexible way if I am at the same time holding myself physically rigid or clutching 
tightly to my preferred ideas. The same quality of freedom, ease, coordination, etc. 
or their opposites will be embodied in my whole action in all of its aspects. Perhaps 
83And indeed, myself in relationship with my environment. 
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as a complement to dimensions of personal meaning, we might usefully define 
physical, mental, emotional, etc. as dimensions of embodiment. Note that this view 
is phenomenological in the practical sense that what is referred to as "my body" has 
its meaning relationally rather than substantially, and is thus not limited to a 
subcutaneous" self. The same dimensionality will be evident in the qualities of my 
action, whether it is the dynamic quality of the contraction of a muscle I use to bend 
my knee or those of the strategies I and my associates use to further our ends on the 
national political scene. At all levels the "natural" course is to seek to employ means 
that exhibit the same qualities as the ends they are intended to produce. Beyond the 
question of whether "ends justify the means" it is simply not possible to bring about 
any end which is concrete and whole and which embodies an intended set of 
meanings if one employs means which are the embodiment of conflicting di- 
mensions of meaning. This is simply because the meanings of means and ends are 
constructed and embodied with the same dimensionallty. 84 To attempt to have things 
otherwise is to live a contradiction. Unfortunately this is just what most of us do 
attempt as we operate in our habitual "robotic" mode. The only way we can 
maintain the illusion that we are free to construe ourselves and our tasks arbitrarily 
with no regard to the continuity of the full cycle of experience, and without conse- 
quence, is to hold the dimensions of our embodiment separate-and then hide that 
effort from ourselves. 85 That is why the robotic mode is so inherently self-alienating 
(and why in practice, I suspect , individuals who step outside of that mode so often 
face such a strong sense of both vulnerability and power). Recall once more 
Dewey's preemptive caution to cognitive science that if we are to consider "'mind" as 
an abstraction from experience, as essentially a nominalization of the mental 
qualities of our actions,, we must apply the same reasoning to the concept of "body. " 
84Here is the essence of the conductivity of experience, that meaning has a dynamic 
quality that spans all of its dimensions. Just as in the case of simple physical motion 
we may change the mathematical description of the motion by changing the 
coordinate system within which we view it, so we may construe events in our 
experience in many ways,, and in both cases the dynamics of the motion survives 
changes in how we construe location. To say that experience is conductive is simply 
to say that meaning is dynamic. 
85This is a sort of misplaced Platonism. To treat alternate constructions of ourselves 
as ideal concepts, alternate ways to "be, " without regard to the dynamics of how we 
are to "become" so is a personal parallel to Plato's discussions of ideal political 
states, without regard for how we are to get there from where we are. In its 
anticipation that where we might go, and the quality of how we are changing, will 
both be expressions of the dimensions of where we are, the present view finds 
Aristotle a much more suitable patron. 
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Treating either of these sets of dimensions as a distinct entity is equally problematic. 
The founding principle here is that what is "real" is the whole person in action. 
Further, as we have seen,, to affirm the unity of the individual but yet divide 
experience into distinct mental and physical domains is the same dualism in another 
guise. What channelizes our processes are, in the words of Kelly's postulate, the 
ways in which we anticipate events. 86 In practice, we escape dualism by embracing 
the dimensionality of whole experience. 
The last phase of the "full cycle of experience" is reconstruing. Kelly won- 
ders whether it might be "better to say that one can never know his immediate expe- 
rience until he has looked back on it again and again. " (Kelly, 1977, p. 9) Here we 
find ourselves in the midst of the less obvious dimensions of the person-as-scientist 
metaphor, and here is where the wider view is clearly implicit. For although one 
may experiment to test one's interpretation of prior events-and this is no less true for 
personal behaviour construed as experiment-an experiment is of little use to a scien- 
tist unless it reveals dimensions of experience that were not explicit in the original 
purpose. "The cycle of human experience remains incomplete unless it terminates in 
fresh hopes never before envisioned. " (ibid., p. 9) But as Radley says, "The creative 
aspect of behaviour is in meeting events, not only in reflecting afterwards upon the 
unforeseen consequences of a considered action. " (Radley, p. 234) These two ap- 
pear in conflict only if we suppose the "separation of mind and body, which allows a 
person to think (construe), and then act and then think again. " (ibid., p. 231) The 
resolution is in recognizing that action and reflection are once again dimensions of 
whole experience rather than separate entities. 87 The "channelizing" of personal 
processes is a two way street. My behaviour is organized to some extent by my prior 
I construction, and to some extent "tests" that construction,, and at the same time it 
86Cf. the "body simulator" in the fictional "health through silent conversation 
movement" (Learning Conversations, p. 360) Note the distinction between 
conversing in order to learn to be better "able to perceive what is going on in your 
own body" (emphasis added) vs. conversing about my seýf in action so as to 
better 
elaborate the "bodily" dimensions of meaning in what is going on 
in my experience. 
871 can sit and think about going to a lecture, and predict what I might 
learn there. 
This is an act, but not the act of going to the lecture. If I decide to actually go, 
I get 
up and leave, and have an experience which meets my expectations, more or 
less. I 
may also come back later and sit and think about what I may 
have "learned" from the 
experience, and marvel that something quite surprising 
had happened. Nowhere in 
this cycle was I just acting or just thinking, and at no point does the course of events 
make complete sense viewed entirely 
from the past or the future. The meaning is in 
the full, embodied,, cycle of the experience itself-including the quality of reflection 
that it bears. 
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generates new experience that invites, or sometimes demands, reconstruction. Re- 
flectiveness has a "fractal" quality in that what we experience as the act of reflection 
has qualities that express the reflective dimensions of experience at a smaller 
11 scale. " At one level of conversation an individual requires a "personal language in 
which to reflect upon unarticulated experience" (Thomas, personal conversation, 
1992). At a finer scale they require means for incorporating a rich enough dimen- 
sionality within their actions to leave those actions continually open to reflective re- 
construction. 
How, in the end, are we to find the unity beyond all of the various dualisms? 
By attending not only to the dimensions of meaning which we can articulate, but to 
the dimensionality of meaning embodied in the continuity of whole experience. 
How are we to navigate a course through the dimensionality and the continuity of 
experience? By seeking the unity of experience i. n action, and to do that, as I quoted 
Dewey earlier, "We need to distinguish between action that is routine and action that 
is alive ...... Enter the robot of isolated habit. Just as my articulation , in the sense of 
being able to say what I know, is limited by the dimensions of my habitual construc- 
tion, so my articulation, in the sense of my dynamic embodiment of personal mean- 
ing in movement , is 
limited by the dimensions of my habitual patterns of muscular 
action. I find myself acting, or failing to act, in ways that do not fit what I take 
myself to be. Action itself, "lived construing, 11) is where meaning is embodied, and it 
is already "anticipatory, directional and organized. " How am I to reconstrue myself 
or my actions when so much of my present construction in buried in the inarticulate 
routine called habit? Indeed how can any construction which is inconsistent with the 
dimensional pattern of my embodiment be anything but disconnected and abstract? 
in the sense of full experience it might well be said that I cannot conceive what I 
cannot embody. In the midst of a routine habitual pattern of embodiment, there are 
patterns of thought and states of feeling and modes of action that are simply not 
available to me. If I had a physical part, my body, and a mental part, my mind, that 
were separate, however intimately related,, then it would be conceivable that I could 
experience a physical or mental change alone, or even that one sort of change might 
result in another. We have seen, however, how problematic that dualistic view is. If 
I am a whole, coordinated, psycho-physical system, then I only change as a whole, 
and if I am bound by unquestioned dimensions of "lived construing, " then I am to 
some extent bound in all ways. The way out is not to begin with what I 
know, either 
in the sense of knowledge which I can articulate or in the sense of sensory apprecia- 
tion which I can rely on, that is, with certainty either thought or felt. The way out, 
and beyond the horizon of what I know, is to begin with my uncertainty. 
The con- 
ductive quality of experience, the embodiment of meaning in the quality and 
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sequence of personal action , is the 
dynamic context of a learning conversation which 
begins With my admittedly faulty perception of the dimensions of my own action as 
the only data that I have and working from there, and takes me to a vantage point 
from which I can appreciate how my starting point was faulty. In other words it is an 
intentional process for living a psychology of the unknown. My current perception,, 
like my current understanding, however flawed someone else, or my later self may 
find it to be,, is a fitting starting point-if I engage the full cycle of my experience. 
The tendency for habit to condense into rigid routine is the great obstacle which 
proves to be a blessing, for the search for the unknown path around it opens us to a 
wider life of much richer dimensionality than we knew. The central task-and 
accomplishment-of my work has been to evolve, in embodied practice, ways of 
carrying on such a conversation. 
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There are two factors that determine the effectiveness of such a conversation 
in action. The first is the clarity and dimensi I ional richness of my construction of the 
exploration. For what is exploration but the search for a goal as yet unidentified? 
Where I cannot say what I am seeking, I may still be intentional about the quality of 
my search and I may even have some sense of what kinds of surprise I am open to. 
By leaming to appreciate and articulate dimensions of my embodiment of meaning, 
and dimensions of changes that I intend, I find a middle way between only going 
where I have been before and being adrift in the dark unknown. I find the possibility 
of navigating. And like a navigator, the quality of my work is dependent upon the 
way the sails are trimmed and the state of coordination of the crew. Thus the second 
factor is the attention to the coordinated quality with which I undertake the acts of 
conversing and reconstruing. No thought or feeling of mine is "in the world" except 
by some physical-that is, muscular-action on my part. Muscular action is my way of 
"happen-ing, " of being an event in my own experience. I am not claiming that 
physical dimensions hold any sort of privileged position in the scheme of things, only 
that because the dynamic quality of change shows no allegiance, attention to the 
physical dimensions grants significant leverage. 
It is customary at the conclusion of research reports to point to the need for 
further research, usually implying the need for further funding. This work also ends 
with a recognition of the need for more work, but as the subject matter is the dimen- 
sionality and continuity of personal experience as embodied in personal action, I can 
only conclude by repeating the invitation to replicate and elaborate something of the 
work itself by continuing on to an active conversational engagement With the 
"Conversational Introduction to Conductive Reasoning" that follows. Beyond that 
lies the open invitation to each of us to construct our own conversational personal 
science and to use it to explore the dimensionality of the embodiment of meaning in 
our own life. 
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APPENDIX 1: A CONVERSATIONAL INTRODUCTION TO CONDUCTIVE REASONING 
1. INVITATION TO A CONVERSATION ABOUT CONVERSATIONS 
Oscar Wilde joked that sending a letter is a dangerous thing to do because the 
other person might send a letter back and then, "before you know it, you're in corre- 
spondence. " in a similar way asking a question is dangerous. Some other person, or 
the world, or your own self, may answer it, and then before you know it, you're in 
conversation. This is particularly dangerous as such a conversation involves not only 
words, but feelings, actions and meanings, and therefore it does not stand apart from 
the processes of life but propels and channels them, often in surprising directions. 
Most of us have a habit of treating distinctions Within our experience as separate 
things-mind and body, thought and feeling, knowledge and action. Then we struggle 
to get the "parts" back into relation with each other. Two and a half millennia agn 
the philosopher Parmenedes pointed out that when one begins With a false 
separation, anything can follow from it. I have observed in my own experience that 
when we make such a separation, we are continually getting things on the "wrong 
side. " How then can we have a conversation about the rich multidimensionality of 
our experience while not loosing track of its unity? Rather than looking at leaming 
and knowing as intellectual things and movement, perception,, emotions and the rest 
as other kinds of things, other "parts"' of experience, for instance, can we have a 
conversation in which we take our experience as a seamless, dynamic whole in 
which all these aspects are constantly interwoven? Working across the mind-body 
"Split" is not a matter of dealing with "both" (or rejecting the reality of "either") but 
of being explicit about our abstracting of dimensions from whole, embodied experi- 
ence. 
Merleau-Ponty described the kind of knowledge embodied in something like 
knowing how to type as "knowledge in the hands. " I want to pursue the idea that, at 
root, all knowledge is like that, and further, that life itself has a conversational qual- 
ity in that the meaningfulness of what I actually do lies in the context of what I might 
have done instead and how I might have done it-and in what happens next. 
What is a Conversation? 
Think of a conversation you have had, one that you would consider to be a 
-good example" of a conversation. What was it about that event that made it a 
-conversation? " What, in your recollection, were the essential features in the event 
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that you find yourself referring to when you call it a conversation? Think of a num- 
ber of other events in which you have participated that were like that event in some 
way, but which you would not consider conversations. How do those events differ 
from the first? In other words, what was it about them that made them not-conver- 
sations? Do these differences reveal anything about what it was that was 
cc conversational" about the conversation? Now thinking about your experience more 
generally, would you consider a discussion to be a conversation? Is an argument a 
conversation? Is a lecture? A dialogue? A debate? Whether your answer is yes or 
no to any of these or other candidatesl the next question is, What are the relevant 
ways in which they are or are not like your prototype of a conversation? Perhaps 
some of these events might be parts of conversations, or vise versa? 
A -r, Arter you have played with these a little you will be in a position to answer in 
a more concrete way the next question. What, fundamentally, is a conversation? 
What attributes would an event or process need to have for you to consider It to be 
"'conversational? " When I play this game myself, I find that for me a conversation is 
basically an exchange, an exchange with a back and forth, ongoing quality. Thus for 
Instance,, a lecture would not be a conversation, though in conjunction with a tutorial 
session it might be part of one. A lecture with a question and answer period might 
be a conversation, although a rather unbalanced one. A dialogue might be a formal 
sort of conversation, whereas a debate might not be,, if something is being presented 
but not exchanged. These are of course, bits of meaning drawn from my experience, 
yours may well be quite different. One of the underlying assumptions I am making 
throughout what follows is that meaning is always personal. It is nothing less than, 
as Laurie Thomas defines it, the relationship between knower and known, not merely 
some proposition about it, but the relationship itself Thomas and Harri-Augstein 
have developed a paradigm of "conversational science" which is intended to go 
beyond the objectivism of a natural science paradigm and the subjectivism of a phe- 
nomenological personal science paradigm. 88 Thus when I refer later to learning or 
the embodiment of meaning as "conversational" what that means to you will be 
constructed in relation to such distinctions as those in your own experience which we 
have just conversed about. In my terms (and I hope in yours), though we are 
separated in time and space, we have just engaged in a bit of conversation. Strictly 
speaking, it will not be fully a conversation until you somehow record what you draw 
from these little experiments and send it to me so that it can have an effect on my 
meaning, but in the meanwhile I invite you to continue conversing with yourself 
88HarTi-Augstein, S. and Thomas, L. (1991) Learning Conversations,, Routledge, 
London. 
1-2 
A Conversational Introduction to Conductive Reasoning 
The fact that events can be better or worse examples of "conversations" leads 
to the Possible conclusion that a conversation is not a thing, defined once for all, - 
but 
that events may be more or less "conversational") in various ways-thus the choice of 
a conversational paradigm. I will be building my framework around three qualities 
of experience: continuity, dimensionality and conductivity. By the continuity of 
experience, a phrase borrowed from John Dewey, I am referring to the fact that ex- 
perience is always whole, not just a unity but a dynamic unity. All of the various 
Cr aspects" or domains of experience are continuous and inseparable. All distinctions 
have, within the wholeness of experience, a kind of equal status. Such qualities as 
round or smooth or red are not more fundamental than such qualities as beautiful or 
frightening. What we might think of as physical qualities or cognitive or emotional 
qualities are not separable. There is no such thing as a purely physical, purely men- 
tal or purely emotional act or experience. The integrity of an event in your experi- 
ence-what makes it, across all of its physical, emotional and cognitive dimensions, 
this experience, this conversation, for instance-is what I mean by the continuity of 
the expenence. 
By dimensionality I refer to the idea that the meaning of an experi- 
ence can be considered as located in a personally constructed system of distinctions. 
Perhaps the simplest and most immediate example of such a distinction is that of 
directions in space. One of the things we can say about the location of an object is 
that it is somewhat north or south of some other object. We are thus using north vs. 
south to establish a dimension for locating the object. If we add east vs. west and up 
vs. down, we have made a "coordinate system, ' that is, a system of directional dis- 
tinctions that establishes a space in which we can then locate an object by saying that 
it is,, for example, lOkm north of, Am west of, and 200m above some reference 
point. This sort of geometric space is a simple special case, and thus a model of the 
dimensional,, "spatial" quality of all personal meaning. Every distinction establishes 
a dimension of meaning within the space of a person's experience. If, for instance, 
we speak of a climate as being northerly or southerly, we are using a distinction, 
northerly vs. southerly, which is of a very different kind from north vs. south, but if 
we add to it other distinctions that might be made between climates, wet vs. dry, 
constant vs. volatile etc. we establish a space of what we can meaningfully say about 
climates. In fact, we might formally define making a distinction as recognizing "a 
difference within a context of similarity. " That is, I recognize a way in which 
something is different from some other things which are similar in some way. Thus 
it is both the difference and the similarity together that define the distinction. "The 
way things are" is only meaningful in relation to some other way that they "might 
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have been. " "North" has no meaning except in relation to something which is 
" south. "' 
It is not just what we can say, however, but how we meaningfully act in rela- 
tion to a climate,, or anything else, that is important to us. This is part of what I mean 
by the conductivity of experience. Meaning is always meaning in a context of 
action. To say that a mountain path is "steep" or "full of obstacles" is only meaning- 
ful in relation to my possible intention to climb it. It is not only what I "think" or 
even "feel" about climbing, but the very way I engage in the act of climbing, that is 
meaningful-that is literally "full of meaning" for me. What I am about is exploring 
the idea that learning is a reconstruction of meaning in all of these respects. Personal 
meaning is played out in action. The meaning of "conversation, " for example, is 
concrete in the "having" of one, that is, in the conversing. 
What is a Learning Conversation? 
Asking a question, like making a painting or a dance,, is a personal creative 
act. I once asked a question and was told in reply, "If you have to ask, you aren't 
ready for the answer. " Aspiring learners are often given this answer, though seldom 
in such explicit form. In whatever form, such an answer most misses the mark in its 
failure to recognize that it is often just by asking the question that we become ready 
for the answer. Finding the next embodiment of the question, the slightly clearer 
expression of what we do not know, is itself our way of becoming able to grasp the 
answer. In large part , it is the process of 
learning. 
Learning that is driven by the needs and purposes of the learner, rather than 
the expectations or skills of a teacher or the logical structure of the matter to be 
learned,, can be described as self-organized learning. Within the conversational sci- 
ence paradigm developed at the Centre for the Study of Human Learning, Self-organ- 
ized Learning is defined as "the conversational construction,, reconstruction and 
exchange of personally significant, relevant and viable meanings with awareness and 
controlled purposiveness. " Simply put, a "learning conversation" is a conversation 
about learning in which the conversational quality of learning is explicit. Learning is 
always a personal matter and takes place in a context of personal meaning. It is the 
dimensional, constructed, quality of personal meaning that makes learning conver- 
sational. Thus the learning conversation is initially about the meaning we 
have 
constructed, as such,, and if we persist in the conversation it comes to 
be about how 
we construct and reconstruct meaning. In other words, learning, 
defined as broadly 
as one wishes, is something we can learn to 
do better, and the way to do that is to 
become reflective about our learning. The learning conversation is a vehicle for 
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carrying on that reflection and cycling the results back into our ongoing experience. 
Like many powerful methods, its basic structure is quite simple. It begins by produc- 
ing a concrete record of a performance, event etc. and then uses that record as a lens 
for reflecting on our experience. Meanwhile,, in the doing, it produces a personal 
language for carrying on the reflection. The purpose of the conversation is to clarify 
the distinctions that I am already making, and to elaborate my system of distinctions 
in order to allow me to engage in more richly varied or detailed interaction with my 
world, that is, to construct richer personal meaning. 
The Personal Learning Contract 
The heart of the technology for putting all this into practice is the Personal 
Learning Contract. The Personal Learning Contract, as a procedure, is a formaliza- 
tion of George Kelly's notion of the "full cycle of experience. "89 It is personal in its 
grounding in the personally constructed meaning of the learner. Even when it is di- 
rected toward some practical end result, It is first of all concerned with the learning 
associated with gaining that end. It is a contract in that it expresses a commitment to 
action on the part of the learner. In its "full cycle" it is a commitment not only to 
action, but to action designed to facilitate reconstruction of the very personal mean- 
ing on which it is based. Learning is not just something that happens to us. It is 
something that we do in an intentional context. 
The best way to appreciate the elements of a Personal Learning Contract is, 
of course, to make one. The outline of the process is quite simple. Think of some 
Context in which you would like to learn something. Write down your Purpose. 
What is your goal, in terms of something you want to learn, or to learn to do? What 
do you anticipate doing in order to meet your Purpose? Write down these Strategies. 
Next write down the Outcomes you expect to follow from undertaking your Strate- 
gies. What do you think will happen when you do what you do? Also, how will you 
know, based on these outcomes,, whether you have met your purpose? Now Review 
the whole thing. How do each of the pieces seem to relate to each other? In particu- 
lar, how does, for example, the fact that you see these Strategies as leading you to 
this Purpose tell you about the meaning that the Purpose holds for you? Converse 
with yourself about this for a while and make any adjustments that seem appropriate. 
you now have a design for learning in a self-organized way. This is actually stage 
one of the learning conversation. The second stage is a matter of carrying out the 
89Kelly, G. A. (1963) A Theory of Personality: The Psychology of Personal 
Constructs, Norton, NY. 
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Strategies and noticing the Outcomes. Then the third stage is to make another, retro- 
SPCctive, contract. 
It is, of course, often true that we don't really know our purpose until after we 
have engaged ourselves in trying to meet it, and often what we do is not what we 
intended to do. So after you have engaged in the process for a time, look back over 
what you have done. What does your Purpose seem to have been from this vantage? 
How does it differ from what you thought it was when you began? What Strategies 
did you actually engage in and what Outcomes actually followed from them? How 
did you actually judge your success? Write each of these down and compare them 
with their counterparts from the first contract. How did each diffierl and what do 
those differences reveal to you about yourself as a learner? You can take this new 
contract as a new stage one and continue the process, learning about your chosen 
context, modifying you purpose, and becoming gTadually more skilled at the process 
itself, for as long as you like. 
The Learning Design Conversation 
The Personal Learning Contract is a practical means for attending to the di- 
mensions of meaning relevant to a given purpose and for relating those dimensions 
to concrete action. A modification of the Personal Leaming Contract which I find 
useful in bringing out the anticipatory quality of learning, and emphasizing the con- 
tinuity of the experience as a whole, is what I call a "learming design conversation. " 
It is simply a Personal Learning Contract with one additional element, the Conditions 
within which the Strategies are carried out. What are the Conditions present at the 
moment? How might carrying out my Strategies change those conditions? What are 
the natural conditions of the Purpose-that is, what are the conditions which would 
have my end as a natural consequence? From the perspective of these natural 
conditions it appears that my strategies must now satisfy dual criteria. 
They must 
accomplish the task in a way that meets the purpose. That is, they must meet 
the 
purpose in a way that is consistent with the reasons, within the context, of 
its being 
the purpose. A most immediate example is that I am now seeking to complete my 
Ph. D. degree. To reach that goal in a way that is satisfying, it must be consistent 
with why I want the degree. If I were to succeed in earning a 
Ph. D. in a way that was 
not consistent with my underlying reasons 
for wanting it,, it would not really be the 
degree that I want. The strategies must also proceed in a way that is consistent with 
the coordination of myself as a whole person in action 
in the present conditions. In 
my terms, they must be "conductive. 
" Difficulties can arise when (as is often the 
case) my very conception of the task is 
incomplete or unclear in such a way that it 
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seems to imply 4cobvious" linear, non-conductive strategies. Leaming itself is not 
only something that can be learned, it is composed of psycho-physical acts engaged 
in by a human person, and thus it is vital , in practice, to include the conditions of our 
own coordination among those we give attention to If we are to converse about our 
learning in a fully embodied way. Before we consider that, let us look more closely 
at the meaning of dimensionality. 
H. THE DIMENSIONALITY OF PERSONAL MEANING AND THE CONTINUITY OF 
EXPERIENCE 
Conductive Reasoning can be thought of as an intersection of the dimen- 
sionality and coordination of meaningful action. It is dimensional in its incorpora- 
tion of the dimensions of personal meaning and continuous in its embodiment of the 
unity of personal action. Think of some experience that you particularly enjoyed. 
To say that you would like to experience it again usually does not mean that you 
want to relive the same experience,, nor even to have a new experience that is identi- 
cal to it, but rather that you would like a new experience similar to that one in certain 
valued ways. If the new experience were also different in certain ways it would be 
even "better. " These similarities and differences are what I mean by the dimensions 
of the meaning in your experience. The more articulate we become about the 
dimensionality of our experience the finer the range and quality of choice we can 
exercise about it. 
Drawing Distinctions: three, two, and one card draw, and anticipations 
The most straightforward way I have found to explore the concept of dimen- 
sionality is with a deck of ordinary playing cards. The dimensions of meaning and 
the relationships among them that emerge are concrete, and yet easily substituted for 
in other,, more personally relevant, contexts. The "trivial concreteness" of this game 
of cards is both an advantage and a disadvantage. Some people find it difficult to 
r(relate to" the whole operation. It may not be easy to care how a card is distinct, ex- 
cept in the context of an actual game. We could just as well use a set of O'cards" 
representing a set of personal experiences of yours. If you find it helpful, think of 
some personally relevant context and let it rest, as it were , just "off stage. 
" Simply 
notice whatever parallels emerge as you continue. You might then want to repeat the 
process formally using your own bits of experience 
in place of the cards. Now, on 
with the -game. 
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Find a deck of cards,, shuffle, and draw three cards. Now simply ask, What is 
some way in which two of these cards are similar and the third card,, different. Can 
you name the similarity? Can you name the "opposite" attribute that makes the third 
card different? One important note here. It is common to use the word "attribute" as 
a synonym for "property" and to think of the attributes of a thing as possessions of 
the thing; they are its attributes. I use "attribute" rather than "property" simply 
because "attribute" is also a verb. These are not qualities that belong to the thing; 
they are the qualities that I attribute to it. It is my way of keeping in mind that the 
qualities of the objects in my experience are not in the objects nor in me, but are 
somehow between us. 
Draw three more cards. An alternative way of asking the question is, Which 
card is the most different? Can you name the difference? Can you name what it is 
about the other two cards that makes them less different? Draw three more cards. 
Ask again, Which two are more similar, or which is the most different? That is,, 
similar or different in some way that you haven't already used. You have now-just 
made explicit three dimensions of meaning within your experience of a deck of 
cards, what within Personal Construct Psychology are called constructs. These di- 
mensions are just the ways in which you might anticipate that the next card you draw 
will be similar or different from the previous one. They are the dimensions of what 
you can meaningfully say about the card. One dimension that usually comes up quite 
early on is red vs. black. Now suppose I offered to give you f5 if you correctly 
predict whether the next card would be red or black. You of course have a 50% 
chance of being correct. But suppose instead I offered to give you fI for every cor- 
rect prediction you made about the next card. In that case the more things you can 
say, that is the more dimensions of meaning that are available in your experience of 
the cards, the better you chances of getting a significant amount from me. Injust this 
way, in "real life, " the higher the dimensionality, the richer the experience. It should 
be noted that this exercise is probably something of a cheat since you have already 
had experience with cards like these. A "strict construction" would say that the 
meaning of each of your dimensions is really only in relation to those three cards. 
Thus knowing which of the available distinctions will be significant, that is, useful in 
distinguishing among other cards , is 
itself a matter of anticipation, and always relies 
somewhat on previous experience with "things of this sort. " The point is that a given 
card is "meaningful" precisely in terms of the ways in which it is like or not like 
other cards, and these have to do both with past experience and present purpose. A 
bridge player and a poker player may draw quite different sets of dimensions from 
the same cards. Also, suppose I had handed you a different set of cards and the first 
two trios contained strange symbols and colours on them. If the third trio of cards 
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were two red and one black, would you then feel so sure that red vs. black was a 
signiticant distinction? 
Continue drawing three cards at a time for a few more rounds. Now draw 
one card, but just before you do, what significant things can you say about it? Some 
distinctions are "obvious,, "' such as that it is either red or black, either odd or even. 
Some, such as high or low value, face or numbered card, may be less obvious than 
they seem. In some people's meaning some curious dimensions can sometimes 
anse. For example, some have an arbitrary, or conventional, "stipulated" quality. Is 
an ace a high or low value card, or does it belong with the face cards or the number 
cards? It depends on the game you have in mind when you come up with that dis- 
tinction, but it is definitely one or the other. But speaking of high vs. low value, 
what about a 10? an 8? Where is the boundary between high and low? It might not 
be easy to say. Also, not all distinctions may apply to all of the cards. Is the queen 
of hearts odd or even? Another curious distinction that sometimes comes up is two 
cards in sequence vs. not in sequence. It is a perfectly reasonable distinction, but it 
really applies not to that one card you are about to draw, but rather to its relationship 
with the one after that. 
Look again at your trios of cards. Notice if you have limited the kinds of dis- 
tinctions you are drawing. For instance, are you only finding distinctions to do with 
how the cards look? What about how they might be used in various games? Or even 
how you feel as you look at them? There are always more distinctions, and more 
kinds of distinctions, possible than seems evident. When I speak of the dimension- 
ality of meaning, I am referring to just this quality. It is not that there are any ready 
made dimensions of meaning waiting for us to experience, but that experience is al- 
ways differentiable in just the way you have been doing with the cards. The distinc- 
tions are always yours; they are between you and the cards; they have always to do 
with your intention in drawing them, and within the continuity of experience there 
are always other distinctions that you might have drawn instead. One more point: we 
do not in general have these distinctions and then use them; they are dimensions 
within our experience. Of course, suppose I asked you to sort the deck into four piles 
such that for each card you could say three things about why it was in that pile and 
none of the others. In that case consciously (or unconsciously) drawing some dis- 
tinctions useful for the task, and then consciously (or unconsciously) using them is 
just what you probably would do. We might say that the world is not differentiated, 
but differentiable, though we are so good at differentiating that it often appears the 
other way round. 
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Next draw two cards. How many ways can you find in which they are simi- 
lar? How many in which they are different? This task is of course much easier now,, 
in the context of all of the dimensions you have drawn from the previous trios, than 
it would have been at the beginning. In a sense, a third card is implicit in the context 
of your prior experience with the deck. That is, "they are both red" is a significant 
similarity because you know that there are other cards that are black. They are both 
rectangles with trimmed comers, but that is a trivial similarity. Since it is true of all 
of the cards it is of no use in distinguishing them, and so it has no "significance, " 
(and I would have refused to give you a pound for predicting it). "One is a diamond 
and the other a heart" is a significant difference because you know there are other 
diamonds and other hearts in the deck. 
Finally, draw one more card. How might that card have been different? Of 
course, there are an infinity of possible ways, but which ones are significant in the 
context of the deck? The deck provided the context of similarity within which the 
ways in which that one card might have been different can be significant distinctions. 
Imagine someone giving you a quick glance at strange looking deck,, handing you 
one card, and asking you that same question, How could this card be different? You 
would have a much more difficult time. This is just the situation we find ourselves 
in whenever we have only one experience to reflect upon and nothing to contrast it 
with. As we will find in a while,, our own, largely kinesthetic, sense of ourselves is 
just such a situation in which if we always act the same way we have no way of 
appreciating how we might be instead, and so it is difficult to give our present state 
any meaning beyond "normal. ") 
We have stayed with these cards so long because they are such concrete and 
yet "trivial" instances of what I am claiming about experience at large. The opera- 
tion itself illustrates other aspects of experience as well. As I am describing these 
little explorations I am dealing with abstractions-distinctions, attributes and such. 
Youl, however, are dealing concretely with physical cards. "Draw three cards" is 
something I am imagining, but for you it is a complex physical action as well. That 
experience has a much wider dimensionality and also embodies the continuity of ex- 
perience. Just as I can make and use distinctions about the mathematical or colour 
attributes of the cards, I can make distinctions among the physical, mental, emo- 
tional, social etc. dimensions of the experience itself And just as "dimensionality" 
refers to a kind of openness or availability for differentiation in my experience (and 
not to any kind of prior dimensions), "continuity" refers to its unity as a whole expe- 
rience. We can converse about your explorations with the cards in physical or 
intel- 
lectual or whatever terms we like, but the experience itself has its own integrity, its 
1-10 
A Conversational Introduction to Conductive Reasoning 
own continuity. We may think of drawing a card as a bodily act and drawing a dis- 
tInction as a mental one, but those are already extreme abstractions. But then, 
abstracting is itself an act, with its own continuity. Let us use the cards once more to 
make this concrete in your experience. 
Draw one more card. How do you like it? If you could have a "better" card, - how would it be different? By now you have ready to hand several useful dimen- 
sions abstracted from your experience with other cards. In answering this question 
you are adding another aspect to the matter of drawing out the dimensions, the aspect 
of preference. Not only do you have a preference as to where you might want your 
chosen card to be "located" on any particular dimension, diamond rather than club, 
perhaps, or even numbered rather than odd, but some dimensions themselves matter 
more than others-maybe you really don't care what colour it is as long as it is a face 
card. Ordinarily these acts, of differentiating and of choosingl are thought of as 
mental (though in the second case we might admit an emotional component) but of 
course you don't become a temporarily discarnate being while you perform them. 
You are still probably sitting, still holding the card, still perhaps looking over your 
trios of cards spread in front of you. It is just that the dimensions of how you are 
engaged in these aspects of your present experience are not obviously relevant. 
"Choosing" however, is ambiguous. When magicians say, "Pick a card, " they don't 
usually mean, "Decide which card you would like. " It is a request to physically 
reach forward and pull a card out of the deck. But then the usual phrase is, "Pick a 
card, any card. " Let us combine meanings and "pick a card, a particular card, " or 
perhaps, "pick a card, any card meeting certain personally chosen criteria. " In order 
to end up With a "better" card in your hand you require two things, a way of knowing 
what better means to you and a means for somehow getting such a card out of the 
deck and into your hand. Try this now. Decide what would count as "better, " then 
devise a plan for selecting such a card and then carry out your plan. 
You should now have in your hand a card that is in some way more to your 
liking. What did you observe as you made your selection? How did deciding on 
your criteria "feel? " What kinds of dimensions did you include in your plan? 
For 
instance, if you turned the deck over to look at the cards,, did you care about the 
quality of how your hands moved as you did so? In a sense the plan was present as a 
set of dimensions within the act of physically acquiring the new card. 
This is once 
again what I mean by the continuity of experience, the wholeness which gives rise 
to 
its potential for many 
different differentiations, in how we act as well as what we can 
say. 
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What we will do next is explore some ways of attending to some of the "felt" 
rather than "thought about" dimensions of such experience. 
"Interlace" 
Fold your hands on your lap, fingers interlaced. Notice that one thumb is on 
top of the other, and that each finger of that hand rests on top of the same finger of 
the other hand. If you do this several times you will probably notice that the same 
hand is always cron top. " Switch your hands so that your fingers are interlaced with 
the other hand on top. Notice how that feels. This is a simple demonstration of the 
unfamiliar feeling that comes from doing something in a non-habitual way. I would 
like you to take the matter a step further and elaborate some dimensions of that un- 
familiar feeling. In other words, what are the ways in which the "feeling" of having 
your hands folded one way is different from the other. Note that this is like the 
"draw two cards" example earlier. The meaning of each quality that you observe in 
the unfamiliar mode is precisely in its contrast with the "opposite" quality in the 
familiar mode. Also these distinctions,, these ways in which it feels different do not 
lie in an intellectual processing of the kinesthetic or emotional qualities of the expe- 
rience. They are distinctions between the feelings themselves; the meanings are kin- 
esthetic or emotional rather than cognitive. There are no restrictions on the kinds of 
differences you may notice. They may be "in your hands" or they may be about 
feelings elsewhere. They may seem quite far from the obvious, such as, I find 
myself thinking about my mother. " They may be emotional, perhaps surprisingly so. 
One young girl felt so angry whenever she folded her hands the "wrong" way that 
she refused to continue with the experiment. 
See if you can find three or four different differences. Go back and forth 
between the two modes of folding as many times as you need. In each case, see if 
you can name each end of the distinction beyond "familiar vs. unfamiliar, " some- 
thing like ". comfortable vs. insecure', " Bor example. The labels you decide on are not 
important in themselves. They are merely what Kelly called "convenient word han- 
dles,, " and so drawing a distinction is not less "successful" if you cannot find a suit- 
able word for it. I have found in practice, though, that the very attempt to find a sat- 
Isfactory label draws my attention to the quality within my experience in a much 
more detailed way. In any case what I mean by the dimension of meaning is the 
r, way it feels different" behind the labels. (You may find a particularly clear instance 
of this if you choose a label which feels almost but not quite right, and then find a 
"better" one. What that label "'means" is just the "what about the feeling" that 
makes the second label fit it better than the first. ) 
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Suppose when you first folded your hands I had only asked, What does that 
feel like? This is, of course, just like the "draw one card" case,, and involves the 
same difficulties. Most people have trouble saying much of anything beyond , ClIt feels normal. " In a sense, what you have just done is to make explicit a few of the 
dimensions of what "feels normal" actually means in your own concrete experience. 
Now unfold your hands and fold them again. Which fingers are on top? Most likely 
the same ones that were on top the very first time; that is still your habitual mode of 
folding your hands. To do it otherwise requires thought and attention, and may be 
difficult even then. Unfold your hands once more. Think about the "unfamiliar" 
folding and fold them again. Was it easy or difficult? If you managed it, how does it 
feel now? 
One more experiment: unfold you hands. Think again about your three or 
four pairs of attributes, and think in particular about the qualities of the "unfamiliar" 
mode that made it different. Now keeping these ways of being different in mind as a 
guide, bring your hands together in the unfamiliar way. What happened? 
Dimensions of "Grace" 
Think of the most graceful animal or person you can remember. Recall as 
vividly as you can some episode of observing that individual in action. What was it 
about the action that you mean (or are referring to) when you say it was "graceful"? 
Think of some contrasting episodes of observing individuals who were not graceful. 
How many ways can you find in which the graceful was different from others? The 
meaning of "graceful" in your experience, at least these bits of your experience, is 
constructed of these ways in which the concrete episode of graceful is different from 
the other episodes. For instance , if a significant attribute of grace 
for you is moves 
smoothly, " that takes its meaning in relation to how it might have been instead. 
Thus the usefulness of finding contrasting experiences; that is where you find the 
"opposite" ways of moving that give "smoothly" its personal significance. One point 
of all this is that once we have abstracted these dimensions from our 
experience-which we usually do in a completely inattentive way-they become 
"abstractions" and it is all too easy to lose the connection between them and the 
whole personal experience whose meanings they represent. 
Try the same exercise again, this time beginning with a time when you felt 
graceful yourself What new dimensions of your meaning of graceful come from 
considering the matter according to how it feels as well as how it looks? Do any of 
the dimensions you found in the "interlace" conversation seem to apply? Make some 
movement, moving forward from the 
back of your chair or standing up, for instance. 
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Repeat the same movem 
, 
ent, but just before you do, think about the dimensions of 
Your meaning of graceful which you just found. Now keeping clearly in mind the 
0; graceful"' end of each of these dimensions, as you did before with the unfamiliar 
hand folding, make the movement "gracefully. " Observe what happens. This may 
bring you back to the continuity I spoke of earlier. Concepts, feelings, movements 
etc. are all abstracted from whole experience. They are the dimensions drawn into 
the foreground of meaning against the background of dimensions that collectively 
become "everything else" as in "everything else being equal... "' 
Dimensionalizing an Experience 
By "dimensionalizing an experience" I mean the act of abstracting dimen- 
sions of meaning from it. It is a conversational process which begins by explicitly 
recognizing the dimensional character of my experience before I say anything about 
the any particular dimensions. That recognition provides a space in which I can 
construct a language in which to both articulate and reconstrue my experience. Di- 
mensionality is the meaningfulness of what did not happen instead. What happens is 
simply "what happens, "' but the meaning of what happens lies in the ways it differs 
from what else "might have happened" but did not. In addition, what we anticipate 
about future events are the ways in which what actually happens may be similar or 
different ftom both past events and other possible future events. 
Recall some experience you have had recently-perhaps an experience of 
being frustrated in traffic, or of being distracted upon seeing a sexually attractive 
person, or of trying very hard to accomplish something and either failing or succeed- 
ing. In any case, part of what gives it the quality of being 44an") experience may by 
the set of predominant dimensions of meaning within it. But what if my being at- 
tentive to just this set of dimensions available in the moment, and not others, is "just 
a habit? " I am predisposed to experiencing the situation through the lens of these 
dimensions simply because I have done so before. The situation is frustrating or 
sexual or effortful not in and of itself, but simply because I am construing its mean- 
ing for me in those terms. This does not mean that I am "only making it up, 11 of 
course; those dimensions of frustration or sexuality or whatever are "really there. " 
But so might many other dimensions if I were only open to them. As you recall your 
experience, notice the prominent dimensions, not just how you felt, or your interpre- 
tation of it, but the context within which you made that interpretation. Decide to 
explicitly recognize that this experience is 
dimensional. Do nothing initially about 
the dimensions; just notice them as such. This can open a space in which you can 
then ask yourself the powerful question, What other dimensions might I use instead 
1-14 
A Conversational Introduction to Conductive Reasoning 
to make this meaningful? What if I observed the shape and quality of how I embod- 
ied my frustration? What if I watched that person's movement in terms of artistic 
composition? What if I thought about the relationship between what I was trying to 
accomplish and how I was going about it? If you find an interesting set of alternative 
dimensions available, recall the situation again, or more concretely, go and put 
yourself in a similar one, and keep those new dimensions in your attention as you 
"have" the experience. You may find, not just a new experience, but an unfamiliar 
kind of experience. 
If a habit can be described as a disposition to react in some particular way to 
a given stimulus, then an "attitude" (perhaps most easily observable in a person with 
an "attitude problem") might be described as a disposition toward a certain style of 
response, relatively independent of the specific stimulus. It is, in a sense, a meta- 
habit. Carrying on a conversation that begins with explicit recognition that my 
experience has dimensional quality before I say anything about what the dimensions 
might be can lead me to a new, conversational attitude,, and a new relationship to my 
own experience. 
Dimensional Meaning of "Better" 
It is very difficult to improve, especially in any sort of intentional way, if one 
does not know what one means by "improve. " Habits, whatever else they may be, 
are specific, and so if I want to improve upon my habitual reaction I require a con- 
ception of the change which is at least as specific. How do I want to be better? 
Wanting a better card relies on some basis for knowing how the new card would be 
different from the one I have. Th 
,e 
generic command , in effect, to 
"do something 
else, " is not likely to get a very satisfying response, or to be carried out with any 
clear consequence. A habit is the embodiment of my conception of the "thing to be 
done" and tends to distance me from engagement with either the conditions in which 
I act, or the dimensionality of the personal meaning of what I intend to accomplish 
by it. To "have" such a concept is both convenient and limiting. 
In order for the change to be both specific in the above sense, and general in the 
sense of applying to many differing conditions, I must address the situation at a 
higher organizational level than that of the particular habit. Learning, whether con- 
scious and self-organized or accidental, occurs on more than one level. If I engage 
in an unconsciously directed habitual pattern, I not only become "better" at that par- 
ticular habit, I also become more skilled at operating unconsciously. I get better at 
doing what I practice, but also better at practicing the way I practice. Part of what 
makes this matter troublesome in actual practice is our habitual tendency to confuse 
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our conception of our ends with what we believe we must do to reach them. This is 
quite simply to be unskilled in the art of abstracting. To find appropriate dimensions 
for the construction of a clear idea of how I want to be different, unmixed with the 
dimensions of meaning of "due effort" and the like, opens a space in which I can 
find myself free to follow new paths in order to reach new destinations. The central 
issue, which will be an explicit focus of the later parts of our conversation,, is that,, 
within the continuity of our experience, and the unity of our action, the large part of 
the dimensionality lies outside the domain of what we know how to articulate. If we 
define learning as an elaborative reconstruction of personal meaning, then much of 
the process of learning is the development of a language in which to articulate and 
reflect upon the dimensions of meaning in our experience. The literal meaning of 
"articulate, " however, is "to connect together by joints. " So it is literally true that 
before we can say something, we already live it. We embody our personal meaning 
in the articulation of our own movements. The subject of much of what Will follow, 
and a central task of what I Will call a "conductive conversation, " is the bringing to- 
gether of those two senses of articulation in a single conversation. The overall in- 
tention is to make it possible to learn to consider, and to direct, one's own action in a 
unified way-to escape the traps of dualism by embracing the dimensionality of per- 
sonal experience. All of the levels of embodied construction are "going on" at once. 
The task of the conductive conversation is to navigate the process. 
999 WHAT IS"CONDUCTIVITY . 
A ffiend related a story about a Zen meditation retreat which she once expen- 
enced. After an intense two days of meditating, the group took a break. As she was 
resting, the leader of the retreat approached her, placed a teacup in front of her and 
asked,, "Is the cup inside or outside of your mind? " As she related the event to me, 
her experience at that moment was of her mind "imploding. " She felt herself in a 
completely new relationship to what she had been doing for the past two days. Like 
many questions in Zen stories, both yes and no were incorrect answers, as would be 
the conclusion that it was a pointless question. Such a question, one that calls, not 
for a propositional response, but for an appropriate action, I would call a "conductive 
question. " Thus at that moment the psycho-physical response, the release of mental 
and physical tensing which my friend experienced as 
her mind imploding was the 
proper answer to the leader's question, and the question carried significant momen- 
tum as evidenced by the physically observable response my friend had on recollect- 
ing it. This quality of Zen koans as questions that call for a change of perspective or 
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for an appropriate action rather than for a proposition is an illustration of what I 
mean by the conductivity of experience. The dimensionality and the continuity of 
experience are woven together in its conductivity, its quality of ongoing action. 
Meaning is not "about"' experience; it is embodied in it. In the continuity of experi- 
ence all dimensions have equal status, and thus all change is a kind of motion. Life 
is not only meaningful, it is dynamically so, and the dimensions of personal meaning 
not only give structure to how we anticipate events, they are the anticipatory charac- 
ter of our actions. 
On "Conductive Reasoning" 
This conductive quality of experience gives it a kind of ongoing logical 
structure. Indeed, I would say that it is just this logical structure out of which what 
we usually think of as fon-nal "logic" is abstracted. Propositional logic is of two 
general types, according to the direction in which reasoning proceeds between 
premises and conclusions. Inductive reasoning proceeds from a number of specific 
propositions, the premises,, to a general conclusion. The premises may be, for in- 
stance, statements about observations, and the conclusion is then a general statement 
toward which those observations are said to lead. The root meaning of "induce" is to 
draw toward. Deductive reasoning, on the other hand, proceeds from general 
propositions of some kind to conclusions which are their consequences. The specific 
conclusions are propositions which are, etymologically speaking, "drawn from" the 
premises. In both cases the logical process is of the form, "if I know A then I also 
know B. " The elements of the logical process are all statements about phenomena of 
some sort,, and thus the whole process is abstracted from experience. Suppose, 
however, that we could place not only statements about phenomena but perceived 
phenomena themselves in the role of premise. If the potential premises include, for 
instance, my perception of my own action as well as propositional assumptions 
which I may hold about the context of my action, then I find myself engaged in a 
new kind of logical process in which the conclusions drawn may include not only 
other propositions but also other actions. The logical process is then of the form, "If 
you perceive conditions A and you feel bodily state B, then take the next step 
C. '15 
The process is "conductive" in the sense that one is "drawn along" toward the next 
step. The term is rich in metaphorical connections, having to 
do with electrical con- 
ductivity etc. all of which seem apt. The process is conductive also in the sense that 
it is fundamentally about, and in, conduct. 
One important consequence of conductivity is that all of the implicit, embod- 
ied dimensions of meaning are 
"operative" during any process of reflection. Thus 
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while I am trying to elicit as many dimensions of my meaning as possible, the habit- 
ual construction embodied in all of those implicit dimensions continue to be 
cc effective. " This is perhaps not so important if I am seeking dimensions of some 
Cc external" domain, but if the domain is that of my own action, then what is required 
is not so much a representation of a large number of specific dimensions as an ability 
to act from an appreciation of the dimensional character of the experience. The 
practical question then is, What dimensions need I have explicit awareness of in 
order for me to able to direct the whole in a more satisfying way? Practically 
speaking, within the conductivity of experience, learning as reconstruction is always 
to some extent a matter of "leverage. " Rational is not opposed to irrational, but 
rather rational thought and action bear the same relation to thought and action as a 
whole that the set of rational numbers bear to all numbers. Reasoning is a process of 
drawing from the broader context those dimensions that are amenable to certain 
kinds of comparison, and then manipulating that more limited set. Reasoning is a 
sort of leveraged construction. Reason is also a phenomenon within the continuity of 
whole experience and thus reason in the intellectual sense is but a dimension of the 
dynamic structure of that continuity. In other words, it is conductive. And con- 
ductive reasoning is the logic of knowledge in the hands. 
Conductive Conversations 
The learning conversation is a vehicle for becoming more reflectively 
articulate about the dimensions of my construction of meaning. In a sense, as I be- 
come able to bring more of the conversational qualities of my own experience into 
my awareness, I become able to engage in it more conversationally. My central as- 
sumption throughout, however, is that meaning is not only personally constructed, it 
is embodied. A "conductive" learning conversation is a conversation about the 
dimensions of that embodiment. It has all the basic characteristics of a learning 
conversation, but by taking explicit account of the conductivity of the experience 
from which I construct my meaning, it is a conversation about, and also in, action. 
Sustaining such a conversation in a way which is itself embodied requires leverage, 
and we can find one aspect of that leverage in an attention to the "psycho-mechan- 
ics" of our action. In a human individual, as a psycho-physically whole system, the 
psychological organization of an action is inseparable from its physical organization. 
Thus the physical factors will be present, either explicitly or implicitly, and will have 
consequences whether I take account of them or not. I take the term, psycho- 
mechanics, to refer to the psychological organization of "physical" action. In my 
teaching practice I sometimes refer to what we normally think of as a physical 
movement as the embodiment of a thought, or conversely, to a thought as the orgam- 
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zation of the movement. Either way I am attempting to draw attention to that conti- 
nuity in relation to which both mind and body, or thought and movement, are ab- 
stractions. Thus a psychomechanical approach to my action would include attention 
to my idea of what I am doing and the mechanical principles at play in carrying out 
the action. The personal meaning of the action may well exhibit dimensions which 
are not physical; they may be context specific, technical, aesthetic, emotional, social, 
spiritual etc. The study of the relationship between the psychological organization of 
an action and its mechanical organization is but a portion of being conductive, but it 
is a portion that has high leverage in practice because, as the phenomenologists have 
it, my body is my way of "being in the world. " So in what follows I am not claiming 
that the mechanicall anatomical or other such dimensions are in any way primary, 
merely that they are inevitable. Kelly's "alternative relativism" essentially is the as- 
sumption that while we are free to construe events as we Will, we cannot avoid 
construing them, nor can we construe them without consequences. If that is so of 
experience of my universe as a whole, it is true in an even more immediate way of 
my experience of my own self in action. The tacit assumption commonly made is 
that if the human organism has an underlying physical organization for movement, 
then that physical organization will operate naturally-and can therefore be ignored. 
Unfortunately, in practice, this assumption does not take into account the "middle 
management" problem of learned habit. Perception, especially self-perception,, is 
both relative and adaptive. What we perceive is always difference and change. In 
particular , if we perform some action in a routine way, we come to attend primarily 
to the sensory cues that tell us that we are doing it "properly" according to the rou- 
tine, as for example in the "interlace" conversation. Not only does this make us in- 
I orm the action sensitive to contrasts in the varying conditions under which we perf 
but because that associated feeling remains fixed, it too becomes invisible, disap- 
I erence with our pearing into the feeling of "normal. " Thus it is that patterns of 
natural self-organization in movement can persist. 
Dimensions of "Poise" 
Suppose that you are over-tensing the muscles of your neck and thus pulling 
your head back off its natural poise. Suppose further that you have become accus- 
tomed to this tensing and thus cannot perceive it. Suppose you had reason to suspect 
that this tensing was the source of some pain or discomfort and wanted to stop doing 
it. What would you do? You can, of course, do this deliberately; you can tense your 
neck and pull your head back. You can then 
deliberately stop doing it, precisely be- 
cause you know what "it" 
is. Try this and notice the differences you observe 
between the two conditions. Note that this is another "two card" situation,, except 
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that it might be a bit more difficult in that the implicit "third card" is even more 
implicit, being buried in past experiences to which you may not have been attentive. 
So it may be helpful to increase the contrast. 
Raise an arm over your head, or move it about, while pulling your head back. 
Continue this movement as you return to "normal" and notice any differences in the 
feeling or quality of movement of your arm. Most people prefer most of the second 
set of qualities over the first. Did you? Now note two things about your situation. 
You just produced changes that you liked, not by doing something, but by ceasing 
something you had been doing. Secondly, you could cease doing it because it was 
well defined in your present experience. Suppose, however, that the "normal" you 
have returned to still involves excess tensing, but tensing which is imperceptible to 
you because it is so familiar. If I suggest that you stop doing that, what are you to 
do? You have no immediate way to give concrete meaning to "that. " Precisely be- 
cause you know it so well, you don't know it at all. Indeed, the ultimate dilemma 
most people face in this situation is that while normal is so familiar as to be invis- 
ible, every other possible state carries the same meaning---ý'not normal. " Even worse, 
CC just since we have a strong tendency to avoid not normal" states, we seldom have ' 
those contrasts in our experience that might lead us to give it a more highly dimen- 
sional meaning. We find ourselves always in the situation of having drawn "one 
card, " and lacking anything with which to contrast it, we find great difficulty appre- 
ciating its meaning. As Dewey expressed it, "One may lead a horse to water but 
cannot compel him to drink. If one is unable to perform an indicated operation or 
declines to do so, he will not of course get its meaning. "10 We have already seen a 
way out of this, however-at least a way onto a path that leads out-back in the 
"interlace" conversation. By redirecting our attention from the two objects to the 
dimensions of similarity or difference between them, we begin to converse on an- 
other level. Each of the ways in which the two conditions above were different 
defines a dimension of the meaning of change. By attending to those dimensions, we 
can replace the intention to "stop doing that" with one to "change what I am doing in 
this direction. " 
Note once more your preferences among the ways in which your arm moved 
with and without the pulling of your head. For each of them, think about Ceven more 
of that. " This becomes a sort of outline for a concept. What you had before was a 
concept of normal and a concept of more than normal, but you were without a con- 
9ODeWeY, I Questfor Certainty (1947), cited in F. P. Jones (1976) Body Awareness in 
Action, Schocken Books, NY, p. 104. 
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cept of less than normal. Now you have a framework for moving in a new way even 
without such a concept. You have a means for moving, kinesthetically, into the 
Unknown. A note on the process: while I have been using words and talking "about 11ý 
the dimensions of what you are doing, you have been working directly with the 
qualities of feeling and moving. Thus for you this conversation is conductive. 
Let us take the process one step farther. Here is a bit of simple reasoning that 
Alexander engaged in early in his self-study. 91 You are working under the suspicion 
that when you feel normal and upright, you may actually be pulling your head back 
off its natural balance. If that is so then what feels like balanced uprightness to you 
is, in fact, a state of relatively rigid holding in a position which is behind such a 
natural balance. It is reasonable that if being back feels like upright to you, then 
actually upright would feel forward in contrast. As an experiment simply remind 
yourself of the supposition that you may be pulling your head back and not noticing 
it,, and decide to allow your head to move on the top of your spine in such a way that 
it feels just slightly "too far forward. " When Alexander attempted to produce a 
change by "putting"' his head what felt like farther forward than he was accustomed 
to he "overdid" it , and was 
forced to follow a much longer path to his discoveries 
than he might otherwise. So the key to the experiment is "slightly. " As you do this 
experiment you are, in effect, conversing conductively with the dimensions of your 
own kinesthetic perception. What requires close attention is the distinction between 
doing anything and simply giving consent for an unknown change leading to a spe- 
cific perceptual, dimensional result. One of the things that makes this task subtle, 
and perhaps quite difficult, is the distinction between quality and quantity of move- 
ment. One concept that I have found helpful in attending to this distinction is the 
idea of a kinesthetic afterimage. If I were to shine a red light at you for a long time 
and then switched it off, you would see a green afterimage. If you had not noticed, 
or had forgotten, the red light, you might be puzzled by the apparent sudden presence 
of green. You would probably not realize that the green was simply your perception 
of the absence of the red light. There is a kinesthetic counterpoint to this visual 
situation. if you have been pulling back for long enough that you no longer perceive 
it,, and then stopped, what would it feel like? It is possible for the sudden absence of 
unnoticed sensation of pulling back to be perceived as a forward movement, or 
sometimes as an odd sense of "forwardness. " No actual movement is needed and 
thus almost any amount of moving forward is too much. Of course, there is some 
mechanical effecti, just as a spring that has been compressed for some time will get 
longer when the pressure is removed, but this perceptual effect is often more dra- 
9'Alexander, F. M. (1932) The Use of the Se4f, Dutton, NY 
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matic. Thus the odd-feeling strategy of stopping a pull that I do not perceive by 
giving conscious consent to the afterimage, while withholding consent from any 
CC movement. " This would be as if we could switch off the hidden switch to the red 
light by giving ourselves permission to see green. Of course, it is always possible to 
see green by switching on a green light, but that would leave the red light unaffected. 
Page 2 of The User's Manual: two useful "'Tacts" and why they are important 
Suppose each of us came into the world equipped with a user's manual. 
After the "congratulations on your choice of a Self and we hope you have many pro- 
ductive and enjoyable years of use of it'" sort of thing on page one, we would likely 
find on page two some "useful facts to keep in mind. " Every instrument, - and the 
more complex the more true this is, functions best when used in ways that are consis- 
tent With its design. Instruments that are used "improperly" will not do the job as 
well, and if we persist in so using them can actually be damaged. Some instruments,, 
on the other hand,, are actually improved by being well used. Recognizing that these 
things are no less true of ourselves, we may find a few simple, empirically 
observable, facts about our own physical organization quite advantageous. Here are 
two such facts, one anatomical and the other "physiological. " 
Anatomical fact: Your head rests on the top of your spine , in such a way that 
it is more or less free to rotate forward or back at that point. 
A simple way to approximately locate this point is to place your fingers in 
your ears. The point where your head rest on the top of your spine is very near the 
centre of a line between your fingertips. You may make a rough test of the accuracy 
of your kinesthetic knowledge of this by observing yourself in a mirror while you tilt 
your head slightly forward and back on the top of your spine, with your fingers still 
in your ears. Notice whether your fingers move forward and back in space along 
with your head, or whether your head simply rotates around them. If they move , it 
is 
evidence that your kinesthetic idea of the location of the top of your spine is some- 
where lower. Of course, you can move from that lower point, but the organizing di- 
rections for the movement will not be quite consistent with the natural organization 
of the moving parts. This is more important than it might appear, because of the 
second fact. 
Physiological fact: The dynamic quality of the movement of your head in 
relation to its balance point on the top of your spine is a determining factor in the 
balance and the organization of muscular tone throughout the rest of your system. 
This is so simply because it is the first relationship to change whenever there is a 
change in the movement of yourself as a whole. 
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This organizing principle is easy to overlook, but it is really quite reasonable, 
as you have just demonstrated it in the experiment above. The spine not only pro- 
vides the primary core of support but, since the entire musculature of the organism is 
organized around its attachments to the spine, and since the limbs are also so at- 
tached, it is also central to balance and to the general organization of movement. 
Our skeletal, nervous and muscular systems are commonly spoken of as distinct 
systems, but from a functional point of view this is somewhat misleading. Together 
they constitute a single functioning system which simultaneously provides for the 
support, balance and movement of an individual. That general function provides the 
context in which any specific movement we make with any part ourselves takes 
place, and thus the quality of that general function is always involved in anything we 
do. What is more, in relation to it my whole coordination can be seen as an example 
of self-organization. 
Self-organization is large scale organization in the behaviour of a systetfi that 
emerges" from the structure of the system itself, that is, the expression of relation- 
ships already present and therefore not requiring the intervention or control of exter- 
nal mechanisms. A classic example of self-organization is found in the construction 
of termite mounds found in parts of Africa. When a group of Winged termites land, 
they each begin to gather soil and form it into balls of mud, using their own saliva. 
There is a pheromone in the saliva of these tennites that attracts other termites,, so 
that if two individuals happen to be near enough to each other they end up working 
on the same mud ball. Thus a greater density of termites leads to a larger ball, a 
greater concentration of the pheromone and thus a greater attraction to ever more 
distant termites. At some point, however, one of the growing balls reaches a critical 
size at which it becomes so attractive that all of the termites come and begin to work 
on it. Thus the collective behaviour suddenly becomes "organized" and a large, 
complex mound results. The significant point is that, both during the random phase 
and also during the highly organized phase, each individual termite is functioning 
independently, responding only to significant features within its own local condi- 
tions-in this case the local concentration of the pheromone. The organized 
behaviour of the whole population of termites is the collective expression of the 
relationship between each individual and its immediate conditions. Human coor- 
dination can be viewed as an instance of self-organization in a similar way. Each of 
my -parts" Will, if not interfered with, respond to its local conditions-including the 
needs of support, balance and movement within the context of my present intention. 
But the functioning of all of these parts together also contributes to the conditions 
faced by any individual part. Thus the coordinated action of the whole is a collective 
expression of the relationship between each part and its immediate conditions. No 
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external control mechanism,, nor indeed even an internal control program, is 
required. 
You can generate a simple demonstration of this phenomenon quite easily as 
follows: extend your two index fingers parallel to each other and begin to slowly 
move the two fingers from side to side. Gradually increase the frequency of this 
oscillating movement and notice what happens. As you increase the frequency you 
eventually encountered a point at which the coordination of the movement becomes 
unstable and then you suddenly found your fingers oscillating in opposition rather 
than parallel. There are two alternate ways of coordinating this specific movement, 
and the parameter which determines which one will be expressed is simply the fre- 
quency of the oscillation. The "parallel" organization is not sustainable at frequen- 
cies higher than a certain level; the parts will not move easily in relation to each 
other with the required speed. So the system spontaneously switches to the alternate 
mode. 
Now try it while pulling your head back. What do you observe? Are any of 
the dimensions of difference in what happens with your fingers similar to the di- 
mensions you found in earlier experiments? Once again the differences between the 
two conditions can be used to frame enough dimensions of an unknown third state to 
engage in conversation about it. To become skilled in the art of that conversation 
requires practice and discipline in attending to the details. 
The "Find Something I'd Like to Change" Conversation 
Here is a simple conversational structure that can be used both as a way of 
making small changes and also as a laboratory for small experiments with the rela- 
tionship between parts of yourself and your whole self Each time I play the inner 
"find something I'd like to change" game, I find myself entering a "task focused 
learning conversation" with the potential of opening onto a small scale "life conver- 
sation. " 
As you are most likely sitting, I have structured it that way. If you happen to 
be walking or doing something else while you read, please sit for a moment, or just 
do the experiment while walking. 
Step 1. Take a moment to observe the quality of "hoW' you are sitting, not so 
much the position or shape etc. of your sitting posture, 
but the quality of ease or 
effort, balance, pressure, comfort or discomfort and so on. 
You may notice certain 
parts of you that call attention to themselves as 
being a particular focus of effort or 
freedom, for instance., or you may be aware of a general quality. If you had to find a 
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single adverb that described the overall quality of your experience of sitting at this 
moment, what might it be? 
Step 2. Now, find some one thing within your observations that you would 
like to "improve. " This might be a particular place that is working harder than you 
would like or it might be a particular way in which you would like the overall adverb 
to be different. Most people who are asked this question immediately look for 
something "bad" that they want to make better, but note that it might just as well be 
something that you particularly like and would like to have more of that counts as an 
improvement. You don't have to be bad to get better. The significant experimental 
point is that your specific observation and your specific choice of a change of quality 
provide you With a concrete reference for observing change. It is a clear dimension 
of meaning in your bodily experience. 
Step 3. The hypothesis underlying this little experiment is that the specific 
change you have in mind is in some way related to general changes in the quality of 
your coordination in the act of sitting. So notice the quality of movement in the 
poise of your head in relation to the top of your spine. Decide to allow your head to 
be free to move (rotate) very slightly forward on top of your spine to facilitate a 
general "lengthening" release of tension in your whole spinal support. Don't "do"' 
anything. Merely give consent for that small change to happen in the movements 
that are already occurring. 
Step 4. Observe any changes in the particular place or quality that you chose 
in step 2. If there was a change, how did it compare with the change you had in 
mind? Perhaps it was the kind of change you wanted but very little of it, or maybe it 
was a different change altogether. Perhaps your reference didn't change noticeably 
at all, but something else happened that you hadn't anticipated. 
You have, in step 4, essentially reiterated step 1. So you may want to return 
to step 2 from this point, and continue the cycle of the conversation as long as it 
seems fruitful. If you experienced no observable change repeat the experiment with 
particular attention to two factors in step 3. First, be clear about your intention in 
allowing the slight change in the quality balance of your head in order to initiate the 
general change in the quality of your movement so that it can be, in turn, a context 
for the specific change you have in mind. Second, in case doing vs. allowing is not a 
clear enough distinction in practice for you, think clearly about "doing 
less" as you 
give consent to the change. 
There is a variation on this conversation that is useful when the desired 
change is "technical" in some way, 
for example if it is a certain musical quality that 
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you are seeking. In such a case think clearly, and abstractly, about just what 
technical qualities you want to have. Imagine the musical phrase or whatever the 
way you want it to be, completely disregarding any concern about how you might 
achieve it or even whether you are capable of doing so. If you could hire any 
musician in the world to produce the phrase, and they would repeat it an unlimited 
number of times until it met your requirements, what would they be? Now take that 
abstract idea of the sound or other technical product, and set it aside. In a sense,, 
forget about it but remember where you put it. 
Now go back to Step 3 above. Just as you notice that you are feeling a gen- 
eral sense of "lengthening" reach out and take up you abstract idea and give consent 
to it. Observe how the aspects of what happens matches your idea. It may be that 
you get some of what you want but not all. You can then repeat the process with 
special attention to the aspects that were not so clear the first time. It may also be 
that you do get what you thought you wanted, only to find that it doesn't satisfy. Be- 
cause the technical idea is explicitly abstract, however, you may find it is a much 
simpler matter than usual to "edit" it. Just as with the cards, being clear about the 
dimensions of the end that you desire, and distinguishing that end clearly from the 
psycho-physical process of bringing it about, allows you freedom to chose and 
achieve ends relatively unfettered by your habitual expectations. 
Conversations About Embodied Meaning 
While we have been conversing and experimenting with some of the physical 
dimensions of your experience, you might be wondering at this point just how this is 
related to the continuity of whole experience we began with. Life is not separable 
into physical acts, mental acts, acts with emotional meaning, acts with aesthetic 
quality and so on, though we often talk, and sometimes try to act, as if it were. 
When I speak of something physical, "physical" does not refer to a class of acts, but 
to a class of dimensions, to a set of qualities. Thus when I spoke of the relationship 
between a part of myself and the coordination of my whole self, I was not limiting 
the range to "physical parts" or to "physical coordination" but was referring to my 
whole self, in all its dimensionality. Every act is a physical act and a mental act and 
has emotional meaning and aesthetic quality; those are dimensions within the 
continuity of experience. Indeed, as Dewey said, the only place to find the unity of 
mind and body is "in action. " So as I said earlier, I am not claiming that these 
physical, or perhaps a better term might be bodily, relationships are in any way 
primary; they are simply inevitable. A phrase that Alexander liked to use is, "All 
together, one after the other. " It is mostly used to express something of the 
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cOmplementarity of quality and sequence in movement, but I find it open to a wider 
usage in expressing the conductive quality of experience that gives impetus to action 
in all of its dimensionality. "Transcending the obvious" is a phrase that Kelly used 
to express the openness to the continuing elaboration of meaning that lies just 
beyond the horizon of our present construction. The routine, robotic,, habits that give 
more or less rigid structure to our daily existence , in whatever domains they are 
played out, are quite concretely the embodiment of the obvious. Our task is ever to 
transcend it, and providing a conversational framework for that is the intent of what I 
call a conductive change conversation. 
Suppose that you were about to take a step and wanted to do so in a way that 
was less limited by your habitual conception of how to take a step, a way that was 
more consistent with the natural self-organization of movement. How would you 
proceed? What would you need to know and how would you go about learning it? If 
we consider your habitual way of taking a step to be the embodiment of your concept 
of "take a step, " then it is in terms of the dimensions of that embodiment that any 
new way Will have meaning. A way to do that which seems to provide a good deal 
of leverage is the" slightly too far forward" strategy we experimented with during the 
conversation about "poise. " It is a way of taking account, in action, of the "all to- 
gether, one after the other, " the dimensions of quality and sequence. By consciously 
attending to the quality of poise in that relationship, you are simply attending to the 
quality of the whole of the movement at its physical beginning. The relationship is 
no more important than any; it is merely the first one to change, and that is what 
gives attending to it such leverage. In a similar respect, when we attend to the 
physical dimensions first , it is not because they are any more important than any of 
the rest, but simply in commitment to my recognition of the embodiment of the rest. 
Though we may find it most convenient to construe the act of conceiving of, or of 
consenting to, a change in mental terms, and the act of making the change phys' 
cal terms, the meaning embodied in the act itself is not limited to them. Thus it 
makes no difference what kind of change we are contemplating. The full dimen- 
ollows is a simple conversational structure sional range is implicit in the act. What fi 
for engaging in such multi-dimensional change. 
The Conductive Change Conversation 
Step 1: Observe yourself in your present situation. Note two or three physical 
things about your present experience, the same sort of observations you made in the 
"find something you want to change" conversation. The rest of the process may be 
more convenient if you can give each observation a 
label. Notice in particular 
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whether any of your observations has any quality of direction to it. For instance , if You feel tension somewhere, does it make any clear sense to say that it is pulling 
"that way? " 
Step 2: Note two or three things about how you feel emotionally. 
Step 3: Note two or three things about your sense of the quality of your 
thinking or attention,, or about your sense of your relationship with your environ- 
ment, whichever seems most salient at the moment. 
Step 4: You now have six or more bits of observation of your present experi- 
ence that span at least three different domains. For each of them ask,, What is the 
"opposite" of this? How do I want to be different in relation to this specific quality? 
Again it will be convenient if you can label each of these contrasts. 
You began with perhaps the ultimate "one card" situation,, and with some 
care, you now stand in an at least six dimensional space that to some extent spans 
what you may normally think of as your physical, emotional, mental or social, self. 
As you did back during the "interlace" conversation, think about the contrasting ends 
of each of your six dimensions. Should you decide that you want to change, that is,., 
to become different, they are explicit dimensions of a new experience, an abstract 
coordinate system for locating what you mean by "different. " From this vantage, 
there is no strategic difference between giving consent to the change which is 
"taking a step" and giving consent to the change that is becoming "different" in this 
way, and the quality of the movement is equally subject to the condition of your co- 
ordination whether the movement is in ordinary "physical" space or this more 
elaborate space. 
Mentally place this set of contrasts "slightly to one side" and take note of 
how you are standing or sitting. You are about to perform a small experiment in 
conductive logic. The hypothesis is that if at the moment of consent you are doing 
nothing to interfere with your natural coordination, then the act of changing from the 
way you are, in all of those different ways, will be natural and unimpeded, just as 
taking a step would be. So the first priority is to bring about that condition of 
unimpaired coordination, and as before that is brought about by attending to the 
point in personal space-time at which the movement begins. 
Step 5: "Allow" your head to be free to rotate forward ever so slightly in re- 
lation to the top of your spine in such a way that it initiates a general release from 
any habitual holding that you may be doing. This "allowing"' is itself a skill., of 
course, so don't worry about how well you manage it, or even if you "get it wrong. " 
Whatever happens, and however slight the change, it may be cycled back into the 
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conversation. As this general pattern is in play, only specific actions whose quality 
and sequence are compatible with it are possible. So just as you begin to detect any 
effects of your general order, give active consent to the change you reasoned out in 
steps I through 4. Notice what happens. Observe where you seem to be on each of 
your six dimensions. Have you changed physically in the ways you chose? The 
magnitude of the change is unimportant at the moment, only the quality of it in 
relation to your dimensions. Have you changed emotionally? In other ways? 
The process of describing and commenting on the procedure has probably 
disrupted the process, so you will want to cycle back and repeat the steps in a more 
continuous way. You may choose to change "farther" in the same directions, or you 
may Wish to choose new ones. 
There are two keys to the whole process. Just as in the earlier case of 
choosing a card that was more to your liking, there are two phases to the process of 
intentional change in general. We require an articulation of enough dimensions of 
difference to provide us With an outline for giving consent to a move to an as yet un- 
known new state. It is what we face when we shop for a birthday present. 92 We 
don't know what we are looking for, yet we do know the person for whom the gift is 
intended., something of their likes, something of what we want the gift to express. 
The clearer we can be about these dimensions of the meaning in the context of the 
gift that we do not know, the more intentional we can be as we navigate our search. 
Also, whether we seek an appropriate present, a better card, or a more satisfying 
state of being, as we make concrete our abstract conception of our unknown destina- 
tion, the quality of the whole experience depends on the quality of how we undertake 
the j ourney itself. While a concept may be abstract, the act of conceiving and carry- 
ing it out it is not. The first of these has to do with the dimensionality of experience, 
the second with the continuity, and the conductive change conversation is a means 
for weaving them together. 
92For a discussion of this and other extended metaphors which I have found useful, 
and of the metaphorical quality of conductive conversations, see 
"A Metaphorical 
Tool Kit" which follows as an appendix. 
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"Is a Metaphor" Is a Metaphor 
We often understand things, events etc. "in terms of' other things, events etc. 
This "in terms of' refers not merely to the linguistic expressions, figures of speech 
etc. by which we refer to experience, but to the experience itself. It Is a reference to 
the dimensionality of meaning across domains of experience. Thus we can find 
metaphorical quality not only in our expressions of meaning about experience but 
also in the meaning itself, in our perceptions, our comprehensions., our anticipations, 
our actions. 
A metaphorical relationship can be viewed as a relationship between two sets 
of closely related dimensions of meaning in two different domains. It is not that the 
objects are related, or even that the dimensions of meaning are. It is the similarity of 
the relationships among dimensions across domains that constitutes the metaphorical 
connection. To get a picture of what I mean, think of a point at which a set of lines 
in various directions all intersect. The point is located on each of the lines-and there 
are relationships among the directions of the lines themselves (angles between each 
pair of lines etc. ). Now imagine a second set of lines,, in different directions and 
intersecting at a different point, but having similar relationships among their 
directions. It is this similarity of relationships between the two sets of lines that 
allow us to describe relationships within one set in terms of the other. This is the 
essence of a metaphorical relationship. It is the similarity of relationships between 
two domains of experience that permits us to comprehend (i. e. locate in a space of 
meaning) one experience "in terms of'the other. It is in this sense that the entire set 
of operations with the playing cards was metaphorical. Indeed, the dimensions of 
intellectual, emotional or kinesthetic meaning can be usefully viewed in this way, as 
metaphors for each other. 
I have been using metaphors as tools in my teaching for quite some time now, 
but I recall learning about their full conversational use from a particular instance of 
failing to do so. In the midst of a conversation about kinesthetic meaning the other 
person began telling me that she had been thinking of her head as a cloud. As this 
was not what I had just asked her to think about,, it did not answer my question and 
so I gently guided the conversation back "on track,, " and thus 
declined an opportunity 
to engage her meaning in a more immediate way. I later realized that I might 
fruitfully have asked just what it was about "a cloud" that made it seem a fitting 
metaphor for what she was trying to do. Metaphorical expressions,, our own and 
other's, are just that-expressions. They express, perhaps 
indirectly, or in summary, 
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several dimensions of meaning together. Thus a very useful way of engaging in a 
conversation about ordinarily hidden dimensions is to be aware of the metaphorical 
implications of what we say. 
Notice how you feel right now, placing no particular limit on the range of 
what "how you feel" might refer to. Pay special attention to the words you use to 
describe what you observe about yourself Do any of your words reveal the pattern 
of your construction of what it means to feel the way you do? For instance , if you 
said anything like, "I feel tension in my shoulders, " what sort of thing do you take 
"tension" to be? Is it a kind of stufP The kind of stuff, that is, that can be in part of 
you? How do you suppose it got in there? Distinctions between, for example, ten- 
sion as stuff that is in there and tension as something you are doing, are not trivial 
because they imply very different strategies if you want to be less tense. Notice any 
metaphorical usages in your description, and then see how far you can usefully 
extend any of them. Once you recognize a metaphorical relationship between two 
domains, elaborating the meaning in one domain can sometimes open the way to 
great insight into the meaning in the other. Of course, any metaphor can be pushed 
too far; otherwise it would not be metaphorical but simply two sets of labels for the 
same meaning. Sometimes there are insights into your meaning to be found at the 
boundaries where the connections weaken and break down. Exploration of these 
metaphorical relationships in your own experience, especially when one of the do- 
mains involved is "physical" can be a powerful means of elaborating the dimensions 
of personal meaning Without loosing the sense of concreteness in the experience. 
Conversation: Your meaning as a metaphor for my meaning 
One other important aspect of metaphor has to do with the metaphorical 
quality of communication. As we interact with each other we each must interpret the 
other's words and actions in terms of our own dimensions of meaning. Thus I make 
sense of your responses to me in terms of a system of meaning which is different 
from the meaning which that same response expresses for you. If however the 
relationships among each of our systems of personal meaning are sufficiently simi- 
lar-not the dimensions themselves, but the relations among them-then our meaning 
systems will be in a metaphorical relationship. I will continue to be able to make 
sufficient sense of your responses in my own terms to generate a response of my own 
which you in turn will be able to interpret in your terms, and so on. 
Thus we can 
remain in conversation, even though the meaning involved is personal to each of us. 
Shared meaning does not mean coming to the same meaning. 
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Self-Organized Learning as Personal Cybernetics: 
On Being One's Own Captain 
A metaphor, actually two related metaphors that I have been elaborating over 
the past few years, to express the relationships my students often deal with is I call 
my "Ship's Captain"" metaphor. One part of the metaphor relates to the captain's 
relationship to the sea, and the other his or her relationship with the crew. Both 
express aspects of the paradoxical nature of self-organized learning. Active and 
passive at once, both director and receiver of learning, the embodied self-organized 
learner is captain and crew and ship all at once. 
Sailing and "Selective Consent" 
A sailing vessel is entirely at the mercy of the wind and currents. Yet, by 
properly configuring the vessel itself, by giving selective consent to being at their 
mercy, the wind and currents will take the vessel where its captain wants to go. In 
general we are passive before natural forces-both outside and within ourselves-yet 
we have the ability to be active and make conscious choices precisely by recognizing 
the passivities. We are open to an essentially Taoist strategy of getting what we in- 
tend by giving selective consent to being at the mercy of various forces. We are no 
less passive before all the forces for our consent being selective, any more than a 
ship ceases to be at the mercy of the wind if the crew doesn't bother to trim the sails. 
The consent) however,, has everything to do with our own intentionality. And it is 
the ship itself that changes; it is the dimensions of our own embodied meaning that 
we change. 
This principle applies no less to the internal influence of my own habits as to 
any external forces. In fact, as Dewey pointed out , if I want to overcome my 
habits it 
is precisely my submission to my habits that I can use to accomplish this. I do not 
become non-habitual, but I set up conditions that determine which of my habits are 
going to have more effect than others. "The real opposition is not between reason 
and habit, but between routine, unintelligent habit and intelligent habit or art. 1193 
That is being at once completely at the mercy of the forces around (or within) me 
and at the same time intelligent and able to make choices. On the other hand, when 
one gives consent to any particular outcome one also gives implicit consent to any- 
thing that seems to be prerequisite to that outcome. As a common example, if I 
choose to stand up I may not wish to also tighten all of the muscles of my 
back. I 
may even engage in a deliberate attempt to stand without this tightening. 
Yet if my 
93Cited in Jones, p. 100. 
I a-3 
A Metaphorical Tool Kit 
habitual experience seems to imply that tightening my back is a necessary condition 
for standing, then I will do so whenever I decide to stand, and this in spite of all my 
best intention or effort not to. Thus it is important in what order of priority one gives 
consent. In practice,, I must find a way of making my refusal to give consent to the 
tightening a higher priority than my consent to stand up,. and I must maintain this 
unfamiliar priority all the way onto my feet. (See Imperial Permission below. ) 
Here is another small experiment. As you sit on a chair, notice the quality of 
your balance and support. Think about standing up and notice what changes. With 
enough practice you may be able to converse about the dimensions of the differences 
within the sitting when you are just sitting and when you are "about to stand. " Now 
actually stand up and notice what happens. What sense can you make of this event 
in terms of the dimensions you drew from your earlier conversations? Next begin 
again by sitting and this time do not stand, only move forward from the back of the 
chair. Explore this movement,, noticing what effects beginning it with attention to 
the quality of the very beginning has on the rest of the movement. Finally, move 
forward from the back of the chair,, not intending to stand,, but in such a way that you 
remain open to the possibility should you change your mind. You might think of this 
as just moving forward with an "option" to stand. Again with practice, and with 
your primary attention on the continuing quality of the movement itself, you may be 
able to "not stand up" all the way onto your feet. If something like this does happen 
where do you located the experience in relation to the dimensions you found in the 
"interlace" and "grace" conversations. 
This whole conductive approach becomes a sort of "personal cybernetics" in 
the literal sense of being at one's own "helm" (the word "cybernetics" itself deriving 
from the Greek for steersman). 
Captain and crew (the executive role) 
The traditional roles of the captain on a sailing ship are that of verifier of 
reality, by official recognition, and that of giver of orders. The captain's task is to 
know what is the appropriate order to give in a given situation, and to give it at the 
optimum time with sufficient clarity that the crew can carry it out with confidence. 
The captain does not attempt to help carry out the orders; that is the crew's job. 
The first mate has a role in communication between the captain and the crew: 
to inform the crew of the captain's orders, and to give the captain feedback 
from the 
crew about the ongoing work to provide information the captain may need in 
deter- 
mining whether and how to modify the orders. 
Things can go awry if the first mate 
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unilaterally takes on the additional role of telling the crew members how to carry out 
their tasks. 
The captain, upon discovering this difficultY, may be tempted to fall into the 
same error, either by becoming involved in carrying out her own orders or by at- 
tempting to dictate how they should be carried out. The captain is still best served 
by giving clear orders and then trusting the crew to their own skills. There may now, 
however, be the additional task of taking the first mate aside and reminding him of 
the limits of his own role, and to otherwise maintain conditions of organization in 
which the crew can in fact be trusted to carry out orders without further ado. 
This is a model of natural human coordination. The captain is the whole per- 
son in their intentional, executive function; the crew is again the whole person in 
their embodied "carrying out" function; and the first mate is the habitual self, with a 
preference for the routine and a tendency to run amok and try to exert control over 
everything. When the captain admonishes the first mate to stop interfering with the 
crew as they carry out her orders, she is engaging in what Alexander means by 
"inhibition. " "Awareness" is the first mate returning to tell the captain that her order 
has been carried out, sometimes in spite of the fact that the results of the order are 
readily observable. A sort of principle of "least awareness" operates, in that it is not 
the captain's job to know everything; she only needs the high leverage knowledge 
that leads to conditions under which she is free of a need for specific awareness of as 
many details as possible. It is not a matter of becoming more erconscious" in the 
sense of knowing and being able to control every detail. It is one of being 
"directive" of events below the horizon of control. In the sense of knowing every 
detailed of operation and how it is being carried out, the less she knows, the more 
smoothly the ship is running. So it is with human coordination. 
The Natural Corporation 
The natural corporation is another metaphor I sometimes use to express those 
same three functional roles in good, or poor, coordination. In a malcoordinated cor- 
poration it is middle management which has run amok and become overly involved 
with telling the workers how to do their jobs or even doing it for them. This is usu- 
ally accompanied by a failure on the part of the executive staff either to articulate 
clear orders or to maintain conditions under which the organization can 
function on 
Its own. What tends to follow is that some person or unit is not getting their particu- 
lar job done satisfactorily. If this is a vital function,, some other person or unit will 
be drafted to do that work. That is,, someone who is good at what they do, and 
largely because they are good at it, may actually enjoy doing it, is now doing 
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something they are not so good at-not very well-and suffering the double frustration 
of doing one job poorly and not having their usual reward of their own job well done. 
Meanwhile, of course, someone else has been drafted to do that Job, also not as well 
as they would be doing their own job, and so on throughout the system. 
At the opposite extreme is the model of a natural self-organized corporation. 
Suppose a group of diversely talented and creative individuals were simply given 
money and other resources and told, "Do something productive. " These individuals 
might then self-organize into a corporation in which each individual was free to do 
their best work under conditions that coordinated with the best work of their col- 
leagues. The collective work of this group would be beyond teamwork (the word 
team,, after all, derives for a term for draft animals which all pull in the same direc- 
tion), being rather more an ensemble blending their creativity together. It would be 
probable that something productive would follow, but it would be impossible to 
predict just what that might be. Normally a corporation has a specific mission; it is 
actually in the business of producing a particular kind of product. It is the function 
of the executives to decide and communicate the intended outcome of the collective 
work,, and then to promote conditions which look and feel to each individual worker 
as much like what they would experience in the idealized natural corporation as is 
consistent with the production of the product as specified. Management, again, has a 
two directional communication function. And again all of this is a model of myself 
as an individual , in which the workers are analogous to my 
"parts, " which in a well 
coordinated state are free to function as they will under their own local conditions 
without being interfered with by specific overriding commands from habitual middle 
management. Coordination may be defined as a state of inner democracy in which 
every part that has a contribution to make is free to make it. 
Principle of 111[mperial Permission" 
"The queen gives orders, but she does not help to carry them out. The Em- 
press doesn't need to give orders, she just gives permission. " 
I use this principle to illuminate the effortless quality of giving consent to 
change of whatever kind. It expresses a certain attitude of simple giving or with- 
holding of that consent. Imperial permission carries with it the implication that any 
of her subjects who can do something that contributes to the permitted object 
has 
permission to do so-and significantly, that any subjects who are currently 
doing 
something that would interfere with that end 
have permission to stop. What is 
-imperial" about the consent is that it is free of concern about the details of how the 
result is to be brought about. 
That is the concern of the "subjects. "' Indeed,, by 
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attending to the dimensions of what one wants, it is thus possible to give clear con- 
sent to something new without preconception of what that something will be. For 
instance, I may suppose that there is a quality of movement that is delicate enough to free me from a particular habitual tension and give consent to it in spite of my not knowing how delicate that is, let alone how to accomplish it. 
Jazz improvisation 
What we seek in many domains is enough similarity to be able to identify the 
present case as similar to some set of previous cases and at the same time enough 
difference to continue to surprise us. Such situations seem to be inherently attrac- 
tive. A good example is that of listening to jazz. Jerry Coker, in his book Improvis- 
ing Jaz_-, quotes from a letter from R. Browne of Yale, "the listener is constantly 
making predictions; actual infinitesimal predictions as to whether the next event will 
be a repetition of something, or will be something different. The player is constanth, 
either confirming of denying those predictions in the listener's mind. As nearly as 
we can telt the listener must come out right about 50% of the time-if he is too 
successful in predicting, he will be bored; if he is too unsuccessfal,, he will give up 
and call the music 'disorganized'.... Too much difference is sameness: boring. " So 
the task for the improviser is to maintain this what might now be called "fractal" 
relationship of self-similarity in which the audience's pleasure derives from the 
continuing state of sustained anticipation. 
The Birthday Present 
The search involved in shopping for a birthday gift is inherently paradoxical. 
We often do not know what we are seeking, and yet, since we know the person 
whose birthday is coming, what our relationship with that person is and to some ex- 
tent what we wish to express With the gift, we do know what we are seeking. There 
comes a moment when we find just the right gift and say, yes, that is what 1 have 
been looking for all along. Of course,, we could not have been looking for that. We 
may not have known that such a thing existed. Yet it is the thing for which we were 
looking. This is, of course, a very old problem, Socrates's "old philosophical joke. " 
The resolution of this paradox, which is a metaphor for the paradox of seeking a 
change when we cannot know in advance what we will change to, lies in the dimen- 
sionality of the meaningfulness of the thing being sought. Because of that dimen- 
sionality it is possible to give conscious consent to the unknown. We can know what 
It will be about the gift, or our new condition, by which we will recognize it as the 
one we want without knowing what the object which will have these attributes might 
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be. It is the clarity with which we can articulate those attributes combined with our 
ability to hold in abeyance our need to know what the object will be before we have 
found it that leaves us open to discovering the "perfect gift. ") 
Renaissance Art-the what and the how 
The word "how" as in "how will you do that? " has a double usage, meaning 
sometimes,. "by what series of what's, " and sometimes,, "with what quality. " We 
thus treat our action either as what we are doing or as what we are doing, that is, we 
treat the activity either as a noun or a verb. One interesting illustration of this differ- 
ence lies in the difference between Mediaeval art and Renaissance art. In Medieval 
paintings it was what was depicted that was important. As long as the appropriate 
saints and symbols were present to tell the story, how they were portrayed was of 
lesser importance. The Renaissance painters were fascinated with how they por- 
trayed everything; every detail of anatomy, light, colour and expression was of vital 
interest. The wonderful irony was that by giving priority to the how over the what, 
the Renaissance painters were able to portray the same saints, symbols and stories 
with much greater depth and beauty than had been possible earlier. Of course there 
are some very beautiful Medieval paintings, and the distinction did not appear sud- 
denly at the beginning of the Renaissance,, but it is a fruitful distinction even so. 
When my daughter was six, we had the good fortune to visit Florence. After strolling 
through rooms of Medieval and early Renaissance paintings of "Annunciation's" and 
"Madonna's",, we turned a comer into a room full of Botticelli5s. There was a 
beautiful "Annunciation" near the door and as we looked at it I remembered a simi- 
lar one we had seen earlier. I asked my daughter, "What's the difference between 
this one and that other one we saw before? " After some deep thought, she replied 
that the difference was that in this one you could tell that, "Mary knows that what the 
angel said was real and not just a dream. " That was the sense of reality that Bot- 
I ur own actions ticelli's attention to the "how" achieved. If we look at the quality of o 
in a similar way we find that a Renaissance character is open to us; here as well, 
when we make the quality of our means more important than our end as we conceive 
it, we can gain our end in surprising ways that are more beautiful than we thought 
possible. 
Swiss Rail 
A useful metaphorical model of coordination is the SWIss rail system. Not 
only does each train depart and arrive on time at each station 
(or nearly), but if a pas- 
senger needs to transfer from train A to train B, they 
find that train B has left its ori- 
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gin at such time that it arrives at the transfer station shortly after train A. To get 
from Zurich to Schwyz I must take the Lugano train and transfer at Zug to the Luzern 
to Chur train. Of course the Swiss trains are notorious for departing and arriving on 
time,, but what constitutes the "coordinated" character of the system is that not only 
does my train leave Zurich and arrive at Zug on time but that the second train departs 
on time from Luzern at such a time that it arri ive. ives at Zug very soon after I arri 
Thus the coordination of the system is not only a matter of each train's operation but 
of the interrelationship of the functioning of the various parts of the system. The 
trains are scheduled in such a way as to constitute a system, and that system. is not 
only organized, it is coordinated. It is a reasonable simulation of a self-organized 
system. When I consider my own coordination I find that I am a self-organized sys- 
tem that has that same quality of relationships among my "parts. " Indeed, I find a 
hierarchy of relationships among relationships. 
Sport as metaphor 
One of the easiest arenas in which to observe the continuity of action is that 
of sport. There is a wide range of effectiveness among players and in one player at 
different times. There appears to be an inverse relationship between the degree to 
which one would attribute the quality "natural" to a particular bit of athletic per- 
formance and the degree to which the performer can be observed to be interfering 
with their own coordination. Changes in the quality of thinking employed by the 
player are quite observable. When the major league outfielder runs down a fly ball,, 
we can literally see the moment when he concludes that he will not be able to reach 
it in time. Typically, his response to this conclusion is to muster a final burst of 
effort,, which often ironically causes him to shorten himself just enough to verify his 
prediction of failure. It is ironic because often the same dive without the shortening 
produced by his extra effort would have resulted in making the very spectacular 
catch he was after. It seems to be a common feature of daily life as well that the very 
effort we make to accomplish our ends actually limits our ability to achieve them. 
Indeed the very notion of effort is often counterproductive. As Alexander 
summarized the common situation,, suppose a person employs a certain means to 
achieve some end, and fails because the means were not sufficient or appropriate to 
the task. Rather than recognizing this fact and altering the means, what the person 
typically does is try again, only harder. This indeed is a socially valued strategy 
epitomized by, "If at first you don't succeed ...... 
Yet what it amounts to is nothing 
more than an amplification of same the inadequate means employed the 
first time, 
and they are still inadequate, only more so. Not only that, but the amplification is 
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accompanied by a second set of activities which serve the function of giving the per- 
son the feeling that they are making due effort. They know they are trying hard pre- 
cisely because they can feel the effort. What the person must do to produce this 
feeling of trying is in all probability far less suitable for gaining the original end than 
was the first ineffective means. In the end,. though the person has failed, they can 
enjoy the additional feeling of virtuousness for having "given it their best effort" thus 
avoiding noticing that they have acted unintelligently by persisting in following a 
course that has proven itself to be ineffective. Track and field is a good place to 
observe this phenomenon. Whatever the result of having competed using this prin- 
ciple of effort, the result is the feeling on the part of all concerned that the runner 
could have done better if they had only "tried harder. " There is an alternative prin- 
ciple available, however. Perhaps one of the best illustrations of that alternative in 
practice is a video of Florence Griffith Joiner's world record 200 meter run in the 
1988 Olympic Games. The picture shows "Flo Jo" out in front of the other runners, 
smiling, running very fast but with no evident effort. She simply seems to know that 
further effort would be pointless, that anything more she could possibly do would 
make her slower rather than faster, as can be seen quite clearly by observing the run- 
ners behind her, all of whom are makingjust such a counterproductive effort. As she 
crosses the finish line the commentators are reporting that when asked how she be- 
came able to run so much faster than before, she had said it was because she learned 
"to relax while I run. " It is clear from the video of the race that she did not mean the 
kind of passivity or collapse that many people call relaxing. She is working very 
hard, nearly as hard as she productively can, but without "effort. " Indeed, effort has 
sometimes been defined physiologically as just the kinestbetic perception of the 
muscular work that exceeds the actual needs of the task. The irony for most people 
is that we systematically build that feeling of extra work into our very concepts of 
our actions-as if to provide kinesthetic confirmation that it is we who are responsible 
for the results. In my teaching I have often had students who, when moving in such 
a way that they were not doing their accustomed great amounts of extra work, 
experienced a pleasant "effortless" quality but also a very disconcerting sense that 
they were not performing the action but that it was "just happening. "" They can 
sometimes find the experience quite frightening. But Flo Jo's case shows what the 
external results can be when a person gives up this need to feel that confirmation. 
These are just a few of the gradually elaborating metaphorical structures that 
1. have used in my teaching. They have been a laboratory space for experimenting 
with the relationships,, in practice, across a whole range of embodied meanings. 
Constructing one's own metaphors can provide useful tools for grasping-and 
exploring-the more general structure of one's system of personal meaning. 
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Appendix 2a: From The Videotape 
The following are descriptions of the videotaped sessions found on Appendix 
3a. Each begins with a brief setting of the context of the session followed by a nar- 
rative timeline which is intended to "tell the story" of the session in such a way that 
the viewer can find and follow the significant events. The first number at each 
paragraph is the time within the session. The second number is the cumulative time 
on the tape. 
1. Lynne 
Lynne is a massage therapist and a teacher of the Alexander Technique. I 
asked her to have this conversation primarily because I wanted to explore ways of 
demonstrating the conversational aspects of working With my hands that I discussed 
in the section on Teaching Practice. I asked Lynne in particular because from our 
earlier conversations I knew that she would be able to articulate her perception of 
what was happening. In order for this to be a real conversation, however, Lynne 
needed to have her own purpose. She chose a perceptual matter that she had been 
pondering, her receptivity to the sounds around her. As our conversation went on 
she came to find that her relationship with her auditory environment had its own 
conversational character. She was also interested the qualities present in the surface 
of the water of the lake outside her window, which afforded us the opportunity to 
explore the conversational quality of her experience of her environment across sev- 
eral domains. What follows is a narrative timeline of events on the tape. 
,0 min. 1 In the first six minutes I ia out what it was about the nature of fy 
the hands-on portion of the conversation I hope to illustrate and then we begin to 
explore her purpose with those features in the background. I bring up the qualities I 
hope to illustrate: conversational quality of hands, continuous questions,, vector 
questions, conversation without nouns and ask if she can relate them to her prior ex- 
perience. She does so, though she seems to find the last one a bit abstract at this 
point. As our two purposes wind together through the remainder of the session there 
are times at which each serves as a vehicle for the pursuit of the other. Indeed I find 
that the explicit laying out of my purposes in such a way as to provide a frame within 
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which to pursue her purpose seems to illustrate a common strategy in these sessions, 
both taken as a whole and at smaller scales within the session. 
116 min. II invite her to "forget" everything we've said and pursue her 
purpose. She finds that she has two. "I'm attempting to open out my auditory 
world ... and secondly I'm really interested in how water moves. " 
8 min. I This leads me to an indirect invitation to consider the idea of 
(. qualitative unity, " that is, that we might seek the same qualities in her kinesthetic,, 
auditory and visual experience, that she might find the qualities in her own standing, 
in the sounds around her, or in the water. I am pointing toward a dimensional view 
of action in which 
f 10 min. ) I invite her to "listen. " She reports a change in her "focus" 
and in her kinesthetic and spatial sense-which continue to change as she attends to 
them. 
11.5 min. II ask for a specific short term goal, and she replies that she has 
a lot of tension ... in my 
face area, and I can feel it in my eyes ... 
I'm doing more than I 
need to. " 
f 12 min. II use my hands for the first time to ask about the quality of 
poise of her head on top of her spine and the response of her upper torso-followed 
by an explicit question, "I'm wondering ... if I move this way, and you come along 
with me , if anything else 
happens. What's happening? " As she moves in response 
she notices a "wanting to get it right" though she doesn't know what "right" means. 
She does have a "kinesthetic reference point, of something light and easy, a sort of 
billowy feel, and being more to take in more information. " She agrees that this abil- 
ity may be a product of her own coordination, which leads us to a conversational 
view of openness to infon-nation. 
f 14.5 min. I Around the idea of conversation, she says, ". 1 think I have a lot 
of "organizing" which has a certain physical tightness... so there is a lot of screening 4z7- 
and holding out rather than shaping. " I suggest indirectly that this making of herself 
into "the appropriate listening device" is a preconception,, and invite her to listen 
without it-an experiment. 
f 15.5 min. I Another question with my hands: "Does it make a difference 
if you're moving 'this way' and decide to notice that bird ... 
how does the sound feel? " 
She replies that it has a blending quality, that "I feel as if it blends into who I am 
rather than enters through a doorway that I've agreed to form. " She readily accepts 
my claim that that is also a good description of the intention behind what my 
hands 
were doing. 
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17 min. An explicit "continuous question. " "I'm not 'doing' anything 
because I don't know what's right. I'm just saying if 'I go this way, what's your re- 
sponse? "' The question and the answer change as I ask. I move my hands to a new 
place, "so I can ask a different question, )*) which she clearly understands kinestheti- 
cally. As the question continues, its elaboration becomes a new question. Lynne's 
response is that the question "had more of the sound of a chime-expanding... " This 
expanding elaboration of my question and her answer embodies once again the con- 
versational nature of the interaction as the dimensions in her response provide the 
frequencies of an expanding question. 
f 19 min. I While continuing the conversation with my hands, I reframe 
my role as providing an external framework within which can more fully enjoy what 
she could accomplish on her own. We then draw a parallel between my hands as a 
reference and the floor, or the earth, in that role-not freedom in a vacuum but free- 
dom in relation to.... As I talk, she continues to experiment and observe. 
f2l min. 1A two part demonstration of "vector questions: " My hands are 
in the same place, moving in basically the same way, the difference being my inten- 
tion, the thought behind the question. Lynne's response, and her experience of it, 
demonstrate the complex vector quality of the interchange. 
f23 min. 1 We move (with a momentary renegotiation of purpose) to the 
question of the qualities of moving water in relation to the qualities of sound and 
movement we explored earlier. I ask, "How does the water look in relation to the 
field of sound? " She finds a similarity in the way in which, in the field of sound, 
"there wasn't one overriding note. " What I can see is that there is no one overriding 
note in her movement either. 
f 24.5 min. I Her difficulty in relation to the variety of qualities she finds on 
the surface of the take is that, CSometimes I move away from it because-I don't 
know how to let myself-take it in. " I suggest that she come back and begin with 
herself The next few seconds is a complex bit of dialogue in which I keep my hand 
on her head while we scan across the lake observing different qualities in the water. 
This continuous question seems to hold the kinesthetic and visual components of the 
moment together in a way that changes how she looks at the lake. 
126 min. I Some questions-with-the-hands are not translatable, as is the 
case at this point, but they can be readily comprehensible nonetheless. It is followed 
by a dimensional experiment, an attempt to find the same quality in movement and 
in visual experience. She found a quality of "depth" and "when I thought 'depth' I 
had a sense of myself much more clearly-through my whole torso-so it made my 
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previous experience of myself seem rather 'flattened, " although I had had no realiza- 
tion of that until the change occurred. " 
ý28 min. Hands again, to ask about the inner meaning of "depth" in re- 
lation to the visual meaning; we pursue for a moment the idea that that inner depth is 
the embodiment of the meaning which makes possible the perception of that quality 
in the outer world, although it may be finding it in the outer world that allows us to 
bring it back and recognize it in ourselves., Lynne agrees and notes, "and by that one 
experience my use of 'depth' is now changed. " 
129 min. I Once again I ask if there is anything she wants help with, giv- 
ing her the role of directing my assistance. She is concerned with some remaining 
tightness in her back. A "pretty big change" follows from a manual question at her 
mid back. As she puts it, "Your not doing anything really shows me what I am 
doing-and whether I want it or not. " There is a "spaciousness" with many directions 
within it. We look at how we can "make the whole thing clearer by attending to how 
it's expressed in one particular place. " 
31 min. With one hand on her back and one on her shoulder, I ask 
many questions in rapid sequence and she responses with a complex shift in her 
whole way of moving, which she is aware of but cannot translate verbally. It had "a 
continuous movement, almost a billowing sense to it ... once I started changing there 
was an agreement to go that was very easy. " 
33 min. The question comes back to the original one of how this way 
of being relates to her receptivity to sound. Lynne's own voice sounds noticeably 
different to her, as do other sounds. "It's more like being wrapped around by sound 
than being hit by different sounds. " 
f 34 min. I Taking things one step farther, we experiment with letting a 
clear attention to that easy way of moving be a context for attending to the surround 
of sound, and to any particular sound within it. She finds a wider choice among 
sounds that are "more pleasant. " 
t35 min. 1 Bringing the visual back in, I ask about how the water looks, 
and point out that this time Lynne does not tighten her face to "look. " Just as it is 
easy to be unaware of how we are doing things at the beginning, it is easy to not no- 
tice when we demonstrate in action that we have learned something. So pointing out 
a way in which her action is changed is merely another aspect of my role of provid- 
ing auxiliary perception. As she looks at the water, she 
is aware of how her relation- 
ship to her perception has changed. 
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'3 5.5 min. I I We conclude by reviewing our purposes and discussing the 
conversational qualities of what we have been doing. I put my hands on one more 
time as the manual channel of that review process, and then add in one more ques- 
tion that points beyond the session. 
13 8 min. I I With my hand on her lower back I ask her about her experi- 
ence of the relationship between what we have been exploring and her concept of 
what she must do in her back to resupport" herself. We notice that the water has be- 
come much calmer. 
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Truman 
This was about the third time I had seen Truman. His purpose was clear, 
specific and urgent. He had been within months of completing a novel, his publisher 
already gearing up its advertising campaign, when he found himself completely un- 
able to continue writing because of severe pain, primarily in his forearms. He found 
the idea, that the pain was the product of something he was doing as he wrote to be a 
useful one, and in the first few sessions had made noticeable progress in alleviating 
it. He actually set up a mirror near his desk to help him observe himself at the com- 
puter and wrote the steps in the process he wanted to follow on cards in front of him 
on the desk. He had in fact made enough progress that he was mostly free of pain 
when he was not at the computer, and could maintain a moderate amount of freedom 
as he "just typed. " What brought him to this session, however, was the sense of utter 
failure he felt when he attempted to bring that freedom back to the task of actually 
working on the novel. As he reports at the beginning of the session, he knows what 
he ought to do, but at the moment of truth he doesn't do it. Truman is imaginative, 
energetic, "full speed ahead. " Thus I found myself constantly maneuvering to stay 
ahead of where he thought we were going in the conversation, adopting a directive 
rather than an interrogatory style, at times setting up multiple choices or making de- 
scriptive statements for him to assent to rather than eliciting distinctions by asking 
questions. I continually proposed experiments for him to do and asked him to report 
his results, leading him step by step through the implications of the previous experi- 
ments. 
f 0/3 9 min. I As with Lynne, the first six to eight minutes are taken up with 
Truman laying out his situation as he sees it and my framing it in the context within 
which the conversation will proceed. Truman volunteers to act as a classic example 
of "what not to do. " He is indeed a classic example, but rather of a person who can- 
not distinguish between ways of going about his task that are different at a funda- 
mental level, and thus perceives his problem as a lack of will. ". J know this is 
good-and I don't do it. " I am essentially setting up a logical argument. Truman 
recognizes the first premise, that his discomfort is the product of his way of going 
about the task of writing. The second premise is that his immediate difficulty is that 
he cannot distinguish between different ways of going about it except, or until, one 
begins to hurt. Thus my proposition to him that it is not "simple perversity or lack of 
will power; it is a lack of discrimination. " 
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ý 3/42 min. I As a bit of support dialogue and to renegotiate our general 
strategy, I remind Truman. of what he has been able to do and what it implies for the 
Present task. He does know how to make the changes he wants-when he isn't writ- 
ing-but seems to lose that knowledge "in the lion's den. " He is a classic "endgainer" 
but he also has real reasons for being so. How can he follow a strategy of taking the 
time to let his means be more important than his end when his end is very important? 
16/45 min. Continuing to lay out the logic of hi III is current way of going 
about things, we come to the paradoxical strategy of making his attention to his 
means primary and his end secondary, precisely in order to improve the quality of the 
end. This requires a continuing conscious choice; the old choice is the unconscious 
default. 
18/47 min. I Truman sees as his real problem not the act of typing but the 
act of (. r creating, "' of solving creative problems having to do with his plot or charac- 
ters. His embodiment of his concept of the work of creating is clearly visible as he 
tells the story of his concerns and reveals something of the meaning that his tension 
holds for him in relation to his creativity . 
..... if I lose 'this"... would that really inter- 
rupt these light bulb times? " I challenge this connection,, again on "logical grounds, 
that is, by making the conductive logic verbally explicit. We are talking about the 
psychomechanics of creating fiction. This opening to the exploration of this psycho- 
physical frame introduces another premise in our "argument. " The act of creative 
problem solving is no less physical than the act of typing, and is thus just as much a 
matter of coordination. And thus Truman can use the same strategy that he has pre- 
viously demonstrated in regard to typing. 
11/50 min. If Truman expresses concern that his original physical symptoms 
seem to be returning. We engage in a bit of formal logic drawing out the implica- 
tions of the fact that they had gone away. This leads to a little "debate" about the 
necessity of the tension. Truman recognizes the improvements he made, and is 
willing to accept the possibility of bringing them into the task of creating, but has 
"never tasted creating and the smoothness. " This brings us back to our starting 
point. We might say that Truman has an unfortunate personal meaning for the con- 
cept of "creative tension. " I propose as our hypothesis the idea that the relationship 
to creating is the same as it was for sitting and typing; it is not the act that is the 
problem but his way of going about it. What he has to give up 
is relying on a certain 
associated feeling. 
f 17/56 min. I Truman buys the hypothesis but laments that he feels "like an 
alcoholic ... 
I have testimony with my teeth and my arms, you are right-but when I'm 
in it, I'm-totally oblivious. " This is precisely the need for consistent conscious 
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choice to attend to factors that may not seem related. This draws us into our formal 
experimentation. 
17.5/56.5 min. By inviting him to think about a real task relating to the real 
novel, I am framing his real present situation as a logical argument of the kind that 
we have been talking through. As he thinks about his characters in their situation, I 
ask him to observe where hefeels that. He takes this as an invitation to the present 
moment,, an invitation to engage in a moment of real problem solving. 
18/57 min. As Truman begins to consider his writing problem, he 
launches himself into the familiar physical pattern that embodies his concept of 
being creative. When I ask him to "notice what you are doing with your neck in or- 
der to remember, " he is able to describe what he had been unaware that he was do- 
ing. I propose that what he gets from. that tensing is the feeling by which he knows 
that he is "remembering, " although it is unlikely to contribute to the effectiveness of 
his memory. It is essentially a challenge to his robotic assumption of what it means 
to engage in an act of remembering. 
f 20/59 min. II briefly use my hands to engage him in a "secondary" conver- 
sation while he is verbally distracted by his explaining the nature of the problem he 
is working on. This helps him to move out of some of his tension before he goes 
back to the problem. My intent in doing this is simply to increase the contrast avail- 
able as he returns to it. In the midst of his working I ask for a report of how he feels 
different,, and he is able tell me in greater detail where he noticed the changes asso- 
ciated with his return to the problem. This is what I call Truman literally embodying 
the problem. 
f21.5/60.5 min. II suggest that there is something in the quality of how Truman 
is moving as he wrestles with the problem that is the embodiment of the 
"problematic" quality of the problem, and further, that that quality is observable. I 
can see that quality in his moving. I use this observation as a basis for arguing that 
the idea of Truman's psycho-physical unity has useful consequences. 
f 23/62 min. I if he is embodying his concept of solving a problem with that 
pattern of tension, then even when he engages in the "verbal tricks" designed to 
free 
up his thinking, he continues to carry that tension with him. The 
harder he tries, the 
more he does it in the old way. Truman has already demonstrated 
his ability to 
choose a more satisfactory way of moving that he 
found more graceful, easy etc. as 
long as he is not engaged in "writing a novel. " The question at this point 
is, "Is it 
necessary to not be writing a novel for three months ... 
T' Would three seconds be 
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enough? Thus we approach the matter of making attention to the means primary by 
small steps. He becomes easierjust by considering this. 
126/65 min. Truman observes that he feels freer, but then,, "Of course I 
panic right away ... and say, but David, of course it feels freer-because I'm not 
thinking about the problem ... 
but then how would I get the book done. " Here we are 
again at our starting point from a new perspective. I point out a strategy suggested 
by Dewey. When faced with the problem of an habitual pattern, since anything that 
we might do that seems related to the problem becomes just another stimulus for the 
old pattern, we need to find something to do that seems initially unrelated to the 
problemathand. This is what Truman has just done. 
12 8/67 min. I Because he has made this "unrelated ý111 change in hi s way of 
"just sitting" he has the opportunity to go back to the problem, but as long as he 
makes primary the continuation of the qualities he likes in that, he will be unable to 
solve the problem in the old way. Before setting up the next experiment I deliber- 
ately preframe the experience with a bit of fanciful dialogue with the feelings that 
will follow. "... the feeling will be... " 
f29.5/68.5 min. 1 Back to thinking about the problem: he catches himself in the 
act of tightening his forearm, which suddenly doesn't make sense to him. '. 61"y am I 
tightening here? I never thought of it. " Truman supposes that it is something he is 
"conditioned" to do. I suggest that it is a matter of meaning; the feeling of the ten- 
sion means that he is working on the problem. We engage in a series of experiments 
and observations. 
f3 1/70 min. I Throughout the last several minutes I have been "sneaking in" 
bits of work with my hands, and Truman has been getting generally more and more 
easy in his sitting. Having noted the connection between the meaning of the tension 
in his forearm,, I introduce the idea of multiple dimensions of meaning for the feeling 
of tension,, or its absence. Ordinarily I would do this by asking questions to elicit 
what a person might find in their experience of their arm, but in this case I have put 
it into a multiple-choice form, noting some kinds of things it might mean and elicit- 
ing only Truman's assent to each. At a verbal level I am being directive rather than 
overtly conversational, but the words I suggest are again mere labels. In order for 
Truman to assent, or not, he must seek a dimension of meaning in his experience of 
his own arm that corresponds to each label. Both the seeking and the finding of such 
dimensions are expressed in observable, though extremely subtle, effects on the 
quality of his moving. As my suggestions derive from my observation of these ef- 
fects, I would claim that at this point Truman and I are engaged in a real, conductive, 
conversation. 
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t32.5/71.5 min. ) Based on this experience of finding many meanings for the 
freer feeling in his arm besides only "not making enough effort to solve the prob- 
lem, " we initiate a new experiment. Truman catches himself beginning to tighten his 
neck,, and makes a fresh choice to stay with his original priority. I make this issue of 
holding to his priority decision explicit, especially the aspect that he is free to go 
back to doing it his old way in a moment if he wishes. This is done for two reasons; 
first it is in keeping with the "experimental laboratory demonstration" character of 
our interaction. It is like the sort of experiment students perform in science labs in 
which the format and the instructions for how to do the experiment are given. It is 
unlike many of them in that these are real experiments whose outcomes are unknown 
until they are performed. Secondly, making the reversibility explicit opens a 
working space in which, because any outcome is acceptable, true experimentation is 
possible. The actual experiment is engaged "hands on" in order to minimize losses 
in translation. 
t35.5/74.5 min. ) Truman reports a "floatingness" in his neck. I bring this 
physical observation back to the wider context by asking if there is anything like this 
"floatingness" in the problem when considered from where he is now. He decides to 
11 get back into it" and tightens slightly as he begins to do that. With my hands I re- 
mind him not to get back into it, but to consider it from the perspective of his new 
choice. We engage in several very small cycles of guided experimentation. He finds 
that he can mutter his way through a bit of the problem with a varying degree of at- 
tention to that new choice. He wonders if moving his neck helps him to keep the 
freedom. My reply, working with my hands, is yes,, in the sense that it "helps you to 
know what kind of quality that movement has, and that makes the choice explicit. " 
It becomes a concrete example of the chosen quality which one might seek to find in 
one') s torso, or arm, or in the problem. 
f 40/79 min, I Truman proposes his own experiment of cc non-verbally" 
thinking through the problem on his own. He looks as if he is in rather unfamiliar 
territory, but he is willing to persist with his experiment. There is also a quite no- 
ticeable difference in his sitting now compared with the beginning of the session. 
His "report of findings" is quite interesting. He went along for a while, then felt a 
moment of "panic" during which he thought that although this all sounded good to 
him, he would have to '. go back to the real world" of his own desk. He decided to 
bring his attention back to himself, however, and made a fresh choice. He then 
brought the problem back, and shortly after that a "new angle" that he hadn't seen 
before "wafted in. " I follow his observations with a review of the process from my 
viewpoint as a sort of public validation of his, again part of a support 
dialogue and a 
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post-framing of what Truman has accomplished in a way that may point toward his 
future work. 
147/86 min. II is k As we preftame the discipline of his future practice on hi 
own,, I work a bit more with my hands in the interest of his leaving the session with a 
clear impression of the quality that he has found. 
f 50/89 min. I Truman finishes with a new purpose: "To do this and come 
back to you with things that I found that are blocking it. " [He subsequently did this 
and has continued to progress through a series of little "crises" like this one. ] 
{51/90 min. I We conclude with my question about Truman's impressions of 
this whole process in relation to the question of discrimination with which we began, 
and his concern about his ability to continue the process on his own In his own 
world. 
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Miriam 
Miriam is a violinist who has also been teaching violin,, especially to chil- 
dren, for several years. She has also recently begun teaching the Alexander Tech- 
nique. Her work with me has been largely directed toward applying the technique to 
the improvement of her violin playing, but she is also always interested in how and 
why I do what I do as we work. In a recent session we had been exploring the conti- 
nuity between the dimensions of the quality of movement in her standing and playing 
and those of the sound and musical qualities she was after. This session was to be 
about the further conversational pursuit of that continuity, but when she arrived she 
noted that she was feeling restricted, both in her general sense of ease in herself and 
specifically in her ability to get what she wanted from her violin. She had worked a 
bit too hard while practicing the previous day and could feel herself carrying that 
overworking into the present. As she put it, she had never fully "put the violin 
down" after practicing. There are thus three levels of purpose evident at the begin- 
ning of the session. She wants to be free of the physical discomfort, free to play with 
ease and intention unimpaired by past tension and within that context free to make 
finer technical musical choices about the piece she is playing. 
f 0/93 min. I Miriam begins directly with a straightforward purpose. She 
had practiced a long time the previous night and feels as if somehow she had "never 
put [the] violin down. "') So she says, I can kind of do what I want to do,, but not 
quite. There is something in my way. " My perspective is that her kinesthetic ideas 
are mixed in with her musical ideas. This conversation is about how to separate 
them out in order to find a wider range of choice of ways of going about playing. I 
remind Miriam that she already has skill at attending to her playing within a context 
of her coordination, at making her coordination primary and the playing secondary as 
she plays. She recognizes that she has reversed this order and is thus stuck with a 
"package" of interfering tensions. 
f 2/9 5 min. ) As she considers this choice of priority the quality of her 
standing is already noticeably different. I ask her to play with that difference. She 
observes that her playing is "'some better. " So I ask what, in particular,, is better, and 
what she means by "some. " She replies that there was "less interference between my 
musical idea and what s actually coming out, " but that her hands are still cold and 
she can still feel that though she can do what she needs to, "something is not good. " 
This something is a "something in general" which seems to related to her having 
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played, a something extra that, since she didn't really need it, was all too easy to 
retain. 
t4.5/97.5 min. I The first experiment begins with my request that she find a 
quality in her balance as she stands which is the quality she wants in her playing, and 
also a quality which is what she had felt as restrictedness in her playing before. She 
finds these qualities and reports that they are "the opposite ends of the same things. " 
She has found a clear example of a dimension in her experience, with these two 
qualities defining points on a "line. " Her purpose now can be expressed as to move 
farther in one direction on that line, toward something which is more like one quality 
and less like the other. The experiment is to think of giving consent to moving along 
that line as an act, and using what she knows about allowing a change in how her 
head and body move as the way that act is to be performed. Her Alexander-based 
skill thus provides a means toward a specific, dimensional end. Miriam does this 
and reports that she does seem to have more of the quality she wants. 
f 6.5/99.5 min. I She repeats the procedure, using moving in that way as the 
initiation of her bow coming up. This movement is different, but she wants to re- 
serve judgment until she plays. But that is the "end. " I review what she has just 
done. The test of it, in her terms, will be whether she can continue it as she plays. 
The hypothesis is that if she does, that quality will be in the music as well. 
f 8/101 min. I The full experiment at this point is for Miriam to think about 
the musical version of that same quality, how she will know when she hears it-this is 
the same dimensional end in an extended context-to repeat the procedure of finding 
the quality she wants in her standing and then using that to initiate the movement of 
bringing her bow up, and then to simply think of the playing as the continuation of 
the same movement. I leave observation of the changes in her standing and her 
playing for the viewer. 
f 9/102 min. I She is "greedy. " She wants it all. The difficulty when she 
plays this game by herself is that she wants '. Call of it right away. " This leads us to a 
discussion of "altogether, one after the other"' in relation to the various "shortcuts" 
that we always seem to be seeking. (We did come to a more satisfying resolution of 
this discussion after the session. ) But I bring the question back to the playing, and 
specifically how it was less than satisfying, that is , if she played again and 
it was 
"better, "' how would it be specifically different. I am seeking a dimension of her 
meaning of better. 
f 12/105 min. ) Nfiriam finds the difference most clearly in a quality in her 
bow changes and in a musical quality she calls "depth. " I check to be sure that the 
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label clearly refers to a perceptual dimension in the sound. Miriam notes that "in 
physical terms ... I haven't brought my legs along. " We agree that bringing them 
91 alon would be another expression of more "depth. " This Is the idea of the qualita- 
tive unity of experience. Her musical idea, her auditory idea and her kinesthetic idea 
are distinct categories, but the same quality is present in each, and is indeed what 
knits them together into a whole experience. It is thus an attention to that single 
unifying quality by which she can organize her action in such a way that she can rely 
of the coordination of herself as a whole system. This idea leads to the next experi- 
ment, which begins,, as many do, with "think about ...... 
t 14/107 min. I "Think about "more depth"... what is it ... in the movement at 
the point of each bow change that would count as more depth. " The experiment is to 
repeat what she has done, with that thought in mind. The whole quality of how she 
brings her violin up is quite different-as is her playing. 
t 17/110 min. I The "hire any musician in the world7 game: I claim that the 
musical intention comes in at two points, before the act of playing-so there is a clear 
idea of what you want-and in the act of playing, at the very end. Having this inten- 
tion clear,, and not entangled with kinesthetic preconceptions about how to produce 
it, is a matter of abstraction. My little strategic game for being clear in this is to 
imagine hiring any musician in the world to play the piece, as many times as needed 
until they get it just the way you want it, and think only about how you Will know 
when they have, to think in purely musical, auditory etc. terms. Miriam plays this 
game, builds her musical idea and then sets it aside and attends to her coordination 
in the act of playing. I use my hands in the conversation to bring the movement di- 
mensions clearly to the foreground of Miriam's attention. 
f 19.5/112.5 min. I Minam plays With this idea and finds that the music had some 
parts of what she wanted, and not others. Of the important parts, she "missed one. " 
The next cycle is to think about that one missing part, that is, about the one way in 
which the playing would be different with that part in place. She is also aware of the 
aspect of her general movement that seemed to be interfering with it. So I suggest 
playing with the intention of moving in such a way as to allow that particular musical 
dimension to be more the way she wants it, while giving up any preconception of 
how that Will happen. 
f2 1/114 min. I Beginning by "finding" the quality she wants in her mid-back 
and her legs, Miriam performs one more experimental cycle. I continue conversing 
with my hands while she plays in order to help keep all of the dimensions present. 
With my hands on her knees I can feel when she is moving with the quality that she 
wants, though I do not know in any prior sense what that quality is. 
I only find out in 
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conversation, but that conversation also gives Miriam a reference frame in which she 
can make specific choices. It is significant at this point that she could have designed 
and performed this experiment entirely on her own. The utility of my assistance,, 
both in setting up the explicit experimental plan and in continuing the manual con- 
versation while she carried it out , is in increasing the resolution of the distinctions 
that she is able to make and the clarity of the experience, which I anticipate will bear 
their fruit as she reflects on the experience on her own later. 
24/117 min. We finish by observing how Miriam is in relation to her ob- 
servations at the beginning. She has succeeded in expressing her musical intention 
and at the same time her physical restrictions are no longer present. Her playing, 
both the qualities we can hear from the violin and those we can see in her movement 
as she plays, are markedly different from what was observable at the beginning of 
the session. 
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4. Penny, Part I 
Penny has a simple goal. She wants to feet more comfortable and at ease 
withherself, She has a job, as many people do, which makes that difficult to achieve 
with any consistency. Penny is much more comfortable than she once was,, and she 
has become gradually better able to perceive and articulate distinctions in her expe- 
rience. She can still be drawn into old patterns of tension by conditions at work but 
she is getting more skilled at drawing herself back out of them. This session was in- 
spired by an earlier one in which she found that she felt rather freer than usual across 
her shoulders and at the same time felt a bit of restrictive tightness in her legs. This 
provided an opportunity for an explicitly conductive conversation in which she wove 
concepts, perceptions and movements into a consistent logical structure in order to 
get more of the quality she liked. This session was not intended to be a recreation of 
prior one, but as she began with a very similar self-observation it is quite similar, 
though because we enter it with an awareness of what we are about there is a bit 
more reflection on the process folded into the process itself As we share an interest 
in the evolution of the method itself, the conversation has a rather more leisurely 
pace than it might otherwise have had. 
f 0/118 min. I FolloWing the pattern of the other sessions, the first five min- 
utes are given to setting up the framework for the conversation, negotiating purposes 
and making our working hypotheses explicit. Penny is aware of qualities of both 
freedom and restrictedness in herself as she sits, the one more evidently in her upper 
body and the other in her legs. I suggest the premise that her situation has a learned 
component, that is, that these qualities are dimensions of how she has learned to sit. 
5/123 min. The question "Where do you feel the most free? " begins a 
straightforward eliciting of specific dimensions as I ask Penny, essentially, to find 
meanings in different places. As the label for the underlying dimensions evolves 
from "free vs. restricted" to "free vs. closed down" to "widening vs. crunched" many 
of Penny's distinctions are expressed gesturally. This leads to a sort of disclaimer. 
7/12 5 min. II make explicit my distinction between meaning and labels, 
that what I am hoping to draw her attention to with my requests for labels is pre- 
cisely the distinctions in her perception by which she decides that a given label 
seems to fit, but that the meaning is always in the ways in which the feelings etc. are 
different; the labels are merely labels. 
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18.5/126.5 min. ) We clarify that the "pulling in" in her legs and the crunching 
in her middle is a matter only of geometry. This leads to a general sense of "pulling 
in toward the middle of myself, " which also has other potential, non-physical, di- 
mensions available. 
(10/128 min. ) Two more disclaimers: She need not include any of these 
other dimensions in her conversation with me, but is free to converse with herself 
about them if she wishes as we converse together about the "public" dimensions of 
her sitting. Secondly, though I may propose my own labels for what I think she 
means by something in an attempt to carry on our conversation, she ought not let me 
get away with using a label which does not seem to fit the dimension in her experi- 
ence to which I intend it to refer. This is about her meaning and she is in charge. 
f 11.5/129.5 min. ) I ask her to notice what she particularly likes about the quality 
of freedom in her upper body and to see if she can find that in her legs. This quality 
is "hard to find, " but it is present along with the quality of pulling. Her ability not 
only to find opposite qualities in different places, but to find them in the same place, 
reveals the dimensional character of the distinction. The presence of that freedom in 
her upper body provides an unambiguous example of its meaning which makes it 
possible to find it in her legs, where it is not so clearly present. As we converse 
about this "freedom, " I am being abstract, but she is not, having direct access to the 
original data of her own experience. 
Throughout this session it appears at a verbal level that I am carrying 
most of the conversation and much of her contribution is a series of nodding 
"uhuh's. " The "real" conversation, however,, is composed also of the redirection of 
her attention to inner dimensions in her experience and the changes in the quality of 
her movement. From this perspective my verbal descriptions are merely provoca- 
tions and benchmarks for that larger conversation. And it is not only her conversing 
with herself that is conductive in this way, but the conversation between us since my 
contributions are not responses to her expressions of assent, but to the observable 
changes which are the products of her inner conversing. Her task is to pursue a cer- 
tain conversation about her own meaning in such a way that she increases her level 
and range of choice in relation to it. My personal task is to find reasonable ways of 
articulating or describing what she is doing and how, and to do so in a way that is of 
present use to her. We are helping each other with our tasks by bringing them to- 
gether. 
14.5/132.5 min. I ask Penny about her awareness of her general sense of sup- 
port on the chair in relation to this dimension of freedom vs. crunching. She again 
finds both qualities, each more clearly in some places than others. Reminding her of 
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the skill she has attained in making changes in her coordination of that general sup- 
port, I propose an experiment: essentially to produce the change she knows how to 
produce, but keeping that particular dimension of freedom, which she has just made 
clear in her awareness, as reference. This little experiment is a concrete illustration 
of how it is that what we are engaged in is not the Alexander Technique but a syn- 
thesis of Alexander's work with Kelly"s. This distinction will come up later in the 
session. 
f 17/135 min. ) As a debriefing of the experiment, I ask three questions. 
Penny observes that there was in fact more of the specific quality she had in mind in 
the movement of her head and neck, from the lack of a sense of a "dividing line" 
between parts, she deduces the effect that the change had on her whole torso, includ- 
ing the part that had provided the prime example of that quality. 
18/136 min. These observations lead to a fourth question and another ex- 
periment. Building on her experience with that particular distinction between free 
and restricted, as embodied in the change that just occurred, she goes back to the 
same process, letting her head move "even more freely in that particular way, 17 and 
observing that the even freer quality actually is present. I then ask her to notice if it 
is also present now in her legs and to "recognize" it in the "parliamentary sense, )*) 
implying both perception and consent. As she does this the quality changes. She ob- 
serves that on the dimension of free vs. restricted her legs have become "30%" more 
free. These changes which she is feeling are extremely subtle, but they are visible. 
In a sense what I am doing, in relation to my purpose is recruiting Penny as a remote 
researcher, proposing experiments that only she can perform and listening to her 
findings. Care is needed here to ensure that her purpose rather than mine is primary 
in her experimenting. The significant point is that the immediate consequences of 
this primacy of her purpose are observable phenomena. I can see it being so. A 
further point is that it often happens that my little "digressions"' are serving the 
function of allowing time for Penny to carry on more of her own inner conversation 
uninterrupted while both of us are occupied at a conceptual level. 
f 20.5/13 8.5 min. I Penny checks back in with the original question of how she 
feels in general "just sitting. " She feels "freer and more open all over.... " She has a 
fuller appreciation of being freer in that particular way. I elicit further dimensions, 
"Are there any other ways in which you are feeling freer? " She notices that her free- 
dom has a "circular" quality, a sense of a fuller geometry. Her gesture seems to in- 
dicate a relationship between the freedom and her support on the chair, so I ask 
about this. She feels "lighter" and less "tight against the chair. 
" 
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t22.5/140.5 min. ) I ask if Penny has any questions about what we have been do- 
ing. She reviews what she has done and decides that it "makes sense" to her. But 
her "'whole legs still aren't coming along. " I suggest that CC maybe we need more di- 
mensions" to work with. Perhaps if one distinction leveraged some change, having 
several will leverage even more. 
124/142 min. I In a sort of "laddering" I ask if Penny can "take apart" the 
quality in her legs that she doesn't like. She finds a quality of "tightness" and one of 
"heaviness, " thus coming to a two dimensional view of the movement of her legs. 
The opposites of these for her are "openness" and "lightness. 17 From the way she 
says them these are clearly labels for particular qualities. I introduce another prem- 
ise, that while the new state of being that she is seeking can have these particular 
qualities because she has articulated, and thus can intend, them more clearly, it will 
also have its own integrity. It Will be a whole. What makes the exploration interest- 
ing is that as we intend certain qualities, the wholeness implies that what other 
qualities the new state will or cannot have, are unpredictable. It is by insisting on 
these predictions that we get into trouble when we attempt to change. Giving our 
allegiance to that wholeness,, and its implications, is part of our strategy. 
f 29/147 min. I We recall the specific qualities of freedom, the circular widen- 
ing, lightness and openness, not as isolated choices but in contrast with the qualities 
of crunching, heaviness and tightness. We don't know how she will be sitting in or- 
der to be more "that way. " But it is possible to give conscious consent to sitting in 
that unknown way. We have previously referred to this as the "Penny strategy. " In 
the present case the strategy is to think about these specific qualities,, to suppose that 
there is an unknown way of allowing her head and whole self to move that is suffi- 
ciently clear that her legs Will also clearly have those qualities, and then give consent 
to moving in that unknown way. I invite Penny to give the strategy a try. 
f3 1/149 min. I She does so,, and after several seconds of subtle change, feels a 
need to "move around. " We converse a bit about the implications of this 
felt need, a 
bit more support dialogue. Her whole general way of sitting, her relationship with 
the chair,, and especially her feet on the floor, are considerably changed since we 
be- 
gan. She looks much more at ease, and the quality of her expressions of assent 
to my 
comments is richer and more solid. She specifically notices that one 
leg seems 
"more willing to come along than the other. " This leads us to a more 
focused inner 
conversation, this time one leg "conversing with" the other 
in the way her upper and 
lower halves did earlier. 
f 32.5/150.5 min. I We begin by clarifying her awareness of how her "better" 
leg 
feels in relation to each of our working dimensions, and then noticing 
how her other 
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leg is different in regard to each. While she attends to the "negative" qualities in or- 
der to ask this last question, she begins to take them on in a general way. This is an 
instance of how an idea can be an organizing factor in action. If she can become 
4C crunchier" that easily, why can't she become freer with equal ease? The answer is 
that she could if she made the choice, but that habit is precisely the making of the 
other choice without being aware of having done so. 
f3 5/153 min. II describe the details of an experimental conversation and 
Penny carries it out as I do. By first attending to the specific qualities, the way of 
moving, that she wants and then giving recognition to her head, her torso and her left 
leg moving "that way, " she gets either a clear contrast between the observable quali- 
ties in her legs or she finds the qualities she wants more clearly in her right leg as 
well as her left. Then the deciding to let the right leg be more like the left is a matter 
of simple, unambiguous choice, and her attention to her general coordination sus- 
tains a clear context for that choice. As she carries out this experiment-and I can see 
her doing it-she finds that she is able to find more of her desired quality in her right 
leg, but is surprised by the way it comes about, not in the order that she had 
C 'orchestrated" in her mind. By being clear about her destination, she has been able 
to get there by an unknown path. 
f37.5/15 5.5 min. II expand the reference frame by asking how the relationship 
between Penny and the floor relates to the qualities she has just been observing. She 
finds some of the "pulling in" quality and also the distinct " concentric" squeezing 
quality. 
f 39/157 min. I Once again she experiences both of the qualities of several 
dimensions, making it evident that these are not separate qualities to choose between 
but the dimensions of the choice. 
f40.5/158.51 I invite her to be aware of each of her "this rather than that" 
choices and to give consent to those qualities, particularly in relation to the floor and 
the chair. 
42/160 min. Penny proposes that if she can get more of the particular qual- 
ity of lightness she wants in her relationship With the chair, she will 
be better able to 
experience that quality in her feet. I invite her to do the experiment on 
her own and 
to do her thinking "out loud. " She clearly demonstrates her skill with the process as 
she draws together much of what we have built up together. 
44/162 min. Referring to a quote from Dewey, I make an implicit 
invitation 
to a wider conversation about how what she has just 
done in relation to herself and to 
the floor extends to the quality of any other relationship. This 
invitation springs 
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from this session but also from other conversations we have had about her own wider 
purposes. It is a small set piece on the priority of attending to quality in relation. It 
also serves as a review of what we have done in the session. The general quality of 
Penny's sitting and listening, and of her gestures of assent, are quite different from 
what they were at the beginning. Her feet are calmly resting on the floor and she sits 
with a relaxed uprightness. There is a sense of clarity and specific reference to her 
responses to my comments. As I tell her again, "I'm talking about words. I'm being 
abstract, but you're not because you've got the original data that the words are just 
labels for. " It is observable that she has. This becomes a short discussion of how 
this original data is the basis for a "personal science. " 
(4 8/166 min. I We conclude the first part by checking back on where Penny 
seems to be, in her own experience, in relation to each of the dimensions we devel- 
oped at the beginning. 
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Penny, part 2 
ý0/169 min. 1 Penny and I have had a significant amount of fairly straight- 
forward hands-on experience with the Alexander Technique. So one of the most im- 
portant things about the preceding conversation is that it was entirely "hands-off " It 
was for Penny a demonstration of the extent to which she can make these improve- 
ments in her own terms and for herself Our conversation about how what she has 
been doing is, in a sense, the opposite of the Alexander Technique is a transition to 
the second part of our session. The focus of this second part is a simple question. - If 
Penny is able to accomplish what she has in that conversational way, without any 
manual assistance, then what is the relationship between what I do With my hands 
and what she has just done without them? 
{3/172 min. ) I recruit Penny and what she has learned in Part I to the task. 
Any decisions I might make about how to intervene with my hands would be empiri- 
cal "guesses" based on my observations. Though I have become rather skilled at 
such guessing,, in order to serve Penny's purposes she doesn't need to guess. So I ask 
her directly what she wants my help with. 
{4/173 min. I Penny finds that her overall sense of herself in relation to the 
qualities we have been exploring is that she is about "70%" where she would like to 
be. I relate this to the idea of "all together, one after the other. " The clarity of the 
beginning has much to do With that of the whole process of change. I suggest that to 
this point we have been rather casual about the level of detailed attention we have 
given to the beginnings. I have merely said, "You know how to allow your head to 
move With this quality ... "') and 
left the matter to her present level of skill, which is 
evidently about 70% of what she requires. We might pursue a conversation about 
that finer level of detail in the same form as we have used, and I suspect she would 
be able to make further progress. 
5/174 min. I invite Penny to engage in that conversation later, whenever 
she chooses to take the required time. But for the present I offer the shortcut of us- 
ing my hands to provide a reference frame that allows her to make more sophisti- 
cated distinctions sooner. 
f 7/176 min. II invite Penny to recruit me to her purpose by telling me spe- 
cifically what she wants me to do With my hands and with what intention. She 
draws 
on her past experience to ask that I put my hands on her neck with the intention of 
enhancing an "opening up" rather than "pulling in" quality. I accept 
her request on 
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two accounts, first that the scale of the change at the beginning is so fine that it is 
easy to miss the distinction unless the reference is clear enough, and second, that as 
she had noticed earlier, the path toward the change may not be the one that one ex- 
pects and thus one may miss the choice of taking it. 
f 9/17 8 min. I As I begin to place my hands on Penny's head and neck I 
make a distinction between giving her the other 30% of discrimination, which I will 
not do, and providing a frame of reference against which she will be able to -find it 
for herself, which I will. So that her experience of my hands will be in the context of 
the dimensions of the change with which she is already familiar,, I ask her to notice 
something in herself that she wants to change, and what it is about that change that 
will make it satisfactory. This is entirely in her dimensions. As I bring my hands 
back to her neck,, I ask her to decide that she wants that particular quality or set of 
qualities to be present in the movement there, and at the same time to recognize that 
we don't know what the combination will be. 
110/179 min. 1 She moves with more like 90% of her desired quality, report- 
ing that, "That was very nice-I didn't realize I was moving that well. " I make the 
side observation about the aesthetic reward of what we are doing. When my hands 
are in contact with her and she is moving that way, we both can enjoy the aesthetic 
quality of that movement. I continue conversing with my hands and she continues to 
respond with an ever finer quality of movement. In terms of the general methodol- 
ogy of learning conversations, this conversation between hands and movement is a 
micro-scaled version of "talkback. " 
f 11/180 min. ) My next question is, "how is it different from what you 
thought it was going to be? " Penny replies that she has found a new dimension, 
which she labels "smooth" vs. "rusty. " I ask if the smoothness is present in her 
lower half also,, and she finds that it is as she moves. 
112/181 min. ) Since one of her particular issues was the quality of her feet on 
the floor, I note-while conversing foot to foot-that as the movements involved are so 
small,, the presence of the smoothness can be quite exquisite. This also provides a 
very fine reference for smoothness as I go back to her neck. 
"Maybe more 
smoothness is the other 100/&--in order to then ask, (is my 
foot resting on the floor 
smoothly? 1) " 
f 13/182 min. ) Penny finds this quality is (cso minute that it's difficult to 
de- 
tect, " but decides that "it has some of the quality of smoothness, 
" more than a mo- 
ment ago, which provides a dimension for further choice. 
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14/183 min. Having asked what Penny wanted next, I bring my hands back 
to her neck. She decides that she wants to be "lighter" and immediately becomes so. 
I bring my hands to her shoulders and arms in order to draw her attention to the 
"lighter" quality from her head and neck to other parts of herself, particularly to her 
arms, which have not been as fully included in her attention as they might be. I bring 
one hand to her shoulder and the other to her knee as I ask her how she is feeling in 
relation to the earlier sense of "pulling in toward the centre of herself. " This 
provides an expanded context in which she can respond, and she finds that she no 
longer has the sense of pulling in. In response to my request for general questions or 
observations, Penny notes that her left side, where my hands had been has the 
qualities she wants more fully than does her right side. 
115.5/184.5 min. 1A note on my perspective at this point: it is Penny's dimen- 
sions of meaning that make it possi fect on the quality ble for my hands to have an ef 
of her movement. It is in relation to her dimensions that the movements of my hands 
can be, for her, meaningful questions. Using her left arm and leg, and my hands, as 
references,, she is able to allow more of the change she wants in her right arm, and 
then leg. As her right arm moves through space,, it is also "moving" in the Aristote- 
lian sense of becoming more like her left along the particular dimensions of interest 
which she is attending to. The one movement is a vehicle for the other. My hands at 
this point are both inviting the movement of the first kind and giving external rec- 
ognition to the movement of the second kind. As I first place my hand on Penny's 
leg, there is a clear, but small change, and I ask her if she noticed it. The change it- 
self, in response to my hand, was already evidence of her ability to distinguish the 
qualities involved. The point of the question is to confirm that she is, in a sense, 
aware of knowing what she knows. It is a conscious change. 
f 17/186 min. ) Recalling what Penny said earlier about the order of a change 
not being the one she had expected, I find a quality in her response that seems to be 
associated with the direction in which she expects the movement to proceed. This is 
one of my empirical guesses, which I test by bringing her earlier discovery into the 
present. Thus we make explicit our "psychology of the unknown" by giving con- 
scious consent to an unknown path while attending to the dimensions of meaning of 
the intended destination. This verbal conversation is abstract, but the more direct 
conversation between my hands and her leg make the matter quite concrete at this 
moment. Indeed it appears that Penny's conscious recognition that she is consenting 
to the unknown sharpens her awareness of qualities of the change. 
f 18/187 min. I As Penny continues to elaborate the change in her leg, and the 
rest of herself, in conversation with my hands, I bring the verbal conversation 
back to 
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our starting premise that the clearer we can be about the dimensions of choice the 
easier it is to choose. But we have discovered the dilemma of the choice that we 
cannot know before we have made it. This leads us back to the paradoxical open 
permission we have been experimenting with, to be clear about the dimensions by 
which we will recognize the change we intend and, recognizing the integrity of the 
change, to consciously consent to whatever other dimensions of change may be re- 
quired. There is "danger" in that consent, but if I know what I want I may be willing 
to accept it. 
119/188 min. 11 conclude by bringing us back to the other basic premise, that 
the wholeness of Penny's response, the wholeness of the change, will have as its 
foundation the wholeness of Penny herself and her coordination. I bring my hands 
back to her head and neck,, renewing that channel of the conversation so that we are 
conversing across the whole spectrum toward a clear conclusion. 
f 20/189 min. I Finally I ask Penny about her middle torso, which had been 
her initial best reference for the quality of freedom she sought. She finds that "it's 
no longer ahead of the rest of me. The rest of me has caught up. " As I look at her I 
can see that indeed she has. 
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Appendix 2b: From the Audiotape 
The conversation recorded on the audiotape (Appendix 3b) took place over 
two meetings in the early spring of 1995. It was intended as a reflective retrospec- 
tive of the work that Ann and I had done together over a five year period,, with a par- 
ticular focus on the general question of how her purposes evolved. On the tape Ann 
tells the story of those five years from her point of view, how and why she first came 
to work with me,, how she discovered wider applications of what she was learning, 
and the even wider applications she hopes to make in future. As is often the case in 
our conversations, there is also a good bit of my own attempts to articulate my per- 
spective as well as some sharing of little treasures, such as interesting books etc., that 
we have each come across. I confess to being somewhat hesitant to include the 
entire conversation in raw form,, and being tempted to edit out my own musings. I 
have left it as it stands,, however, because it was a genuine conversation in which 
Ann turned every digression to her own ends, with comments beginning something 
like, "Yes,, and that is just why ...... I believe that in its full form it captures a 
bit of 
the conversational flavour of our particular ongoing interaction. This tape is also 
quite different from the videotaped sessions on Appendix 3a in that it is a recollec- 
tion of past work rather than an illustration of present work. It is thus broader in 
outline,, and consequently this discussion of it less detailed. Its character is rather 
more anecdotal than illustrative. Its importance lies primarily in giving the listener a 
sense of the shape of our work together over time as Ann's sense of her own pur- 
poses evolved. 
The conversation is loosely organized around a set of questions which I ask 
Ann, although she shows a consistent knack for saying a good deal about each suc- 
ceeding question before I ask it. There also seem to be two levels of discourse 
weaving together, a general level of talk about "how purposes evolve" and a more 
personal level about the elaboration of her own. 
Side one: 
0-10 min. - I begin side one by introducing my general question of how what one 
thinks of as one's purpose expands into something else over time and my need to 
address this question in terms of psycho-physical wholeness. 
Ann identifies herself 
as 4ra perfect example"' of such a process. We 
have a bit of a general discussion of 
the purposes people bring to their interactions with me, and the 
difficulty of main- 
taining a balance between leaving them free to be self-organized in the 
long run and 
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ensuring enough concrete positive results in the short run so that there will be a long 
run. She then gives the early history of our encounters, recounting how it was that 
she first came to one of my classes and how that first interaction affected her. 
10-20 min. In response to my question about what it was in this early experience 
that brought her to come for lessons, Ann recalls that she had an Initial primary 
physical purpose-to find relief from a stiff neck. Beginning with this intention to 
deal With her physical discomfort and anxiety-she describes herself as "suffering 
from the mind-body split"-she started "coming for a patch"' of lessons every so 
often. She found two sorts of things happening early on. One was that she recalled 
having experienced on rare occasions a sense of wholeness., a kind of "feeling in my 
body" that she was now beginning to experience as a consequence of something we 
were doing "on purpose. " The other was that she began to become involved with an 
organization of parents concerned about the curriculum in their local school district, 
and she was finding herself gradually better able to handle the delicate and stressful 
situations that arose. Again in response to my question, when and how she first be- 
gan to discover that what we were about was Wider than she had thought, she re- 
counts the story of her rewriting of the initial public statement of the group and her 
recollection of the experience of being able to do a calm and invitational job of it de- 
spite the stress of the situation. This was when she began to realize, in the achieving 
of it., that what she had originally come for had been to "'put the physical and emo- 
tional together in the practice of doing something. " 
20-45 min. - The rest of side one is a recollection of how she came to see,, on the 
one hand how she was learning something that she could do for herself-she clearly 
recalls the time when I said,, having just suggested a certain release as she lay on the 
floor,, "Now, you don't think I did that, do you? " and beginning to believe that she 
really was capable to making the changes she valued-and on the other hand how that 
something was what she calls "the queen of the sciences" which she elaborated and 
applied in her endeavours ranging from the politics of the parents' group to her own 
parenting to getting the greatest benefit from the yoga classes which she began to 
take. There follows a, for the two of us, typical bit of conversation ranging over the 
religious roots of over-effort to the sexual dimensions present in everyday interac- 
tions to the lesson in which her young son's laughter taught her how Powerful and 
subtle learning really is. As she says at the end of side one, 
"Again, that's the work, 
that's the learning, starting off saying, 'I've got a stiff neck' and ending up with a 
very different meaning of what the conversation was all about. 
" 
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Side two: 
0- 10 min.: Side two begins again with the question of how Ann's purposes, or 
her awareness of them, changed over time. Her initial purpose was simply relief 
from sometimes painful tension, but she was vaguely aware from the beginning that 
there was more to it than that. She describes her continuing work with me as at first 
a purely id generated activity. " As she recounts her progress, she came to find her- 
self not only "moving more freely" but being freer; not only did her "muscles feel 
better" but she became calmer,, less nervous and able to "make better choices about 
what I want to do. " Her learning went beyond the physical to the contexts of what 
she thought she should be doing in her life. She found herself "moving to a different 
level of ought, a different basis for making choices about what to do and how. She 
reports that in the midst of the many difficult things she had to do the previous week, 
she found that she was better able to do them effectively when operating at this other 
level. But she finds that what she is also learning that while it is good to be able to 
be definite about what needs to be done , it is also useful to be able to let go of it and 
find that there are other courses open. As she describes her perception, "If you have 
a jellyfish for a backbone you can never get a proper spine, but if you have a well 
determined spine you can soften up as much as you like and you will never turn into 
a jellyfish. " Sometimes the idea of great change can be upsetting, seeming to imply 
either that there was something wrong with you if you needed such change or that 
the new state is a delusion of some sort. But on balance,, Ann finds, the sense of in- 
creased freedom she found has great value for her at many levels. 
10-20 min.: Returning to the question of the awareness of purpose, she agrees that 
it seems to be the case that, as she had a sense early on that there was more to it than 
the merely physical purpose she had come with, and part of her purpose was to find 
out what that wider purpose might be. It seems to us that we have been engaged in 
an exploration, in part a search for the hidden dimensions of her original purpose , in 
part a quest for new purposes. We talk about this matter in terms of the "birthday 
present')' metaphor. In this way we have pursued an exploration that revealed pur- 
poses that were implicit from the beginning but which Ann could not have admitted 
to at that time, if she could have seen them. I ask where she might want to explore 
next, and Ann replies that what she has been learning in the physical, emotional and 
social dimensions of her life lead her to want to explore its consequences 
for her 
spiritual dimension. She is interested in how the spiritual 
dimension of experience is 
embodied in the physical and the social. Recalling an early 
lesson in which she had 
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reported finding it difficult to do the reading she intended to do about the work, she 
draws a parallel between spiritual practice and what I said then about reading,, (It 
doesn't have to be a set aside. " She had found it impossible to make time for her 
reflecting Without setting it aside, but had gradually learned to spread it throughout 
her day. She finds that spiritual practices seem to have Just this sort of relationship 
to daily life. The difficulty is in the nature of habit. 
20-30 mm.: We recall an earlier insight that there is no such thing as the "force of 
habit, " that habit is a probability rather than a force. As Ann puts it, "at any given 
moment we have the freedom to choose if we know how. " The word "habit" at root 
means something that we "hold onto. " It is not that we are forced to; we just do. So 
we find an expanding purpose in playing With the boundaries of habit and expanding 
them into ever wider dimensions, and also, as Ann points out,, to more clearly 
appreciate their interplay. This leads us to another old metaphor of mine, the defini- 
tion of "to concentrate" as "to make concentric, " that ISI to put ever more circles 
around a common centre. Thus while the obvious place to put the spiritual in one's 
attention might be at the centre, because it is most important, actually-because it is 
most important-we need to place it at the edge, on the widest possible circle. What 
goes at the centre is our own whole coordination as we embody the spiritual in our 
daily life. At one point in this discussion Ann observes that, "fundamentally the 
most important thing that I can do for my children is live my own beliefs, " and it is 
clear that this is a statement about her embodiment of the spiritual dimension in the 
physical and the emotional-social. 
30-45 min.: Ann recalls that from her perspective the intellectual dimension has 
been ever-present, though more or less prominent. She remembers having been ac- 
cused of being either too intellectual or two emotional. What we have been about is 
conversing beyond the very idea of the split between them. We have been exploring 
the continuity of thinking and feeling. We recall a particular instance that incorpo- 
rated this continuity, in which we intentionally "bought into" the idea of splits 
between mental, physical and emotional, and pretended to deal with the physical as 
something separate , just as a way of gaining 
leverage in making a change. 
In the last few minutes we weave together some of the loose threads 
and some purposes of my own that are emerging at this time. I raise the question of 
natural conditions, and the strategy of finding ways of bringing about conditions un- 
der which what I might want will come to me easily, rather than working directly to 
get it. Ann finds that we have often been about just that kind of strategy. She gives 
an example of how she used it on her own in the context of the internal politics of an 
organization. She is working through the conditions of the whole organization and 
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its purposes rather than confronting a particular difficult board member. In response 
to my lament about the difficulty of bringing what we have been exploring together 
to a wider world and to larger contexts, Ann observes that, "when people have an 
experience of it, they see how valuable it is. I mean, it's like it becomes 'the pearl 
above price. "") 
Ann has continued to occasionally come "for a patch, " has added starting her 
own business to her list of contexts, and continues to bring the most interesting and 
wide ranging set of specific intentions of any of my students. 
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There are two questions about the videotaped conversations in Appendix 3 
which, although addressed indirectly may still require direct attention: Are they 
Alexander Technique lessons? and Are they Learning Conversations? 
The first question may be answered with a brief yes and no. Large portions 
of them, and the variety of sessions which they represent are my answer to the 
question, What would an Alexander Technique lesson look like if the pupil is 
assumed to be capable of some degree of self-organized leaming? On the other hand 
they are not such lessons in that the skill that is the aim of the Alexander Technique 
is simply developed as a tool towards a different end. Indeed, as Penny found, it is in 
a sense the precise opposite of the Alexander Technique, though in being such they 
still constitute personal explorations of Alexander's "new field of inquiry. "' 
The second question may be best answered by illustration. Thus I will 
reconsider two of the videotaped sessions,, with Truman and with Minaml explicitly 
with respect to this question. I have chosen Truman's session for this 
reconsideration because, as he is the least skilled of my subjects, the distinct threads 
of the conversation are more observable. He also has a clear simple purpose of his 
own, which makes this session more typical than some of the others. Miriam's 
session, involving as it does a learner who is more skilled in the process, represents a 
more "advanced" stage. It is both more clearly task focused and at the same time has 
clearer and more generalized learning focused elements. 
On the pages that follow the left column is the same commentaries on the 
tape as in Appendix 2a. As in Appendix 2a, the first number in braces is the time 
from the beginning of the session and the second is the cumulative time on the 
videotape. The right column is a meta-commenta in terms of the elements of the ry 
Learning Conversation. Moments in the session which represent phases of the 
Personal Learning Contract, or the MA(R)4S heunstic, or of the three levels and 
three dialogues summarized in section 11.2 are highlighted. it should be noted that 
ions proceeded, they although I had the conversational aspects in mind as these sess' 
were not formally organized as "leaming conversations. " There was no formal 
learmng contract etc. Thus although I have identified events that represent various 
elements of the process, it may be more precise to view them as recurring themes 
within the conversation rather than as separate phases etc. This is of course not 
unusual in a learning conversation, where a given sentence may 
be simultaneously 
viewed as part of process, support and referent 
dialogues. 
it is worth keeping in mind that the model of learning conversations is 
implicit in these sessions rather than being used explicitly. This is so in large part 
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because the sessions are structured as demonstrations of aspects of a certain way of 
working rather than as true "raw data. " One important result of this in relation to the 
present task is that mapping the model onto the sessions is much more straight- 
forward than the other way round. That is, while it is relatively easy to Point to 
various events and say, "This is process dialogue" or "This is the second R of the 
MA(R)4S heuristic,., " it is less easy to fit the flow of the whole session into the 
model. The immediate question then is, what is it about the conversation that does 
not fit, and how is it related? As discussed in the main text,, the bringing together of 
the dimensionality of personal meaning and the continuity of personal action in 
conversation requires a conversation with a kind of fractal quality in which the 
conversational character is repeated on varying scales. In a sense the final Intent is 
to take the action-reflection cycle to a sort of mathematical "limit" of reflective 
action. But that leaves the question of the nature of this process vis-d-vis a learning 
conversation as such. The best answer that emerges from this consideration of these 
two session in particular is that the added consideration of "conditions, " whether as a 
stage of the Personal Learning Contract bridging the Purpose and Strategy stages, or 
as a fourth dialogue, is the entry to a new level of Referent dialogue. In general the 
referent dialogue is directed toward the task of constructing a frame of reference in 
which the learner can evaluate performance and learning in ways not bound by the 
limits of their initial model, that is a frame for evaluating learning which itself 
incorporates the learning. These conversations, proceeding as they do on the 
premise that personal meaning is embodied as well as constructed, are directed in 
part toward the construction of a reference frame appropriate to the personal 
conclusions that can follow such a premise. 
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(0/39 min. I As with Lynne, 
the first six to eight minutes are taken 
up with Truman laying out his situ- 
ation as he sees it and my framing it in 
the context within which the conver- 
sation will proceed. Truman volun- 
teers to act as a classic example of 
"what not to do. " He is indeed a clas- 
sic example, but rather of a person 
who cannot distinguish between ways 
of going about his task that are differ- 
ent at a fundamental level, and thus 
perceives his problem as a lack of Will. 
ý` 
... 
I know this is good-and I don't do 
it. " I am essentially setting up a logi- 
cal argument. Truman recognizes the 
first premise, that his discomfort is the 
product of his way of going about the 
task of writing. The second premise is 
that his immediate difficulty is that he 
cannot distinguish between different 
ways of going about it except, or until,, 
one begins to hurt. Thus my proposi- 
tion to him that it is not "simple per- 
versity or lack of will power; it is a 
lack of discrimination. " 
f 3/42 min. I As a bit of sup- 
port dialogue and to renegotiate our 
general strategy, I remind Truman of 
what he has been able to do and what 
it implies for the present task. He 
does know how to make the changes 
he wants-when he isn't writing-but 
seems to lose that knowledge "in the 
lion's den. " He is a classic "end- 
gainer" but he also has real reasons for 
being so. How can he follow a stra- 
tegy of taking the time to let his means 
[We set up an over all PLC for the ses- 
sion, negotiating task and purpose. 
This is already a Spiraling from our 
previous "contract,, " as Truman re- 
flects and interprets the outcomes of 
his efforts to put the earlier strategies 
into play in his work situation. ] 
[This is an explicitly offered recon- 
struction of his record of his experi- 
ence and a step in clarifying the 
purpose for this session. This is a 
challenge not only to his "competent 
robot" but also to his construction of 
the event of his failure. It also pre- 
frames the "Conditions" phase 
inserted into the Personal Learning 
Contract. j 
[This bit of review of the previous cy- 
cle is an intersection of process, sup- 
port and referent dialogues, as we 
establish the frame for the -present 
process, provide support for Truman's 
following a strategy of taking the time 
to let his belief that he is capable of 
meeting his task-that being to employ 
what he learned last time under the 
pressure of his work situation-and also 
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be more important than his end when 
his end is very important? 
begin to establish a framework for 
evaluating his learning in this session. ] 
f 6/45 min. I Continuing to 
lay out the logic of his current way of 
going about things, we come to the 
paradoxical strategy of making his at- 
tention to his means primary and his 
end secondary, precisely in order to 
improve the quality of the end. This 
requires a continuing conscious 
choice; the old choice is the uncon- 
scious default. 
18/47 min. ) Truman sees as 
his real problem not the act of typing 
but the act of "creating, " of solving 
creative problems having to do with 
his plot or characters. His embodi- 
ment of his concept of the work of 
creating is clearly visible as he tells 
the story of his concerns and reveals 
something of the meaning that his 
tension holds for him in relation to his 
creativity. 
lose 'this'... would that really 
intenupt these light bulb times? " 
[We make explicit a meta-strategy of 
giving his strategy priority over his 
purpose in his attention. This gives 
the whole process a tightly spiraled 
shape as we change levels, sometimes 
moment by moment. ] 
[Taking explicit note of the difficulty 
of this continuing meta-task is a re- 
curring thread of support dialogue. ] 
[It is noteworthy that each time Tru- 
man puzzles about his difficulty, he 
tightens himself in much the same way 
as he does when he works on his 
novel. He is slightly, but observably, 
less so when he thinks about what he 
learned about not tightening-as long 
as it is abstracted from the task of 
writing. ] 
[Truman's account is a clear step to- 
wards the life conversation level as it 
reveals the relation between his evi- 
dently physical starting point and his 
underlying concept of what it means to 
be a creative person. At the task level 
it reveals his underlying model of the 
act of creating. This is also part of the 
Conditions phase of the PLC-I see my 
task as bringing these conditions of 
how he is Cc using himself' in the act of 
writing explicitly into the conversa- 
tion. ] 
[The 'this' he refers to is an important 
piece of vocabulary in his developing 
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I challenge this connection, again on 
"logical grounds, 11) that is, by making 
the conductive logic verbally explicit. 
We are talking about the psychome- 
chanics of creating fiction. This 
opening to the exploration of this 
psycho-physical frame introduces an- 
other premise in our "argument. " The 
act of creative problem solving is no 
less physical than the act of typing, 
and is thus just as much a matter of 
coordination. And thus Truman can 
use the same strategy that he has pre- 
viously demonstrated in regard to 
typing. 
t 11/50 min. Truman ex- 
presses concern that his original 
physical symptoms seem to be return- 
ing. We engage in a bit of formal 
logic, drawing out the implications of 
the fact that they had gone away. This 
leads to a little "debate" about the ne- 
cessity of the tension. Truman recog- 
nizes the improvements he made, and 
is willing to accept the possibility of 
bringing them into the task of creating, 
but has "never tasted creating and the 
smoothness. " 
personal language for being conver- 
sant regarding psycho-physical condl- 
tions. ] 
[This logical ploy is another intersec- 
tion of all three dialogues. It brings us 
back to the tutorial level by reestab- 
lishing the task-focus, but in a way 
that keeps the connection to the wider 
level open. By reiterating the spiraled 
applicability of strategies Truman has 
already demonstrated, it also provides 
support so that he can persist with the 
process in the face of the perceived 
difficulty. The argument becomes a 
"process model" for a conversation in 
his wider personal language. I would 
almost want to regard this as part of a 
fourth, "conditions dialogue, " related 
but not identical to the process dia- 
logue. ] 
[Making the logic of tense = creative 
explicit, construing creating as a 
physical act, and considering the im- 
plications of the tension having "gone 
away" are all process dialogue-again 
using a spiraling of what he has al- 
ready teamed to challenge his initial 
construction at the next level. ] 
[Truman's inability to observe 
'creating' and 'smoothness' together 
precludes his being able to Monitor his 
performance in relation to the di- 
mension represented by his earlier 
'this. ' Truman re-articulates his pur- 
pose in terms of the dimensions of his 
self-observations and in light of what 
we have found about his concept of 
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This brings us back to our starting 
point. We might say that Truman has 
an unfortunate personal meaning for 
the concept of "creative tension. "I 
propose as our hypothesis the idea that 
the relationship to creating is the 
same as it was for sitting and typing-, it 
is not the act that is the problem but 
his way of going about it. What he has 
to give up is relying on a certain 
associated feeling. 
f 17/56 min. ) Truman buys 
the hypothesis but laments that he 
feells "like an alcoholic ... I 
have testi- 
mony with my teeth and my arms, you 
are right-but when I'm in it, 
I'm-totally oblivious. " This is pre- 
cisely the need for consistent con- 
scious choice to attend to factors that 
may not seem related. This draws us 
into our formal experimentation. 
f 17.5/56.5 min. ) By inviting him 
to think about a real task relating to 
the real novel, I am framing his real 
present situation as a logical argument 
of the kind that we have been talking 
through. As he thinks about his 
characters in their situation, I ask him 
to observe where he feels that. He 
takes this as an invitation to the 
present moment, an invitation to 
engage in a moment of real problem 
solving. 
-creative tension. "' It is a product of 
his reviewing our previous cycle. It is 
also the link between our previous 
tutorial conversation and our longer 
life conversation. ] 
[I propose the hypothesis to frame this 
purpose as a leaming task which we 
can pursue in psycho-physical terms. ] 
[This also illuminates the need for the 
ongoing conditions dialogue. ] 
[The experiment and report back form 
of this and much of what follows is 
based on a Truman-as-scientist model 
of our process. ] 
[Setting up the experiment with the 
"real situation" is an opportunity foir 
Truman to begin to learn to monitor 
physical dimensions of his action in 
real time. For me the patterns of effort 
he employs in accepting the invitation 
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f 18/57 min. I As Truman be- 
gins to consider his writing problem, 
he launches himself into the familiar 
physical pattern that embodies his 
concept of being creative. Wben I ask 
him to "notice what you are doing 
with your neck in order to remember , 
he is able to describe what he had 
been unaware that he was doing. I 
propose that what he gets from that 
tensing is the feeling by which he 
knows that he is "remembering, " al- 
though it is unlikely to contribute to 
the effectiveness of his memory. It is 
essentially a challenge to his robotic 
assumption of what it means to engage 
in an act of remembering. 
120/5 9 min. II briefly use my 
hands to engage him in a "secondary" 
conversation while he is verbally dis- 
tracted by his explaining the nature of 
the problem he is working on. This 
helps him to move out of some of his 
tension before he goes back to the 
problem. My intent in doing this is 
simply to increase the contrast avail- 
able as he returns to it. In the midst of 
his working I ask for a report of how 
he feels different, and he is able tell 
is as much a conversational response 
as anything he says. ] 
[Truman's way of tensing to carry out 
this experiment illustrates the psycho- 
physical nature of the process we are 
engaged in, and the ma*or reason why 
an acting and then reflecting process is 
not entirely adequate in this domain. 
After the robot challenging bit of 
process, my observations act as a ref- 
erence frame for Truman's evaluation 
and elaboration of his own obser- 
vation's. Also once again this is the 
conditions dialogue, as what Truman 
"does with his neck" is a part of the 
conditions Within which he carries out 
what he conceives of as "remem- 
bering. " These conditions are 
incorporated into a wider, embodied 
concept of "remember" and so I 
repeatedly endeavour to make these 
connections explicit. ] 
[Every time I place my hands on Tru- 
man we are engaged in process dia- 
logue. The interaction between my 
hands and his movement is at each 
moment a challenge to his kinesthetic 
assumptions. It also provides a refer- 
ence frame for an embodied recon- 
struction. ] 
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me in greater detail where he noticed 
the changes associated with his return 
to the problem. This is what I call 
Truman literally embodying the prob- 
lem. 
f 21.5/60.5 min. II suggest that 
there is something in the quality of 
how Truman is moving as he wrestles 
with the problem that is the 
embodiment of the " problematic" 
quality of the problem, and further, 
that that quality is observable. I can 
see that quality in his moving. I use 
this observation as a basis for arguing 
that the idea of Truman's psycho- 
physical unity has useful conse- 
quences. When he observes himself 
in the middle of it now" I ask him to 
report how he feels different. 
23/62 min. fl If he is embody- 
ing his concept of solving a problem 
with that pattern of tension, then even 
when he engages in the " verbal tricks" 
designed to free up his thinking, he 
continues to carry that tension with 
him. The harder he tries, the more he 
does it in the old way. Truman has 
already demonstrated his ability to 
choose a more satisfactory way of 
moving that he found more graceful, 
easy etc. as long as he is not engaged 
in "writing a novel. " The question at 
this point is, "Is it necessary to not be e 
writing a novel for three months ... 
T, 
Would three seconds be enough? 
[These moments are small entries into 
a leaming-to-learn conversation as he 
demonstrates his gradually increasing 
ability to monitor and interpret di- 
mensions of his own process. The 
immediate changes may seem uncon- 
scious,, but the intent is not the 
changes themselves, but rather the 
contrasts which enable Truman to 
become conscious of the underlying 
distinctions. ] 
[This is a kinesthetic equivalent of the 
analyze and record phases of 
MA(R)4S. ] 
[This is a bit of referent dialogue. As 
Truman monitors his action he finds 
himself able to be aware of differences 
in the psycho-physical dimensions and 
begins to use them to evaluate the 
quality. His observation that thinking 
about the problem "in this way" is an 
indication of his becoming aware of 
his own kinesthetically monitored 
model. ] 
[This is a bit of spiraling to a new 
view of some of Truman's writing 
strategies. It is an early step in a 
psycho-physical leaming-to-learn con- 
versation,, bringing new dimensions of 
an old strategy into his awareness. ] 
[We explore the potential of building a 
new strategy from Truman's construc- 
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Thus we approach the matter of mak- 
ing attention to the means primary by 
small steps. He becomes easier just by 
considering this. 
f 26/65 min. I Truman ob- 
serves that he feels freer, but then, "Of 
course I panic right away ... and say, 
but 
David, of course it feels freer-because 
I'm not thinking about the prob- 
lem 
... 
but then how would I get the 
book done? " Here we are at our 
starting point but from a new perspec- 
tive. I point out a strategy suggested 
by Dewey. When faced with the 
problem of an habitual pattern, since 
anything that we might do that seems 
related to the problem becomes just 
another stimulus for the old pattern, 
we need to find something to do that 
seems initially unrelated to the prob- 
lem at hand. This is what Truman has 
just done. 
f 28/67 min. ) Because he has 
made this "unrelated"' change in his 
way of 'Just sitting" he has the oppor- 
tumty to go back to the problem, but 
as long as he makes primary the con- 
tinuation of the qualities he likes in 
that, he will be unable to solve the 
problem in the old way. Before setting 
up the next experiment I deliberately 
preframe the experience with a bit of 
tion of "not writing" so that he can re- 
cruit what he had learned while not 
writing at an earlier stage in the proc- 
ess. Here we are in a gray zone 
between Conditions and Strategies, 
exploring the strategic quality of "non- 
doing. " The way the "choice you 
know how to make" is recruited also 
exhibits aspects of the support dia- 
logue. ] 
[This is part of the referent dialogue as 
Truman reflects and reviews his obser- 
vation in relation to his larger purpose. 
In a sense the key to the whole conver- 
sation is that it is what gets lost in any 
spiraling that we are most interested 
in. Thus each bit of spiraling up is 
followed by a conscious return to the 
process dialogue at the task-focused 
level. ] 
[Each little experiment that Truman 
performs is itself a small PLC. He 
takes the frame and protocol of the 
experiment as his purpose and strat- 
egy. The hypothesis frames antici- 
pated outcomes in question form. As 
he carries out the experiment, he 
observes its outcome and then evalu- 
ates and reviews it in terms of the con- 
struction from which he drew the 
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fanciful dialogue with the feelings that 
will follow . 
..... the feeling will be... " 
ý29.5/68.5 min. ) Back to thinking 
about the problem. he catches himself 
in the act of tightening his forearm, 
which suddenly doesn't make sense to 
him. "Why am I tightening here? I 
never thought of it. " Truman supposes 
that it is something he is 
4;,. conditioned" to do. I suggest that it 
is a matter of meaning; the feeling of 
the tension means that he is working 
on the problem. We engage in a series 
of experiments and observations. 
f 31/70 min. I Throughout the 
last several minutes I have been 
"sneaking in" bits of work with my 
hands, and Truman has been getting 
generally more and more easy in his 
sitting. Having noted the connection 
between the mean-Ing of the tension in 
his forearm, I introduce the idea of 1 
multiple dimensions of meaning for 
the feeling of tension, or its absence. 
Ordinarily I would do this by asking 
questions to elicit what a person might 
find in their experience of their arm,, 
but in this case I have put it into a 
multiple-choice form,, noting some 
hypothesis. This review leads to the 
framing of a new hypothesis and a 
new experiment-the next PLC. These 
experimental cycles may be as brief as 
a few seconds, and although they are 
often non-verbal and internal,, they are 
nonetheless observable. One of the 
things that I must keep constantly in 
mind is that it is the "meaningfulness" 
that I observe and not any particular 
meaning. ] 
[Truman discovers himself doing 
something for which his model of his 
own action cannot account. A robot 
has been challenged and he finds him- 
self in the trough and in need of new 
dimensions by which to make sense of 
what he is doing. ] 
[This manual process dialogue may 
appear to be a matter of eliciting un- 
conscious change in Truman's way of 
sitting, but his responses-movement 
and verbal-indicate that he is increas- 
ingly aware of the dimensionality of 
these changes. ] 
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kinds of things it might mean and 
eliciting only Truman's assent to each. 
At a verbal level I am being directive 
rather than overtly conversational, but 
the words I suggest are again mere 
labels. In order for Truman to assent, 
or not, he must seek a dimension of 
meaning in his experience of his own 
arm that corresponds to each label. 
Both the seeking and the finding of 
such dimensions are expressed in ob- 
servable, though extremely subtle, 
effects on the quality of his moving. 
As my suggestions derive from my ob- 
servation of these effects., I would 
claim that at this point Truman and I 
are engaged in a real, conductive, con- 
versation. 
f 32.5/71.5 min. Based on this 
experience of finding many meanings 
for the freer feeling in his arm besides 
only rrnot making enough effort to 
solve the problem, " we initiate a new 
experiment. Truman catches himself 
beginning to tighten his neck, and 
makes a fresh choice to stay with his 
original priority. I make this issue of 
holding to his priority decision ex- 
plicit, especially the aspect that he is 
free to go back to doing it his old way 
in a moment if he wishes. This is 
done for two reasons; first it is in 
keeping with the "experimental labor- 
atory demonstration" character of our 
interaction. It is like the sort of exper- 
iment students perform in science labs 
in which the format and the instruc- 
tions for how to do the experiment are 
[This conductive conversation is proc- 
ess dialogue, the equivalent of elicit- 
ing and talk-back of a construct grid. 
Truman is elaborating a higher di- 
mensional space in which to conduct 
his next experiment (that is, his next 
micro-PLC) and a non-verbal personal 
language in which to reflect on it. His 
experience of the 'this' referred to 
back in minute 8 now has a more 
highly dimensional meaning. ] 
[The experiment is based on a para- 
doxical strategy, the anticipated out- 
come of which is the impossibility of 
the carrying out the old strategy. In 
this situation there can be great value 
in anticipating the failure of the strat- 
egy as an outcome-and even consen- 
ting to the failure. So this is both 
process and support. By reassuring his 
robot by granting it equal status he is 
supported in the open space where he 
does not know how the experiment 
will turn out. ] 
2-41 
Appendix 2c: Illustrative Sessions Considered as Learning Conversations 
given. It is unlike many of them in 
that these are real experiments whose 
outcomes are unknown until they are 
performed. Secondly, making the 
reversibility explicit opens a working 
space in which,, because any outcome 
is acceptable, true experimentation is 
possible. The actual experiment is 
engaged "hands on" in order to mini- 
mize losses in translation. 
"' 5.5/74.5 min. Truman reports 
a "floatingness" in his neck. I bring 
this physical observation back to the 
wider context by asking if there is 
anything like this "floatingness" in the 
problem when considered from where 
he is now. He decides to "get back 
into it" and tightens slightly as he 
begins to do that. With my hands I re- 
mind him not to get back into it, but to 
consider it from the perspective of his 
new choice. We engage in several 
very small cycles of guided exper- 
imentation. He finds that he can 
mutter his way through a bit of the 
problem with a varying degree of at- 
tention to that new choice. He 
wonders if moving his neck helps him 
to keep the freedom. My reply, 
working with my hands , is yes, in the 
sense that it "'helps you to know what 
kind of quality that movement has, and 
that -makes the choice explicit. " It 
becomes a concrete example of the 
chosen quality which one might seek 
to find in one's torso, or arm, or in the 
problem. 
[Each of these experiments is a PLC, 
freshly negotiated and carried out. 
The reviewed outcomes are cycled 
into the next one at the same task level 
and also into the somewhat less 
explicit higher levels of the conversa- 
tion. Much of the more visible parts 
of those levels occurred in later cycles 
over several months after the taped 
session. ] 
[This "floatingness" becomes a pole of 
a new dimension along which Truman 
decides to reconstruct his experience 
of being ". in the middle of it. " He 
tightens as he begins, however, show- 
ing that the old robot is still at work. 
What follows is a series of close con- 
versational cycles in which the entire 
MA(R)4S process is repeated on the 
scale of seconds. This requires 
threads of support and referent dia- 
logue to be woven in as well. This is 
largely why both the manual and ver- 
bal channels must be in play at once. ] 
[The product of this series is an elabo- 
ration of a dimension of meaning with 
which Truman can make choices 
about his quality of movement in the 
act of thinking that he could not make 
earlier. ] 
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[This is one of the points at which the 
fundamental limitation of a written ac- 
count such as this-or even of a view- 
ing of a videotape-is most stark. Even 
if he could clearly label this dimension 
for verbal purposes, it would be 
merely that, a label. The dimension 
itself, the distinction within the dy- 
namic qualities of his action, is how- 
ever, something which I am observing 
and interacting with in conversation. 
A fair-and possibly vital-question 
could be asked about the perceptual 
dimensions in my own experience by 
which I maintain that interactive 
observation. There are two very 
general qualities in both the visual and 
manual channels: a degree of dynamic 
complexity or dimensionality in the 
mathematical sense used in chaos 
theory-and related to what Truman 
feels as "smoothness, " and a degree of 
Integratedness"-a global correlation 
of the functioning of parts. As a sci- 
entist, I would find a more detailed 
elaboration of these into a set of di- 
mensions of general perceptual mean- 
ings applicable across individuals to 
be of great interest, but as a teacher, I 
wish to resist the temptation to impose 
any such general categories on any of 
the learners with whom I work. I 
prefer to seek the dimensions of 
(conversational meaning" afresh each 
time in conversation. ] 
f 40/79 min. I Truman 
proposes his own experiment of "non- 
verbally" thinking through the prob- 
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lem on his own. He looks as if he is in 
rather unfamiliar territory, but he is 
willing to persist with his experiment. 
There is also a quite noticeable differ- 
ence in his sitting now compared with 
the beginning of the session. His 
CQ report of findings" is quite interest- 
ing. He went along for a while, then 
felt a moment of "panic" during which 
he thought that although this all 
sounded good to him, he would have 
to "go back to the real world" of his 
own desk. He decided to bring his at- 
tention back to himself, however, and 
made a fresh choice. He then brought 
the problem back, and shortly after 
that a rcnew angle" that he hadn't seen 
before "wafted in. " I follow his 
observations with a review of the 
process from my viewpoint as a sort of 
public validation of his, again part of a 
support dialogue and a post-framing of 
what Truman has accomplished in a 
way that may point toward his future 
work, 
j'47/86 min. As we preframe 
the discipline of his future practice on 
his own, I work a bit more with my 
hands in the interest of his leaving the 
session with a clear impression of the 
quality that he has found. 
f 50/89 min. I Truman finishes 
with a new purpose: "To do this and 
come back to you With things that I 
found that are blocking it. " [He subse- 
quently did this and has continued to 
progress through a series of little 
-crises" like this one. ] 
[Truman demonstrates and tests what 
he has learned by taking on his own 
experiment. The MA(R)4S Cycle IS 
clearly in evidence. As he monitors 
what happens as he gets back into his 
writing problem he finds that he has 
improved. But when he begins to 
analyze these results in relation to his 
model of writing, he feels a "panic" at 
the prospect of actually attempting it 
at work. As he reflects on this, how- 
ever, reviewing it in relation to what 
he has been practicing in this session, 
he decides to make a fresh start. He 
brings the problem back to the 
foreground and goes back to moni- 
toring, this time from the perspective 
of the new learning. He is rewarded 
with the new experience of a "new 
angle, " a potential solution to his 
problem, "just wafting in. "] 
[This is referent dialogue, both verbal 
and manual. The specific intention of 
the manual channel is simply to bring 
the psycho-physical conditions explic- 
itly into the conversation once again as 
Truman frames his future strategies. ] 
[Thus he initiates the next major PLC. ] 
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t 51/90 min. I We conclude 
with my question about Truman's im- 
pressions of this whole process in 
relation to the question of discrimina- 
tion with which we began, and his 
concern about his ability to continue 
the process on his own in his own 
world. 
[This is our final review and points 
towards an implied next spiral of the 
conversation. ] 
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ý 0/93 min. I Miriam begins 
directly With a straightforward pur- 
pose. She had practiced a long time 
the previous night and feels as if 
somehow she had "never put [the] 
violin down. " So she says, "I can kind 
of do what I want to do, but not quite. 
There is something in my way. " My 
perspective is that her kinesthetic 
ideas are mixed in with her musical 
ideas. This conversation is about how 
to separate them out in order to find a 
wider range of choice of ways of going 
about playing. I remind Miriam that 
she already has skill at attending to her 
playing Within a context of her coordi- 
nation, at making her coordination 
primary and the playing secondary as 
she plays. She recognizes that she has 
reversed this order and is thus stuck 
with a "package" of interfering ten- 
sions. 
f 2/95 min. I As she consid- 
ers this choice of priority the quality of 
her standing is already noticeably dif- 
ferent. 
[Taken as a whole this session is a 
single task-focused learning conversa- 
tion. Our negotiation of purpose is 
straightforward as Miriam has a spe- 
cific purpose-to finally "put down the 
violin. " This is nested in an ongoing 
general purpose of learning to gradu- 
ally have less of the "something in my 
way" so that she can more easily do 
what she wants to do musically. ] 
[The specific learning task is to be- 
come more skilled as distinguishing 
the kinesthetic and motor dimensions 
from the musical in order to enhance 
her range of choice. This leads us di- 
rectly to the Conditions phase of our 
modified PLC. Attention to the con- 
ditions within which a "robot" oper- 
ates is always a challenge to it. Thus 
this conditions phase is closely related 
to the process dialogue. My reminder 
of what Minam "already knows" is 
both a bit of support dialogue and a 
recruiting of her past learning into the 
present process. ] 
[This consideration of conditions is 
already a Strategic step that leads to an 
immediate Outcome. This is thus a 
cycle of learning conversation the next 
step of which is to elaborate the di- 
mensions of the criteria by which she 
evaluates the outcome. This process 
differs from the usual form of PLC in 
that bringing the conditions phase 
explicitly into the process-especially 
regarding the psycho-physical condi- 
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I ask her to play with that difference. 
She observes that her playing is "some 
better. " So I ask what., in particular, is 
better, and what she means by "some. " 
She replies that there was "less inter- 
ference between my musical idea and 
what's actually coming out, " but that 
her hands are still cold and she can 
still feel that though she can do what 
she needs to, "something is not good. " 
This something is a "something in 
general" which seems to related to her 
having played, a something extra that, 
since she didn't really need it, was all 
too easy to retain. 
14.5/97.5 min. I The first experi- 
ment begins With my request that she 
find a quality in her balance as she 
stands which is the quality she wants 
in her playing, and also a quality 
which is what she had felt as restrict- 
edness in her playing before. She 
finds these qualities and reports that 
they are "the opposite ends of the 
same things. " She has found a clear 
example of a dimension in her experi- 
ence,, with these two qualities defining 
points on a "line. " 
tions-leads to a new kind of referent 
dialogue. ] 
[The Strategy of the whole session it- 
self is to engage in a progressive series 
of experimental cycles. I propose 
strategies relating to conditions and 
process and as she proceeds Miriam 
gets better at observing, reporting and 
applying her experimental results 
(these could as well be labeled Moni- 
toring, Recording and Recycling). ] 
[Minam, knows what I am referring to 
by this "something in general. " It is a 
bit of conversational meaning deriving 
from our prior sessions. ] 
[This request brings the continuity of 
meaning across different domains into 
the conversation as she carries out the 
experiment. Miriam establishes in her 
experience a dimension of meaning 
independent of the particular domain 
(kinesthetic, auditory etc. ). She finds 
in her Monitored experience dimen- 
sions of a Reconstruction beyýond an 
implicit model in which movement, 
sound etc. are separate categories of 
meaning. ] 
[This is very significant point in the 
conversation. Different construals of 
one's purpose-or different process 
models-will imply different strategies, 
indeed different types of strategy. 
Here we have Recycled the results of 
her experiment back to a refraining of 
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Her purpose now can be expressed as 
to move farther in one direction on 
that line, toward something which is 
more like one quality and less like the 
other. The experiment is to think of 
giving consent to moving along that 
line as an act, and using what she 
knows about allowing a change in how 
her head and body move as the way 
that act is to be performed. Her 
Alexander-based skill thus provides a 
means toward a specific, dimensional 
end. Nfiriam does this and reports that 
she does seem to have more of the 
quality she wants. 
f 6.5/99.5 min. I She repeats the 
procedure, using moving in that way 
as the initiation of her bow coming up. 
This movement is differentl but she 
wants to reserve judgment until she 
plays. But that is the "end. " I review 
what she has just done. The test of it, 
in her terms, will be whether she can 
continue it as she plays. The 
hypothesis is that if she does, that 
quality will be in the music as well. 
f 8/101 min. I The full experi- 
ment at this point is for Miriam to 
think about the musical version of that 
same quality, how she will know when 
she hears it-this is the same dimen- 
sional end in an extended context-to 
repeat the procedure of finding the 
quality she wants in her standing and 
purpose in dimensional terms. 
Throughout our conversation we are 
generally following the phases of a 
PLC while spinning off subtasks of 
varying scales. This is necessary to 
sustain the continuity of the conver- 
sation with the embodied conditions in 
which Miriam pursues her purpose. ] 
[Each of these little experiments is a 
complete PLC in which Miriam 
frames her purpose and strategy in the 
protocol of the experiment, performs it 
in anticipation of an outcome in terms 
of her experimental hypothesis, and 
then reflects on the relation between 
her purpose and what she actually 
observes happening. In each case we 
are engaged in process dialogue based 
on our combined observation-I can 
see her monitoring her performance 
and outcomes. Elements of support 
are supplied by my comments and 
questions (questions can often be 
supportive in their implied validation 
of the questionee's observations), and 
sometimes by my hands. ] 
[This change then provides the new 
conditions for a new performance] 
[This experiment is one of the clearest 
the instances of a characteristic small 
scale conversational structure in the 
session. This conductive conversation 
is a curious synthesis of a PLC and 
"non-doing" approach to strategy. It 
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then using that to initiate the move- 
Merit of bringing her bow up, and then 
to simply think of the playing as the 
continuation of the same movement. I 
leave observation of the changes in her 
standing and her playing for the 
viewer. 
f 9/102 min. I She is "greedy. " 
She wants it all. The difficulty when 
she plays this game by herself is that 
she wants ((. all of it right away. " This 
leads us to a discussion of "altogether, 
one after the other" in relation to the 
various "shortcuts" that we always 
seem to be seeking. (We did come to 
a more satisfying resolution of this 
discussion after the session. ) 
But I bring the question back to the 
playing, and specifically how It was 
less than satisfying,, that is, if she 
played again and it was "better, " how 
would it be specifically different. I am 
seeking a dimension of her meaning of 
better. 
involves a clear, dimensional specifi- 
cation of purpose and outcome, but in 
a sense explicitly sets aside the 
question of strategy (although of 
course, the whole of it is strategic at a 
larger scale). This evaluative recon- 
struction of the musical task in terms 
of the shared dimension is a basis for 
consenting to play in a way that she 
"does not know. " She does not "do" 
anything to produce the sound quality 
she wants but relies on the continuity 
of the whole phenomenon from which 
it was abstracted. ] 
[This is a bit of the learning-to-leam 
level conversation about how Miriam 
applies these ideas in practice on her 
own. Our principle that says we can 
have it all, if we can "ask for it in the 
right order" relates to Miriam's desire 
to get beyond the specific dimensions 
in practice-and back to the continuity 
of whole performance. It is a matter 
of finding a conception of the whole 
task which is sufficiently elaborate. ] 
[We come back to the task-focused 
process dialogue. The intent of the 
cycle is to find more dimensions in 
Miriam's idea of what she wants to 
leam. It is a straightforward Recon- 
struction within the MA(R)4S model 
reflected back onto the Purpose phase 
of the PLC. ] 
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12/105 min. ) Miriam finds 
the difference most clearly in a quality 
in her bow changes and in a musical 
quality she calls "depth. "' I check to 
be sure that the label clearly refers to a 
perceptual dimension in the sound. 
Miriam notes that "in physical 
terms ... 
I haven't brought my legs 
along. " We agree that bringing them 
along would be another expression of 
more "depth. " 
This is the idea of the qualitative unity 
of experience. Her musical idea, her 
auditory idea and her kinesthetic idea 
are distinct categories, but the same 
quality is present in each, and is 
indeed what knits them together into a 
whole experience. It is thus an 
attention to that single unifying quality 
by which she can organize her action 
in such a way that she can rely on the 
coordination of herself as a whole sys- 
tem. This idea leads to the next ex- 
periment, which begins, as many do, 
with "think about ...... 
f 14/107 min. I "Think about 
r(more depth"... what is it ... in the 
movement at the point of each bow 
change that would count as more 
depth. "' 
The experiment is to repeat what she 
has done, with that thought in mind. 
The whole quality of how she brings 
her violin up is quite different-as is 
her playing. 
[As Miriam monitors her playing, each 
bow change is an event which reveals 
significant differences in quality in 
contrast with other moments. The 
purpose of the check is to make 
explicit that the label is just a label 
and that it refers to a clear musical 
dimension in her experience. Her 
observation of the difference "in 
physical terms" can then (in personal 
construct theory terms) be brought into 
the range of convenience of the depth 
construct. ] 
[This is the central issue of leaming in 
an embodied way. The conversation 
at this point is explicitly "conductive" 
as it is focused on the continuity of the 
psycho-physical conditions, and thus 
the qualitative unity of the experience. 
The dimension "depth" then becomes, 
in Radley's term, a vestibule through 
which Miriam experiences herself in 
the act of playing. This is again 
"conditions dialogue"' and is a central 
instance of how this dialogue leads to 
a psycho-physical referent dialogue. ] 
[In this little Recycling Miriam's 
monitoring, specifically focused 
through the dimension of "depth" 
constitutes something of a personal 
paradigm shift, a different kind of 
observing. ] 
[Minam runs the experience "through 
the model. " As she does my 
experience of her and her music takes 
on a quality for which "depth" seems 
an appropriate label. I point it out in 
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117/110 min. The "hire any 
musician in the world" game: I claim 
that the musical intention comes in at 
two points, before the act of play- 
ing-so there is a clear idea of what 
you want-and in the act of playing, at 
the very end. Having this intention 
clear,, and not entangled with 
kinesthetic preconceptions about how 
to produce it., is a matter of 
abstraction. My little strategic game 
for being clear in this is to imagine 
hiring any musician in the world to 
play the piece, as many times as 
needed until they get it just the way 
you want it, and think only about how 
you will know when they have, to 
think in purely musical, auditory etc. 
terms. Miriam plays this game, builds 
her musical idea and then sets it aside 
and attends to her coordination in the 
act of playing. 
I use my hands in the conversation to 
bring the movement dimensions 
clearly to the foreground of Miriam 1) s 
attention- 
order to bring that conversational 
meaning into Miriam's awareness. 
The recognition is both support and a 
dimension of her evaluation criteria. ] 
[This game is presented as a process 
model of the relation between the 
dimensionality of artistic intention and 
the continuity of performance as a 
psycho-physically whole action. I 
offer the model, which Miriam has 
played with before, not to impose any 
dimensions of mine, but as a useful 
frame for her use of her own. ] 
[I have not done so until this point 
because Miriam has been conversing 
quite well without them, and in order 
to steer clear of a characteristic source 
of confusion. Because we are in 
general relatively unaware of the 
dimensions of our experience that the 
manual channel of the conversation is 
about, we tend to have the sensory im- 
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f 19.5/112.5 min. I Minam plays 
with this idea and finds that the music 
had some parts of what she wanted, 
and not others. Of the important parts, 
she "missed one. " The next cycle is to 
think about that one missing part, that 
is, about the one way in which the 
playing would be different with that 
part in place. She is also aware of the 
aspect of her general movement that 
seemed to be interfering with it. So I 
suggest playing with the intention of 
moving in such a way as to allow that 
particular musical dimension to be 
more the way she wants it, while giv- 
Ing up any preconception of how that 
will happen. 
pression that events that follow some- 
one's hands being on us were caused 
by them. Miriam has become conver- 
sant enough for this manual conversa- 
tion to proceed in a more balanced and 
fluent manner than was possible with 
Truman, for example. At this point 
then, my hands become just an 
alternate way of asking my questions 
about quality. ] 
[Miriam has unconscious ideas about 
what she must to do with her back,, 
legs etc. in order to stand, or hold up 
her violin, which are in conflict with 
the results she wants. The dimen- 
sional questions I ask with my hands 
at this point are the simplest way to 
challenge the construction of these 
ideas. ] 
[This is another formal bit of process 
dialogue. Attending to the dimensions 
of her own observation, Miriam is now 
monitoring her performance in terms 
of a more precise and elaborate frame 
of reference. She is evaluating the 
event in terms of a reconstructed 
concept of her task. By focusing on 
the single dimension represented by 
the part she "missed, " a different sort 
of "all else being equal, 11) she is able to 
recycle back into her performance. 
The final bit of process, in which she 
plays with the continuity in a sense,, 
"model free, " her own attention to the 
key quality becomes itself a condition 
within which she acts. ] 
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PI/114 min. ) Beginning by 
"finding" the quality she wants in her 
mid-back and her legs, Miriam per- 
forms one more experimental cycle. I 
continue conversing with my hands 
while she plays in order to help keep 
all of the dimensions present. With 
my hands on her knees I can feel when 
she is moving with the quality that she 
wants, though I do not know in any 
prior sense what that quality IS. I only 
find out in conversation, but that con- 
versation also gives Miriam a refer- 
ence frame in which she can make 
specific choices. 
[I use my hands again to insure that 
the conversation is conductive, saying 
as I do, "you want that quality right 
here, " as an invitation to Miriam to 
clearly "find" her key dimension in 
that location in order to expand her 
conscious perception of it to other 
domains. It is a microscopic review of 
the entire process. Miriam"s knee is 
merely a convenient reference point in 
her monitoring of the process. (Part of 
what makes it convenient is that her 
idea of how she must use her knee in 
standing to play is connected to her 
underlying model of her own 
functioning, embodied in her standing. 
We are not directly addressing the 
construction of that model in this 
conversation, however. ) ] 
It is significant at this point that she 
could have designed and performed 
this experiment entirely on her own. 
The utility of my assistance, both in 
setting up the explicit experimental 
plan and in continuing the manual 
conversation while she carried it out, 
is in increasing the resolution of the 
distinctions that she is able to make 
and the clarity of the experience, 
which I anticipate will bear their fruit 
as she reflects on the experience on 
her own later. 
f 24/117 min. I We finish by 
observing how Miriam is in relation to 
her observations at the beginning. She 
has succeeded in expressing her 
musical intention and at the same time 
[This is in a sense a bit of unneeded 
process dialogue. Miriam has shown 
herself to be quite able to guide herself 
through the process at this level. The 
point at which the entire psycho- 
physical thread of the conversation 
which I am calling the conditions 
dialogue maps onto the teaming 
conversation model is in the referent 
dialogue. Because Miriam can carry 
the process as well as she can, my 
intention here is to bring that process 
to a finer level of perceptual detail. ] 
[Considering the entire session as a 
single learning conversation in which 
the first part negotiated Purpose and 
the main body was a series of conver- 
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her physical restrictions are no longer 
Present. Her playing, both the 
qualities we can hear from the violin 
and those we can see in her movement 
as she plays, are markedly different 
from what was observable at the 
beginning of the session. 
c: Illustrative Sessions Considered as Learning Conversations 
sational cycles representing Strategy 
and Outcome stages of a PLC, this is 
the final Review stage. The questions 
that this very brief section needs to 
answer are: 
Has Miriam leamed what she set out 
to leam? Le. has she met her Purpose? 
Has she become more skilled at 
navigating the process? 
Is she more self-organized? 
At the leaming-to-leam level there is a 
question of her appreciation of the 
relationship between her work and my 
assistance-what she can do on her 
own and how she can recruit my aid 
when she wants it. 
In both her personal terms and mine 
all of these questions are answered in 
the affirmative. (This conclusion was 
later venfied by the way in which the 
leaming in this session was spiraled 
into later sessions relating to quite 
subtle tasks. )] 
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APPENDtx 3: ILLUSTRATIVE SESSIONS: THE TAPES 
3a: Videotape of Sessions [ 189 min. ] 
3b: Audiotape of Five Year Retrospective Interview [90 min. ] 
